From 259d9621ba2d1914c835d213a8ba2490facc2705 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joseph Doherty <dohejw01@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 09:59:31 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] feat(adminui): gate the Secrets rail link on the page's own
 policy
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The /admin/secrets link was already in the side rail, but ungated — every
authenticated user saw it, and a Designer/Operator clicking it was bounced by
the page's own [Authorize(Policy = SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy)]. Hide
the advertised dead end.

Gated on that same policy constant rather than Roles="Administrator". The two
are equivalent today (the RCL's AdminRole is "Administrator", read off the same
ClaimTypes.Role claim FleetAdmin uses), so this is not about reach — it is that
the rail cannot drift if the RCL ever changes its policy.

Live-gated on docker-dev, both directions, because the positive half alone
proves nothing here: the link rendered for an admin BEFORE this change too, so
"admin still sees it" is satisfied equally by a working gate and by an inert
one. Negative control — gate swapped to Roles="NoSuchRoleFalsifyProbe", rebuilt,
item went to 0 while /role-grants and /apikeys stayed at 1 (the item is hidden,
not the rail broken). Restored build hashed to the same image ID as the
pre-falsification one, proving the restore was byte-exact. This also rules out
AuthorizeView being inert inside ThemeShell's <Nav> slot under this host's
static router, which would have silently hidden the link from everyone.

SecretsNavLinkTests covers it in the AdminUI's actual idiom — source scan +
metadata cross-check, NOT bUnit (the bunit PackageVersion pin has zero
PackageReferences repo-wide). The load-bearing assertion is index ordering
(AuthorizeView open < NavRailItem < close): a scan that merely finds both tags
in the file passes when they are not nested, which is the ungated state.

Scope: Secrets only. /role-grants and /apikeys are FleetAdmin (Administrator-
only) too and stay visible to everyone, so the rail is now inconsistent —
deliberate, as hiding those is a UX call for the whole rail rather than
something to smuggle into this change. Noted in the markup.

Family-wide task from the scadaproj index session (ScadaBridge ee193cd2,
ignitionoee 3627bb8, HistorianGateway 58b6418, mxgw 87d575d).
---
 .../Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor        |  14 ++-
 .../SecretsNavLinkTests.cs                    | 107 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs

