# AdminUI "Disable Login" Dev Flag — Design

**Date:** 2026-06-11
**Status:** Approved (brainstorming) — ready for implementation plan.

## Goal

A config flag that **disables login in the AdminUI web app**. When enabled, every
request is auto-authenticated as the fixed user **`multi-role-test`** holding **all**
roles, so no login form / cookie / LDAP bind is involved. Default **off**; enabled in
the local **docker-dev** environment for testing.

## Why / scope

Speeds up local AdminUI testing (no sign-in round-trip, no GLAuth dependency). Scope is
the **AdminUI cookie web surface only** — the OPC UA server's LDAP auth and the deploy
API's `X-Api-Key` are separate auth paths and are **untouched**.

## Background (current auth, verified)

- AdminUI auth is a **single cookie scheme** registered in
  `src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Security/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs::AddOtOpcUaAuth`
  (`AddAuthentication(CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme).AddCookie(...)`).
- Authorization has a **`FallbackPolicy = RequireAuthenticatedUser()`** (every page needs
  auth) plus policies **`FleetAdmin`** (→ role `Administrator`) and **`DriverOperator`**
  (→ `Operator` or `Administrator`). **All three name the cookie scheme explicitly**
  (`AuthorizationPolicyBuilder(CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme)`).
- Login flow: `/login` page → `POST /auth/login` (`Security/Endpoints/AuthEndpoints.cs`)
  → `ILdapAuthService` → `IGroupRoleMapper<string>` → builds a `ClaimsPrincipal`
  (`ZbClaimTypes.Name/Username/DisplayName` + `ZbClaimTypes.Role` per role) →
  `SignInAsync` cookie.
- Blazor reads auth via the custom **`CookieAuthenticationStateProvider`**
  (`Security/Blazor/`), which **snapshots the boot request's `HttpContext.User`** and
  then only *invalidates* it by polling `/auth/ping`.
- **Single source of truth:** `HttpContext.User`. Populate it for every request and BOTH
  the HTTP pipeline (pages, `/api/script-analysis/*` `FleetAdmin` endpoints) and the
  Blazor circuit (`AuthorizeView`, `[CascadingParameter] AuthenticationState`, policy
  checks) are covered by one seam.
- Roles: `AdminRole` enum = `Viewer`, `Designer`, `Administrator`
  (`Core/.../Configuration/Enums/AdminRole.cs`), plus the appsettings-only control-plane
  string **`Operator`** (used by the `DriverOperator` policy). Granting all four satisfies
  every policy and every role-gated `AuthorizeView`.

## Approach (chosen: always-authenticating handler under the cookie scheme name)

When the flag is **on**, **replace the `AddCookie(...)` registration with a custom
`AuthenticationHandler` registered under the *same* scheme name**
(`CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme`). Its `HandleAuthenticateAsync`
**always returns `AuthenticateResult.Success`** with the `multi-role-test` principal
(all roles).

Registering under the cookie scheme name (not a new name) is the load-bearing detail:
the `FallbackPolicy`, `FleetAdmin`, and `DriverOperator` policies all *name that scheme*,
so they authenticate through the auto-login handler and pass — **no policy or page code
changes**. `UseAuthentication()` stamps `HttpContext.User` on every request, so the
circuit-boot snapshot and all minimal-API endpoints get the same principal.

Alternatives rejected: (2) stub the `AuthenticationStateProvider` + a pipeline middleware
— two seams to keep in sync, and a page request still 302s to `/login` unless
`HttpContext.User` is also set; (3) extend the existing `Security:Ldap:DevStubMode` to
auto-redirect — still routes through the login form + cookie sign-in and grants only
`Administrator`.

## Components

### 1. Options — `AuthDisableLoginOptions`

New options class (in `ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Security`), bound to a new `Security:Auth`
section:

```csharp
public sealed class AuthDisableLoginOptions
{
    public const string SectionName = "Security:Auth";
    public bool DisableLogin { get; set; }                 // default OFF
    public string User { get; set; } = "multi-role-test";  // the impersonated user
}
```

Roles are **not** configurable (YAGNI) — when the flag is on the principal always carries
**all** canonical roles. The role set is centralized in one place (the enum values of
`AdminRole` + the `Operator` literal) so a future role addition updates one spot.

```jsonc
// appsettings.json (default)
"Security": { "Auth": { "DisableLogin": false } }
```

### 2. Handler — `AutoLoginAuthenticationHandler : AuthenticationHandler<AuthenticationSchemeOptions>`

`HandleAuthenticateAsync` builds:

```csharp
var claims = new List<Claim> {
    new(ZbClaimTypes.Name, user),          // == ClaimTypes.Name → Identity.Name
    new(ZbClaimTypes.Username, user),
    new(ZbClaimTypes.DisplayName, user),
};
foreach (var role in AllRoles)              // Viewer, Designer, Operator, Administrator
    claims.Add(new Claim(ZbClaimTypes.Role, role));   // == ClaimTypes.Role
var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(
    new ClaimsIdentity(claims, CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme));
return AuthenticateResult.Success(new AuthenticationTicket(principal, Scheme.Name));
```

Mirrors the claim shape `AuthEndpoints` already produces, so downstream code (Account
page, audit actor accessor, policies) sees an identical principal — just minted without a
credential check.

