fix(opcua): parallel UserName activations wait for a slot instead of being refused (#833)
A legitimate consumer opening several keyed sessions at once from one key (e.g. a ScadaBridge site node behind one NAT IP on a None endpoint) must never see BadUserAccessDenied for parallelism. BeginAsync now hands out at most MaxFailedAttempts - recordedFailures verification slots per key; further activations queue FIFO and are woken as slots free. A waiter is refused only when the key locks out (never reaching the authenticator) or, uncounted, after OpcUa:CredentialLockout:SlotWaitSeconds (default 10, BadTimeout). Cancelled waiters are dequeued; pruning accounts for waiters. The security property is unchanged: no more than MaxFailedAttempts unverified guesses in progress-or-failed per window.
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@@ -338,19 +338,22 @@ The host now sets `MaxFailedAuthenticationAttempts = 0` on every configuration i
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always starts a fresh count**, whatever `FailureWindowSeconds` is; a successful UserName activation clears the
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count. **Anonymous activations never consult it**, from any client. The first refusal of each lockout episode
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is logged at Information, the rest at Debug.
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- **Parallel activations are held to the threshold.** The check reserves an in-flight slot under the same lock,
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and a client whose recorded failures plus in-progress UserName activations already reach
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`MaxFailedAttempts` is refused (`BadUserAccessDenied`, "too many authentication attempts in progress"), so a
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burst cannot slip past the check before its first failure is recorded. ⚠️ The same rule caps a **legitimate**
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client at `MaxFailedAttempts` concurrent UserName activations (the check is milliseconds, so this only bites a
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burst of simultaneous session opens from one key).
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- **Parallel activations wait — they are never refused for parallelism.** A client gets at most
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`MaxFailedAttempts − recordedFailures` verification **slots**; a UserName activation beyond that **queues** (FIFO)
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until one frees, so no more than `MaxFailedAttempts` unverified guesses are ever in progress-or-failed per window,
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while a legitimate consumer opening many keyed sessions at once (e.g. a ScadaBridge site node behind one NAT IP on a
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`None` endpoint) just waits milliseconds and is admitted. A waiter is refused only when the key actually **locks
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out** (`BadUserAccessDenied`, without reaching the authenticator), or after `SlotWaitSeconds` (default 10)
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with `BadTimeout` — **not** counted as a credential failure. A cancelled activation leaves the queue and frees
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any slot it held.
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- **Keyed on certificate thumbprint *and* peer address together.** That separates clients only when they present
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a certificate. ⚠️ On a `None` endpoint clients commonly present none, so the key is **effectively the IP alone**:
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NAT neighbours there **do** share one count (for UserName activations only — never for anonymous ones). When the
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transport reports no peer address at all, every certificate-less client shares the single key `-@-`. (Observed on
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docker-dev: every host client arrives as `-@192.168.97.1`.)
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- **Validated at host start:** with `MaxFailedAttempts > 0`, both `LockoutSeconds` and `FailureWindowSeconds` must be
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`> 0` (`OpcUaApplicationHostOptionsValidator`); `MaxFailedAttempts <= 0` disables the lockout.
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- **Validated at host start:** with `MaxFailedAttempts > 0`, `LockoutSeconds`, `FailureWindowSeconds` and
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`SlotWaitSeconds` must all be `> 0` (`OpcUaApplicationHostOptionsValidator`); `MaxFailedAttempts <= 0` disables
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the lockout.
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- Every denial counts, including a key-store timeout or miss-budget refusal (as the SDK's did) — a ConfigDb
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outage can therefore lock a keyed client out for up to `LockoutSeconds` after recovery.
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- Bounded at 4096 tracked clients (expired entries are pruned; a client arriving at a full table is not
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