Files
ScadaBridge/src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs
T
Joseph Doherty 2ee84af1c0 feat(grpc): PSK-authenticate the site gRPC control plane; drop the vestigial management receptionist registration
Phase 0 of the ClusterClient→gRPC migration
(docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md). Standalone hardening: it
closes a gap that exists today and is a precondition for moving command/control
onto gRPC in later phases.

T0.1 — delete the ManagementActor ClusterClientReceptionist registration.
It was built for an out-of-cluster CLI that was never written: the shipped CLI
speaks HTTP Basic to /management, which asks the actor in-process through
ManagementActorHolder. Nothing in the repo ever sent to /user/management. The
actor still runs there; only the cross-boundary advertisement is gone. Six
documents claimed the CLI used ClusterClient — including the CLI's own README
"Architecture Notes" — and are corrected here rather than left to rot.

T0.2 — record, do not port, the dead integration-routing path.
IntegrationCallRequest is unwired at BOTH ends: RouteIntegrationCallAsync has
zero callers anywhere, and RegisterLocalHandler(Integration, …) appears only in
a test, so production always answers "Integration handler not available". It is
excluded from the gRPC contract (28 of 29 commands migrate) rather than
enshrined on an additive-only wire format, and deleting it during a
transport migration would mix a behavioural change into a change whose whole
value is that behaviour is identical. See
docs/known-issues/2026-07-22-integration-call-routing-is-dead-code.md.

T0.3 — preshared-key authentication on SiteStreamService.
The service shipped with no auth at all: plaintext h2c, no interceptor, so
anything that could reach a site node's :8083 could open a live data stream or
read audit rows back via PullAuditEvents/PullSiteCalls. ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor
now gates /sitestream.SiteStreamService/ — modeled on LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor
(constant-time compare, fail-closed, PermissionDenied) but gating a SET of
service prefixes so phases 1A/1B add services rather than interceptors. LocalDb
sync keeps its own separate key: it authenticates the pair partner, not central,
and collapsing the two would make a site's central-facing key also admit writes
into its database.

Keys are per site (SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>), never fleet-wide, so a compromised
site yields only its own. Central attaches them through ControlPlaneCredentials,
which binds CallCredentials to the channel — covering unary and streaming
uniformly, and letting the key resolve asynchronously, which a client
interceptor could not do without blocking. All three central→site channel
creation sites go through it (SiteStreamGrpcClient and both audit pull invokers);
the pull invokers' channel caches are re-keyed by (site, endpoint) because
credentials are per-site and bound to the channel.

Two decisions beyond the plan:

  * StartupValidator now requires GrpcPsk on Site nodes. The plan specified only
    the runtime gate, but fail-closed with no boot check produces a node that
    joins, answers heartbeats and reports healthy while refusing every stream,
    audit pull and telemetry ingest — silent and total. Same reasoning as the
    existing inbound API-key pepper rule.

  * Added Communication:SitePsks as a central-side key map. The plan assumed
    central would read the store, seeded via a dev KEK; the docker rig
    deliberately boots with no master key, so store-only resolution would leave
    it unable to dial its own sites. The store stays primary — it is the only
    source that can serve a site added at runtime — with the map covering
    key-less hosts and one-off pins. Neither source falling back to
    "unauthenticated" is the invariant.

T0.4 — dev keys on both rigs and tests.
34 tests. The seven that matter most exercise a real in-process gRPC stack over
TestServer: the unit tests on either side of the wire would both stay green if
the halves disagreed, and gRPC refuses call credentials on a plaintext channel
by default — the UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials opt-in is only provable
by making a real call. They confirm correct key passes on unary AND streaming,
wrong key and no-credentials both get PermissionDenied, and an unresolvable key
fails the call with nothing reaching the service.

OPERATIONAL: a site node upgraded to this build without a key will not boot.
That includes the gitignored deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay.
2026-07-22 17:51:09 -04:00

63 lines
3.6 KiB
C#

using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Extensions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication;
public static class ServiceCollectionExtensions
{
/// <summary>Registers communication services including options, <see cref="CommunicationService"/>, gRPC client factory, and debug stream.</summary>
/// <param name="services">The DI service collection to register services into.</param>
/// <returns>The same <see cref="IServiceCollection"/> to allow chaining.</returns>
public static IServiceCollection AddCommunication(this IServiceCollection services)
{
// Canonical section is ScadaBridge:Communication — the section every real
// appsettings actually writes (arch-review 08 round 2 NF8). The Host used to
// supply the real values via a duplicate Configure<> binding; that duplicate is
// gone, so AddCommunication must bind the canonical section itself.
services.AddOptions<CommunicationOptions>()
.BindConfiguration("ScadaBridge:Communication")
.ValidateOnStart();
services.TryAddEnumerable(
ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IValidateOptions<CommunicationOptions>, CommunicationOptionsValidator>());
services.AddSingleton<CommunicationService>();
// Explicit factory rather than AddSingleton<T>(): the ISitePskProvider dependency is
// optional (central registers one, a site node does not), and constructor selection
// over a nullable interface parameter is exactly the case the container cannot decide
// for itself — GetService returns null cleanly where constructor injection would throw.
services.AddSingleton(sp => new SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory(
sp.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>(),
sp.GetRequiredService<IOptions<CommunicationOptions>>(),
sp.GetService<ISitePskProvider>()));
services.AddSingleton<DebugStreamService>();
// Aggregated live alarm cache (plan #10, Task 4): transient, in-memory, shared
// per-site aggregator backing the operator Alarm Summary page. Singleton so every
// Blazor circuit shares one aggregator per site; started/stopped by viewer
// reference-count. No persistence (locked [PERM]: no central alarm store).
services.AddSingleton<SiteAlarmLiveCacheService>();
services.AddSingleton<ISiteAlarmLiveCache>(sp => sp.GetRequiredService<SiteAlarmLiveCacheService>());
// Startup reconciliation handler — scoped (holds scoped repositories), resolved
// per-request by CentralCommunicationActor inside a DI scope. Harmless on site
// hosts: only the central actor ever resolves it.
services.AddScoped<ReconcileService>();
return services;
}
/// <summary>Hook for registering additional DI services needed by communication actors; actor creation itself happens inside <c>AkkaHostedService</c>.</summary>
/// <param name="services">The DI service collection to register services into.</param>
/// <returns>The same <see cref="IServiceCollection"/> to allow chaining.</returns>
public static IServiceCollection AddCommunicationActors(this IServiceCollection services)
{
// Actor registration happens in AkkaHostedService.RegisterCentralActors/RegisterSiteActors.
// This method is a hook for any additional DI registrations needed by the communication actors.
return services;
}
}