Docs audit — fill gaps so the top-level docs/ reference matches shipped code
Audit of docs/ against src/ surfaced shipped features without current-reference coverage (FOCAS CLI, Core.Scripting+VirtualTags, Core.ScriptedAlarms, Core.AlarmHistorian), an out-of-date driver count + capability matrix, ADR-002's virtual-tag dispatch not reflected in data-path docs, broken cross-references, and OpcUaServerReqs declaring OPC-020..022 that were never scoped. This commit closes all of those so operators + integrators can stay inside docs/ without falling back to v2/implementation/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The driver's mapping is authoritative — when a field type is ambiguous (a `LRE
|
||||
|
||||
## SecurityClassification — metadata, not ACL
|
||||
|
||||
`SecurityClassification` is driver-reported metadata only. Drivers never enforce write permissions themselves — the classification flows into the Server project where `WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(classification, userRoles)` (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/WriteAuthzPolicy.cs`) gates the write against the session's LDAP-derived roles, and (Phase 6.2) the `AuthorizationGate` + permission trie apply on top. This is the "ACL at server layer" invariant recorded in `feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md`.
|
||||
`SecurityClassification` is driver-reported metadata only. Drivers never enforce write permissions themselves — the classification flows into the Server project where `WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(classification, userRoles)` (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/WriteAuthzPolicy.cs`) gates the write against the session's LDAP-derived roles, and (Phase 6.2) the `AuthorizationGate` + permission trie apply on top. This is the "ACL at server layer" invariant documented in `docs/security.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
The classification values mirror the v1 Galaxy model so existing Galaxy galaxies keep their published semantics:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user