dohertj2/lmxopcua
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests 1 Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Docs audit — fill gaps so the top-level docs/ reference matches shipped code

Browse Source 
Audit of docs/ against src/ surfaced shipped features without current-reference
coverage (FOCAS CLI, Core.Scripting+VirtualTags, Core.ScriptedAlarms,
Core.AlarmHistorian), an out-of-date driver count + capability matrix, ADR-002's
virtual-tag dispatch not reflected in data-path docs, broken cross-references,
and OpcUaServerReqs declaring OPC-020..022 that were never scoped. This commit
closes all of those so operators + integrators can stay inside docs/ without
falling back to v2/implementation/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-04-23 09:42:42 -04:00
parent 5fc596a9a1
commit 21e0fdd4cd
13 changed files with 534 additions and 13 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

12
docs/ReadWriteOperations.md
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,16 @@
`DriverNodeManager` (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/DriverNodeManager.cs`) wires the OPC UA stack's per-variable `OnReadValue` and `OnWriteValue` hooks to each driver's `IReadable` and `IWritable` capabilities. Every dispatch flows through `CapabilityInvoker` so the Polly pipeline (retry / timeout / breaker / bulkhead) applies uniformly across Galaxy, Modbus, S7, AB CIP, AB Legacy, TwinCAT, FOCAS, and OPC UA Client drivers.
## Driver vs virtual dispatch
Per [ADR-002](v2/implementation/adr-002-driver-vs-virtual-dispatch.md), a single `DriverNodeManager` routes reads and writes across both driver-sourced and virtual (scripted) tags. At discovery time each variable registers a `NodeSourceKind` (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions/DriverAttributeInfo.cs`) in the manager's `_sourceByFullRef` lookup; the read/write hooks pattern-match on that value to pick the backend:
- `NodeSourceKind.Driver` — dispatches to the driver's `IReadable` / `IWritable` through `CapabilityInvoker` (the rest of this doc).
- `NodeSourceKind.Virtual` — dispatches to `VirtualTagSource` (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.VirtualTags/VirtualTagSource.cs`), which wraps `VirtualTagEngine`. Writes are rejected with `BadUserAccessDenied` before the branch per Phase 7 decision #6 — scripts are the only write path into virtual tags.
- `NodeSourceKind.ScriptedAlarm` — dispatches to the Phase 7 `ScriptedAlarmReadable` shim.
ACL enforcement (`WriteAuthzPolicy` + `AuthorizationGate`) runs before the source branch, so the gates below apply uniformly to all three source kinds.
## OnReadValue
The hook is registered on every `BaseDataVariableState` created by the `IAddressSpaceBuilder.Variable(...)` call during discovery. When the stack dispatches a Read for a node in this namespace:
@@ -20,7 +30,7 @@ The hook is synchronous — the async invoker call is bridged with `AsTask().Get
### Authorization (two layers)
1. **SecurityClassification gate.** Every variable stores its `SecurityClassification` in `_securityByFullRef` at registration time (populated from `DriverAttributeInfo.SecurityClass`). `WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(classification, userRoles)` runs first, consulting the session's roles via `context.UserIdentity is IRoleBearer`. `FreeAccess` passes anonymously, `ViewOnly` denies everyone, and `Operate / Tune / Configure / SecuredWrite / VerifiedWrite` require `WriteOperate / WriteTune / WriteConfigure` roles respectively. Denial returns `BadUserAccessDenied` without consulting the driver — drivers never enforce ACLs themselves; they only report classification as discovery metadata (feedback `feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md`).
1. **SecurityClassification gate.** Every variable stores its `SecurityClassification` in `_securityByFullRef` at registration time (populated from `DriverAttributeInfo.SecurityClass`). `WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(classification, userRoles)` runs first, consulting the session's roles via `context.UserIdentity is IRoleBearer`. `FreeAccess` passes anonymously, `ViewOnly` denies everyone, and `Operate / Tune / Configure / SecuredWrite / VerifiedWrite` require `WriteOperate / WriteTune / WriteConfigure` roles respectively. Denial returns `BadUserAccessDenied` without consulting the driver — drivers never enforce ACLs themselves; they only report classification as discovery metadata (see `docs/security.md`).
2. **Phase 6.2 permission-trie gate.** When `AuthorizationGate` is wired, it re-runs with the operation derived from `WriteAuthzPolicy.ToOpcUaOperation(classification)`. The gate consults the per-cluster permission trie loaded from `NodeAcl` rows, enforcing fine-grained per-tag ACLs on top of the role-based classification policy. See `docs/v2/acl-design.md`.
### Dispatch