feat(historian): #674 HistoryUpdate posture — future-skew bound, Primary gate, SqlServer v1 accepted, QuestDB TTL pin

- HistoryUpdate items with SourceTimestamp > now + ServerHistorian:HistoryUpdateMaxFutureSkew
  (default 1 day, <=0 disables) => BadOutOfRange in the node manager (every backend, never sent);
  clock injected via OtOpcUaNodeManager.Clock (host TimeProvider).
- HistoryUpdate is Primary-only: off-Primary => BadInvalidState per node, after authorization,
  same IDriverPrimaryRoleSource verdict as the native-ack gate; HistoryRead ungated.
- SqlServer: base schema requirement back to v1; SupportsModifiedTrail (v>=2). On v1 with
  AutoCreateSchema=false: writes/reads/events/retention work, modified reads + HistoryUpdate =>
  BadHistoryOperationUnsupported with nothing sent, retention skips SampleModified, one Warning per boot.
- QuestDB integration test pinning wall-clock TTL (far-future row evicts only partitions older
  than the TTL by the wall clock), with a positive control.
- Docs: Historian.md, Configuration.md, security.md, CLAUDE.md (incl. QuestDB retry duplicates,
  #674.4 anonymous-readable trail with ACL off, #674.5 not implemented).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/security.md

@@ -884,6 +884,7 @@ HistoryUpdate rewrites recorded history, so unlike HistoryRead it is gated **wha
 - **Flag off (default):** the session's API key is re-checked on the call (`DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable`, Gitea #563 — an expired or disabled key loses its activation-time roles), then the session must carry the **`HistoryUpdate` role** (`OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.HistoryUpdate`). `ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper` confers it **only from a `Cluster`-scoped grant** carrying `NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate` — narrower-scoped grants confer nothing, for the same reason as `WriteOperate` (honouring a flag without honouring its scope would widen it). A key holding only `WriteOperate` is denied `BadUserAccessDenied`.
 - **Flag on:** `DataPlaneAuthorizer.Authorize(identity, OpcUaOperation.HistoryUpdate, nodeId, realm)` decides per node and **replaces** the role check (never chained) — a session with no roles succeeds on the strength of a scoped `HistoryUpdate` grant, and a `WriteOperate` grant does not help.
 - **Availability is separate from authorization.** A node accepts HistoryUpdate only if it is historized **and** the selected historian backend has an updater when the node materialises (the `HistoryWrite` AccessLevel bit). `Backend=Gateway` has none, so it answers `BadHistoryOperationUnsupported` for every node whatever the grant. Operations, result codes and unsupported cases: [`docs/Historian.md` §HistoryUpdate](Historian.md#historyupdate).
+- **Primary-only, after authorization (Gitea #674).** An authorized HistoryUpdate on a node that is not the redundancy Primary is refused `BadInvalidState` (the native-alarm-ack verdict, #597); an unauthorized one is told `BadUserAccessDenied` first, so the refusal never reveals the node's role to a caller who may not update.
 - **Every applied change is attributed (Part 11 modified-value history, Gitea #668).** The session's principal (the API key's
   `NodeAcl` principal, or the reserved `anonymous`) and key id are passed to the backend with every HistoryUpdate and recorded in the
   modification trail next to the prior value; a modified-value HistoryRead (`IsReadModified = true`) returns it as