Files
ScadaBridge/tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.IntegrationTests/SecurityHardeningTests.cs
T
Joseph Doherty 7b0b9c7365 refactor: rename ScadaLink → ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge (code + projects + namespaces)
Solution + 23 src projects + 26 test projects renamed; folders, csproj,
namespaces, and ScadaLinkDbContext/ScadaBridgeDbContext class updated.
ActorSystem "scadalink" → "scadabridge", Akka seed-node URLs migrated.
SQL roles/logins, LDAP domains, CLI command name, and CLI config dir
(~/.scadalink → ~/.scadabridge) also renamed.

Build green; 5 Host.Tests fail awaiting SQL login rename in next commit.
Pre-existing StaleTagMonitor timing flakes unchanged.

Rename script committed at tools/rename-to-scadabridge.sh.
2026-05-28 09:37:45 -04:00

182 lines
6.1 KiB
C#

using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.IntegrationTests;
/// <summary>
/// WP-5 (Phase 8): Security hardening tests.
/// Verifies LDAPS enforcement, JWT key length, secret scrubbing, and API key protection.
/// </summary>
public class SecurityHardeningTests
{
private static JwtTokenService CreateJwtService(string signingKey = "integration-test-signing-key-must-be-at-least-32-chars-long")
{
var options = Options.Create(new SecurityOptions
{
JwtSigningKey = signingKey,
JwtExpiryMinutes = 15,
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes = 5
});
return new JwtTokenService(options, NullLogger<JwtTokenService>.Instance);
}
[Fact]
public void SecurityOptions_LdapUseTls_DefaultsToTrue()
{
// Production requires LDAPS. The default must be true.
var options = new SecurityOptions();
Assert.True(options.LdapUseTls);
}
[Fact]
public void SecurityOptions_AllowInsecureLdap_DefaultsToFalse()
{
var options = new SecurityOptions();
Assert.False(options.AllowInsecureLdap);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtSigningKey_MinimumLength_Enforced()
{
// HMAC-SHA256 requires a key of at least 32 bytes (256 bits).
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "Test",
username: "test",
roles: new[] { "Admin" },
permittedSiteIds: null);
Assert.NotNull(token);
Assert.True(token.Length > 0);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtSigningKey_ShortKey_FailsValidation()
{
var shortKey = "tooshort";
Assert.True(shortKey.Length < 32,
"Test key must be shorter than 32 chars to verify minimum length enforcement");
}
[Fact]
public void LogOutputTemplate_DoesNotContainSecrets()
{
// Verify the Serilog output template does not include secret-bearing properties.
var template = "[{Timestamp:HH:mm:ss} {Level:u3}] [{NodeRole}/{NodeHostname}] {Message:lj}{NewLine}{Exception}";
Assert.DoesNotContain("Password", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("ApiKey", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Secret", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("SigningKey", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("ConnectionString", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public void LogEnrichment_ContainsExpectedProperties()
{
var enrichmentProperties = new[] { "SiteId", "NodeHostname", "NodeRole" };
foreach (var prop in enrichmentProperties)
{
Assert.DoesNotContain("Password", prop, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Key", prop, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
}
[Fact]
public void JwtToken_DoesNotContainSigningKey()
{
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "Test",
username: "test",
roles: new[] { "Admin" },
permittedSiteIds: null);
// JWT tokens are base64-encoded; the signing key should not appear in the payload
Assert.DoesNotContain("signing-key", token, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public void SecurityOptions_JwtExpiryDefaults_AreSecure()
{
var options = new SecurityOptions();
Assert.Equal(15, options.JwtExpiryMinutes);
Assert.Equal(30, options.IdleTimeoutMinutes);
Assert.Equal(5, options.JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtToken_TamperedPayload_FailsValidation()
{
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "User",
username: "user",
roles: new[] { "Admin" },
permittedSiteIds: null);
// Tamper with the token payload (second segment)
var parts = token.Split('.');
Assert.Equal(3, parts.Length);
// Flip a character in the payload
var tamperedPayload = parts[1];
if (tamperedPayload.Length > 5)
{
var chars = tamperedPayload.ToCharArray();
chars[5] = chars[5] == 'A' ? 'B' : 'A';
tamperedPayload = new string(chars);
}
var tamperedToken = $"{parts[0]}.{tamperedPayload}.{parts[2]}";
var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(tamperedToken);
Assert.Null(principal);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtRefreshToken_PreservesIdentity()
{
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var originalToken = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "Original User",
username: "orig_user",
roles: new[] { "Admin", "Design" },
permittedSiteIds: new[] { "site-1" });
var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(originalToken);
Assert.NotNull(principal);
// Refresh the token
var refreshedToken = jwtService.RefreshToken(
principal!,
new[] { "Admin", "Design" },
new[] { "site-1" });
Assert.NotNull(refreshedToken);
var refreshedPrincipal = jwtService.ValidateToken(refreshedToken!);
Assert.NotNull(refreshedPrincipal);
Assert.Equal("Original User", refreshedPrincipal!.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType)?.Value);
Assert.Equal("orig_user", refreshedPrincipal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType)?.Value);
}
[Fact]
public void StartupValidator_RejectsInsecureLdapInProduction()
{
// The SecurityOptions.AllowInsecureLdap defaults to false.
// Only when explicitly set to true (for dev/test) is insecure LDAP allowed.
var prodOptions = new SecurityOptions { LdapUseTls = true, AllowInsecureLdap = false };
Assert.True(prodOptions.LdapUseTls);
Assert.False(prodOptions.AllowInsecureLdap);
}
}