diff --git a/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor b/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor index 5f90d348..4b89dd6b 100644 --- a/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor +++ b/src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor @@ -25,7 +25,19 @@ - + @* Gated on the page's OWN policy constant, not Roles="Administrator", so the rail + can never drift from what the page actually admits (pinned by SecretsNavLinkTests). + ManagePolicy resolves to AdminRole "Administrator" over the same ClaimTypes.Role + claim FleetAdmin reads. + + NOTE this is currently the ONLY gated item, and the rail is therefore inconsistent: + /role-grants and /apikeys are FleetAdmin (Administrator-only) too and stay visible + to everyone, i.e. still advertised dead ends for a Designer/Operator. That is a + deliberate scope boundary, not an oversight — hiding them is a UX call for the + whole rail, filed as a follow-up rather than smuggled in here. *@ + + + diff --git a/tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs b/tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9327b08 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests/SecretsNavLinkTests.cs @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +using System.Reflection; +using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization; +using Shouldly; +using Xunit; +using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Components.Pages; +using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui; + +namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.AdminUI.Tests; + +/// +/// Pins the side-rail link to /admin/secrets and its role gate. The page has worked since +/// lmxopcua#483, but reachability is a separate property from correctness: before this, the only +/// way to the secrets UI was typing the URL, which is the same orphaned-surface shape as Gitea +/// #546 () — everything builds, tests and deploys while no +/// user can get there. +/// +/// +/// Source scan rather than a rendering assertion: the repo has no bUnit (the central +/// PackageVersion for it is referenced by no project), and razor layout markup — unlike +/// a page's @page/@attribute directives — does not survive into class metadata +/// any form a reflection guard can read. So this proves the link and its gate are *written*; +/// that the gate actually admits an Administrator and hides the item from a Designer is +/// live-verified on the docker-dev rig, per this repo's Razor convention. +/// +[Trait("Category", "Unit")] +public sealed class SecretsNavLinkTests +{ + private const string NavItem = "The reachability pin: without this the secrets UI is URL-only. + [Fact] + public void The_rail_links_to_the_secrets_page() + { + ReadMainLayoutSource().ShouldContain( + NavItem, + Case.Sensitive, + customMessage: + "the side rail no longer links to /admin/secrets — the secrets UI is reachable " + + "only by typing the URL, which is how it shipped before this test existed"); + } + + /// + /// The link must sit INSIDE the AuthorizeView, not merely somewhere in the same file — an + /// unnested pair would leave the item visible to every authenticated user while reading, to + /// a scan for both strings, exactly like a gated one. Ordering is the strongest structural + /// claim a text scan can make; whether the gate actually hides the item is live-verified. + /// + [Fact] + public void The_secrets_link_is_nested_inside_the_authorize_view() + { + var source = ReadMainLayoutSource(); + + var open = source.IndexOf("", open + 1, StringComparison.Ordinal); + + open.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(0, "the rail has no policy-gated AuthorizeView at all"); + close.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(0, "the gating AuthorizeView is never closed"); + item.ShouldBeInRange(open, close, + "the /admin/secrets rail item is outside the AuthorizeView — it is visible to every " + + "authenticated user, and a scan that only looked for both tags would not notice"); + } + + /// + /// The gate must be expressed as the page's own policy constant. Roles="Administrator" + /// or a "secrets:manage" literal would render identically today and then silently drift the + /// moment the RCL changed its policy — the rail would advertise a page that rejects the user, + /// or hide one that would have admitted them, with nothing failing. + /// + [Fact] + public void The_gate_is_the_pages_own_policy_constant_not_a_role_or_a_literal() + { + var source = ReadMainLayoutSource(); + + source.ShouldContain("SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy", Case.Sensitive); + source.ShouldNotContain($"\"{SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy}\"", Case.Sensitive, + customMessage: "the rail hard-codes the policy string instead of referencing the constant"); + source.ShouldNotContain(" + /// Cross-check that the constant the rail references is the one the page actually enforces. + /// The two assertions above are satisfiable by a rail gated on a policy no page uses; this is + /// what makes them mean "the rail shows exactly who the page will admit". + /// + [Fact] + public void The_rails_policy_is_the_one_the_page_enforces() + { + var page = typeof(SecretsAdmin).GetCustomAttributes(inherit: false).Single(); + + page.Policy.ShouldBe(SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy, + "the rail gates on SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy, so the page must enforce it"); + } +}