### 3. Wiring — branch in `AddOtOpcUaAuth`

```csharp
services.AddOptions<AuthDisableLoginOptions>().Bind(configuration.GetSection(AuthDisableLoginOptions.SectionName));
var disableLogin = configuration.GetSection(AuthDisableLoginOptions.SectionName)
                                .GetValue<bool>(nameof(AuthDisableLoginOptions.DisableLogin));

var authBuilder = services.AddAuthentication(CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
if (disableLogin)
{
    // LOUD warning — see Guardrails.
    authBuilder.AddScheme<AuthenticationSchemeOptions, AutoLoginAuthenticationHandler>(
        CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme, _ => { });
}
else
{
    authBuilder.AddCookie(o => { o.LoginPath = "/login"; o.LogoutPath = "/auth/logout"; });
}
```

The cookie-options `PostConfigure`, DataProtection, LDAP services, JWT, and the
`AddAuthorization` policy block are **left exactly as-is** — they're harmless when the
flag is on (`/auth/login` would still work if hit, just pointless), and untouched when
off.

## Data flow (flag on)

```
any HTTP request → UseAuthentication() → AutoLoginAuthenticationHandler.HandleAuthenticateAsync
   → HttpContext.User = multi-role-test {Viewer,Designer,Operator,Administrator}
   ├─ page request: FallbackPolicy.RequireAuthenticatedUser ✓  → page renders
   ├─ /api/script-analysis/*: RequireAuthorization("FleetAdmin") → role Administrator ✓
   └─ Blazor circuit boot: snapshots HttpContext.User → CookieAuthenticationStateProvider._current
        → AuthorizeView / [Authorize(Policy=...)] / IAuthorizationService all pass
   /auth/ping → authenticated → 2xx → ping loop never invalidates the circuit
```

## Guardrails / error handling

- **Default off.** Production deployments are unaffected unless someone explicitly sets
  `Security:Auth:DisableLogin=true`.
- **Works in any environment** (not hard-gated to `Development`) — docker-dev containers
  run as `Production`, and a hard-gate would silently no-op exactly where it's wanted.
- **Loud startup warning** when on: `LogWarning("⚠ AdminUI LOGIN DISABLED — every request
  is authenticated as '{User}' with FULL permissions ({Roles}). Dev/test only — never set
  Security:Auth:DisableLogin=true in production.")`.
- **Cosmetic edges (no action needed):** `/login` is never reached (nothing challenges);
  manually visiting it still shows the form but is harmless. `/auth/logout` clears a
  non-existent cookie and the next request re-authenticates anyway. These are acceptable
  for a dev flag; not worth special-casing.

## docker-dev enablement

Add to the `environment:` block of **both** AdminUI nodes in
`docker-dev/docker-compose.yml` — `central-1` (line ~139) and `central-2` (line ~179),
the only `OTOPCUA_ROLES=admin,driver` services:

```yaml
      Security__Auth__DisableLogin: "true"
```

(`docker-compose.yml` is an existing tracked file that already carries the dev secrets —
no new secret is introduced.) After the edit, `lmxopcua`/docker-dev rebuild picks it up;
`/` loads straight into the app as `multi-role-test` with full access, no sign-in.

## Testing

No bUnit. In `tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Security.Tests/` (alongside
`OtOpcUaLdapAuthServiceTests`):

- **Handler unit tests:** `AutoLoginAuthenticationHandler` returns `Success` with
  `Identity.Name == "multi-role-test"` (or the configured `User`) and role claims for
  **all four** canonical roles; the principal satisfies `FleetAdmin` and `DriverOperator`
  (assert via `IAuthorizationService`/policy evaluation or by checking `IsInRole`).
- **Wiring test:** with `DisableLogin=true`, the registered authentication handler for the
  cookie scheme is the auto-login handler (and the cookie handler when off). A small DI
  resolution assertion.
- **Live proof:** docker-dev `/run` — `/` loads authenticated as `multi-role-test`,
  `FleetAdmin`-gated pages (e.g. RoleGrants) and `DriverOperator` actions are available
  with no sign-in. User drives; agent does not sign in (no sign-in needed when the flag is
  on — that's the point).

## Out of scope

- OPC UA server LDAP auth; deploy API key auth.
- Configurable role subsets / multiple impersonated users (YAGNI).
- Hard environment gating (revisit only if the flag risks leaking to a real deployment).

## Hard rules

Stage by explicit path (never `git add .`); never stage `sql_login.txt` /
`src/Server/.../Host/pki/`; never echo the gateway API key into a **new** tracked file
(the compose edit touches an existing file that already has it); no force-push, no
`--no-verify`; **no Configuration entity / EF migration change**. Build on a feature
branch off `master`.