diff --git a/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor b/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor
index 5f90d348..4b89dd6b 100644
--- a/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor
+++ b/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor
@@ -25,7 +25,19 @@
             <NavRailItem Href="/certificates" Text="Certificates" />
             <NavRailItem Href="/role-grants" Text="Role grants" />
             <NavRailItem Href="/apikeys" Text="API keys" />
-            <NavRailItem Href="/admin/secrets" Text="Secrets" />
+            @* Gated on the page's OWN policy constant, not Roles="Administrator", so the rail
+               can never drift from what the page actually admits (pinned by SecretsNavLinkTests).
+               ManagePolicy resolves to AdminRole "Administrator" over the same ClaimTypes.Role
+               claim FleetAdmin reads.
+
+               NOTE this is currently the ONLY gated item, and the rail is therefore inconsistent:
+               /role-grants and /apikeys are FleetAdmin (Administrator-only) too and stay visible
+               to everyone, i.e. still advertised dead ends for a Designer/Operator. That is a
+               deliberate scope boundary, not an oversight — hiding them is a UX call for the
+               whole rail, filed as a follow-up rather than smuggled in here. *@
+            <AuthorizeView Policy="@ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui.SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy">
+                <NavRailItem Href="/admin/secrets" Text="Secrets" />
+            </AuthorizeView>
         </NavRailSection>
         <NavRailSection Title="Scripting" Key="scripting">
             <NavRailItem Href="/scripts" Text="Scripts" />
diff --git a/tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs b/tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d9327b08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+using System.Reflection;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
+using Shouldly;
+using Xunit;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Components.Pages;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Pins the side-rail link to <c>/admin/secrets</c> and its role gate. The page has worked since
+///     lmxopcua#483, but reachability is a separate property from correctness: before this, the only
+///     way to the secrets UI was typing the URL, which is the same orphaned-surface shape as Gitea
+///     #546 (<see cref="HostsPanelWiringTests"/>) — everything builds, tests and deploys while no
+///     user can get there.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     Source scan rather than a rendering assertion: the repo has no bUnit (the central
+///     <c>PackageVersion</c> for it is referenced by no project), and razor layout markup — unlike
+///     a page's <c>@page</c>/<c>@attribute</c> directives — does not survive into class metadata
+///     any form a reflection guard can read. So this proves the link and its gate are *written*;
+///     that the gate actually admits an Administrator and hides the item from a Designer is
+///     live-verified on the docker-dev rig, per this repo's Razor convention.
+/// </remarks>
+[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
+public sealed class SecretsNavLinkTests
+{
+    private const string NavItem = "<NavRailItem Href=\"/admin/secrets\"";
+
+    private static string ReadMainLayoutSource()
+    {
+        var dir = new DirectoryInfo(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
+        while (dir is not null && !File.Exists(Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx")))
+            dir = dir.Parent;
+        dir.ShouldNotBeNull("could not locate the repository root (no ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx above the test binary)");
+
+        return File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(
+            dir!.FullName, "src", "Server", "ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI",
+            "Components", "Layout", "MainLayout.razor"));
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>The reachability pin: without this the secrets UI is URL-only.</summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void The_rail_links_to_the_secrets_page()
+    {
+        ReadMainLayoutSource().ShouldContain(
+            NavItem,
+            Case.Sensitive,
+            customMessage:
+                "the side rail no longer links to /admin/secrets — the secrets UI is reachable " +
+                "only by typing the URL, which is how it shipped before this test existed");
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     The link must sit INSIDE the AuthorizeView, not merely somewhere in the same file — an
+    ///     unnested pair would leave the item visible to every authenticated user while reading, to
+    ///     a scan for both strings, exactly like a gated one. Ordering is the strongest structural
+    ///     claim a text scan can make; whether the gate actually hides the item is live-verified.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void The_secrets_link_is_nested_inside_the_authorize_view()
+    {
+        var source = ReadMainLayoutSource();
+
+        var open = source.IndexOf("<AuthorizeView Policy=", StringComparison.Ordinal);
+        var item = source.IndexOf(NavItem, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+        var close = source.IndexOf("</AuthorizeView>", open + 1, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+
+        open.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(0, "the rail has no policy-gated AuthorizeView at all");
+        close.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(0, "the gating AuthorizeView is never closed");
+        item.ShouldBeInRange(open, close,
+            "the /admin/secrets rail item is outside the AuthorizeView — it is visible to every " +
+            "authenticated user, and a scan that only looked for both tags would not notice");
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     The gate must be expressed as the page's own policy constant. <c>Roles="Administrator"</c>
+    ///     or a "secrets:manage" literal would render identically today and then silently drift the
+    ///     moment the RCL changed its policy — the rail would advertise a page that rejects the user,
+    ///     or hide one that would have admitted them, with nothing failing.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void The_gate_is_the_pages_own_policy_constant_not_a_role_or_a_literal()
+    {
+        var source = ReadMainLayoutSource();
+
+        source.ShouldContain("SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy", Case.Sensitive);
+        source.ShouldNotContain($"\"{SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy}\"", Case.Sensitive,
+            customMessage: "the rail hard-codes the policy string instead of referencing the constant");
+        source.ShouldNotContain("<AuthorizeView Roles=", Case.Sensitive,
+            customMessage: "the rail gates on a role name instead of the page's policy");
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Cross-check that the constant the rail references is the one the page actually enforces.
+    ///     The two assertions above are satisfiable by a rail gated on a policy no page uses; this is
+    ///     what makes them mean "the rail shows exactly who the page will admit".
+    /// </summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void The_rails_policy_is_the_one_the_page_enforces()
+    {
+        var page = typeof(SecretsAdmin).GetCustomAttributes<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: false).Single();
+
+        page.Policy.ShouldBe(SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy,
+            "the rail gates on SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy, so the page must enforce it");
+    }
+}