ff8354478c
Sign/SignAndEncrypt sessions failed before activation with "ApplicationCertificate
for the security profile ... cannot be found" (BadConfigurationError): both
RealOpcUaClient.ConnectAsync and the verify probe built an empty CertificateIdentifier.
- New OpcUaApplicationIdentity builds the client ApplicationConfiguration for both
paths. Secured modes load the application certificate from a configurable own
store (subject + ApplicationUri), auto-creating a self-signed RSA-2048 cert only
when none exists. A persisted cert is reused across reconnect/restart and never
silently rotated: one that no longer validates (e.g. ApplicationUri mismatch)
fails closed. First-time creation is serialised per own store and logged at
Warning with the thumbprint. None mode is unchanged and never touches the store.
- New OpcUaGlobalOptions: ApplicationUri, ApplicationCertificateSubject,
OwnCertificateStorePath, AutoCreateApplicationCertificate,
ApplicationCertificateLifetimeMonths (validated).
- Owned resources: the private-key cert is disposed on disconnect, failed connect
and at probe end; sessions are now disposed after close, and a reconnect on the
same instance closes the previous session first.
- CertStoreActor wrote trusted server certs to the store ROOT, which the SDK never
reads (it uses {store}/certs), so an operator Trust never affected validation and
SDK-rejected certs never listed. It now uses certs/ and migrates legacy root files
on start.
- Rig: all site nodes (docker/, docker-env2/) put the four PKI stores on the
persistent /app/data volume with a pinned ApplicationUri.
- Tests: in-process strict-trust StandardServer (test-only Opc.Ua.Server 1.5.378.106)
exercising the real adapter through ConnectAsync and VerifyEndpointAsync for Sign
and SignAndEncrypt: allow + read + reconnect + restart on one identity, deny when
the client doesn't trust the server (BadCertificateUntrusted), deny when the server
doesn't trust the client (BadSecurityChecksFailed), None untouched, concurrent
provisioning creates one cert, URI mismatch fails without rotating, auto-create off.
Against the pre-fix client these tests fail with the exact #121 error.
137 lines
6.4 KiB
JSON
137 lines
6.4 KiB
JSON
{
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"ScadaBridge": {
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"Node": {
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"Role": "Site",
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"NodeName": "node-b",
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"NodeHostname": "scadabridge-site-a-b",
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"SiteId": "site-a",
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"RemotingPort": 8082,
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"GrpcPort": 8083,
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"MetricsPort": 8084
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},
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// Script file access (design 2026-09-28): the Files global reads only beneath these
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// roots. ./recipes is bind-mounted read-only at /app/recipes on site-a (both nodes, so
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// a failover keeps the same view); site-b/site-c stay unconfigured = Files disabled.
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"SiteRuntime": {
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"ScriptFileAccess": {
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"AllowedRoots": [ "/app/recipes" ]
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}
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},
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"Cluster": {
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"SeedNodes": [
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"akka.tcp://scadabridge@scadabridge-site-a-b:8082",
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"akka.tcp://scadabridge@scadabridge-site-a-a:8082"
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],
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"SplitBrainResolverStrategy": "auto-down",
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"StableAfter": "00:00:15",
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"HeartbeatInterval": "00:00:02",
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"FailureDetectionThreshold": "00:00:10",
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"MinNrOfMembers": 1,
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"_bootstrapGuard": "Gitea #33 guard ENABLED on the docker rig (2026-08-02): deploy.sh recreates all containers simultaneously, which twice split site pairs into two 1-node clusters on 2026-08-01. Lower host:port founds self-first; the higher node TCP-probes then joins peer-first.",
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"BootstrapGuard": {
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"Enabled": true,
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"PartnerProbeSeconds": 25,
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"PartnerProbeIntervalMs": 500,
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"ProbeConnectTimeoutMs": 1000
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}
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},
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"OpcUa": {
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"ApplicationUri": "urn:scadabridge-site-a-node-b:ScadaBridge-DCL",
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"OwnCertificateStorePath": "/app/data/pki/own",
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"TrustedPeerStorePath": "/app/data/pki/trusted",
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"TrustedIssuerStorePath": "/app/data/pki/issuers",
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"RejectedCertificateStorePath": "/app/data/pki/rejected"
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},
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"DataConnection": {
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"ReconnectInterval": "00:00:05",
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"TagResolutionRetryInterval": "00:00:10",
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"WriteTimeout": "00:00:30",
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"SeedReadTimeout": "00:00:30"
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},
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"Communication": {
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// DEV-ONLY control-plane preshared key — NOT a real secret. Must be
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// IDENTICAL on both nodes of the pair and match the central-side entry in
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// ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__<siteId> (docker-compose.yml).
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// Production supplies this as ${secret:SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>}. Without it the
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// node fails StartupValidator: the gate is fail-closed, so an unset key would
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// refuse every SiteStream call while the node still looked healthy.
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"GrpcPsk": "dev-grpc-psk-docker-site-a",
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"CentralGrpcEndpoints": [
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"http://scadabridge-central-a:8083",
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"http://scadabridge-central-b:8083"
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],
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"DeploymentTimeout": "00:02:00",
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"LifecycleTimeout": "00:00:30",
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"QueryTimeout": "00:00:30",
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"TransportHeartbeatInterval": "00:00:05",
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"TransportFailureThreshold": "00:00:15"
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},
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"HealthMonitoring": {
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"ReportInterval": "00:00:30",
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"OfflineTimeout": "00:01:00"
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},
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"SiteEventLog": {
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"RetentionDays": 30,
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"MaxStorageMb": 1024,
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"_comment": "Retention uses the configured PurgeInterval delay after each purge; no wall-clock cron schedule is supported."
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},
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"Notification": {},
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"Logging": {
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"MinimumLevel": "Information"
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}
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},
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// Consolidated site database (LocalDb Phase 1): OperationTracking + site_events.
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// On the mounted /app/data volume so it survives container recreate - unlike the
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// legacy site-tracking.db / site_events.db, which defaulted to CWD-relative paths
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// outside the volume and were lost on every recreate.
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// Replication is opt-in and configured separately; absent = local-only.
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"LocalDb": {
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"Path": "/app/data/site-localdb.db",
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// The PASSIVE half of site-a's replicated pair: no PeerAddress, so this node's
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// sync initiator starts and idles while node-a dials in. Its own writes still
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// reach node-a - the stream is bidirectional.
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//
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// The key MUST match node-a's exactly. LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor is
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// fail-closed, so a typo here does not degrade to unauthenticated replication;
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// it rejects every stream and the pair silently stops converging.
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"Replication": {
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"ApiKey": "dev-site-a-localdb-sync-key",
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// ---- Phase 2 sizing, from the Task 1 rig soak (not from the defaults) ----
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//
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// The old MaxBatchSize = 16 pin (a hand-computed byte-budget proxy) was retired
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// when LocalDb 0.2.0 added MaxBatchBytes (arch-review WP3.3) - but MaxBatchSize
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// is NOT purely redundant with it. MaxBatchBytes bounds the WIRE message via a
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// per-message split in SyncSession.PumpLoopAsync; MaxBatchSize separately bounds
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// the DB READ page in OplogStore.ReadBatchAboveAsync / SnapshotStreamer, which
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// materializes the whole page into memory BEFORE the byte-budget split runs. At
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// the unset 500 default, a reconnect drain of 70 KB worst-case config_json rows
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// can transiently allocate ~35 MB per read even though every wire message stays
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// under the 2 MB MaxBatchBytes default (arch-review adversarial finding F2). Pin
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// it explicitly here to bound that transient allocation; MaxBatchBytes is left
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// unset (its 2 MB default) to bound the wire message.
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"MaxBatchSize": 64,
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//
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// Backlog caps bound the oplog while the peer is offline. Exceeding them is
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// NOT data loss: the oplog is pruned to the ceiling and needs_snapshot is set,
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// so the peer catches up by snapshot resync instead of incrementally. That
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// makes tighter-than-default correct here - it trades a rare full resync for a
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// bounded file. Sized from the soak's 0.80 sf_messages rows/sec (the only
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// non-zero writer measured): ~69k rows/day, so 2 days is ~138k. 250,000 leaves
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// room for burst without approaching the 1,000,000 default.
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"MaxOplogRows": 250000,
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"MaxOplogAge": "2.00:00:00"
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}
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},
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// arch-review remediation WP1.2: the site hot-path audit writer's SQLite file has no
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// default path (mirrors LocalDb:Path above) and StartupValidator now requires it for
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// Site nodes — an unset value used to fall back to a bare "auditlog.db" resolved
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// relative to CWD, i.e. the container's ephemeral overlayfs, so the pending audit
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// backlog was silently discarded on every recreate. On the mounted /app/data volume,
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// same as LocalDb:Path, so it survives container recreate.
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"AuditLog": {
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"SiteWriter": {
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"DatabasePath": "/app/data/auditlog.db"
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}
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}
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}
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