Joseph Doherty
2ee84af1c0
Phase 0 of the ClusterClient→gRPC migration
(docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md). Standalone hardening: it
closes a gap that exists today and is a precondition for moving command/control
onto gRPC in later phases.
T0.1 — delete the ManagementActor ClusterClientReceptionist registration.
It was built for an out-of-cluster CLI that was never written: the shipped CLI
speaks HTTP Basic to /management, which asks the actor in-process through
ManagementActorHolder. Nothing in the repo ever sent to /user/management. The
actor still runs there; only the cross-boundary advertisement is gone. Six
documents claimed the CLI used ClusterClient — including the CLI's own README
"Architecture Notes" — and are corrected here rather than left to rot.
T0.2 — record, do not port, the dead integration-routing path.
IntegrationCallRequest is unwired at BOTH ends: RouteIntegrationCallAsync has
zero callers anywhere, and RegisterLocalHandler(Integration, …) appears only in
a test, so production always answers "Integration handler not available". It is
excluded from the gRPC contract (28 of 29 commands migrate) rather than
enshrined on an additive-only wire format, and deleting it during a
transport migration would mix a behavioural change into a change whose whole
value is that behaviour is identical. See
docs/known-issues/2026-07-22-integration-call-routing-is-dead-code.md.
T0.3 — preshared-key authentication on SiteStreamService.
The service shipped with no auth at all: plaintext h2c, no interceptor, so
anything that could reach a site node's :8083 could open a live data stream or
read audit rows back via PullAuditEvents/PullSiteCalls. ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor
now gates /sitestream.SiteStreamService/ — modeled on LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor
(constant-time compare, fail-closed, PermissionDenied) but gating a SET of
service prefixes so phases 1A/1B add services rather than interceptors. LocalDb
sync keeps its own separate key: it authenticates the pair partner, not central,
and collapsing the two would make a site's central-facing key also admit writes
into its database.
Keys are per site (SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>), never fleet-wide, so a compromised
site yields only its own. Central attaches them through ControlPlaneCredentials,
which binds CallCredentials to the channel — covering unary and streaming
uniformly, and letting the key resolve asynchronously, which a client
interceptor could not do without blocking. All three central→site channel
creation sites go through it (SiteStreamGrpcClient and both audit pull invokers);
the pull invokers' channel caches are re-keyed by (site, endpoint) because
credentials are per-site and bound to the channel.
Two decisions beyond the plan:
* StartupValidator now requires GrpcPsk on Site nodes. The plan specified only
the runtime gate, but fail-closed with no boot check produces a node that
joins, answers heartbeats and reports healthy while refusing every stream,
audit pull and telemetry ingest — silent and total. Same reasoning as the
existing inbound API-key pepper rule.
* Added Communication:SitePsks as a central-side key map. The plan assumed
central would read the store, seeded via a dev KEK; the docker rig
deliberately boots with no master key, so store-only resolution would leave
it unable to dial its own sites. The store stays primary — it is the only
source that can serve a site added at runtime — with the map covering
key-less hosts and one-off pins. Neither source falling back to
"unauthenticated" is the invariant.
T0.4 — dev keys on both rigs and tests.
34 tests. The seven that matter most exercise a real in-process gRPC stack over
TestServer: the unit tests on either side of the wire would both stay green if
the halves disagreed, and gRPC refuses call credentials on a plaintext channel
by default — the UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials opt-in is only provable
by making a real call. They confirm correct key passes on unary AND streaming,
wrong key and no-credentials both get PermissionDenied, and an unresolvable key
fails the call with nothing reaching the service.
OPERATIONAL: a site node upgraded to this build without a key will not boot.
That includes the gitignored deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay.
120 lines
5.1 KiB
YAML
120 lines
5.1 KiB
YAML
services:
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central-a:
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image: scadabridge:latest
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# CoordinatedShutdown needs cluster-leave (15s budget) + cluster-exiting +
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# actor-system-terminate + Serilog flush; the 10s SIGTERM default SIGKILLed
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# mid-drain, turning every redeploy into the crash path (review 01 [Medium]).
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stop_grace_period: 30s
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container_name: scadabridge-env2-central-a
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environment:
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SCADABRIDGE_CONFIG: Central
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ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT: Development
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ASPNETCORE_URLS: "http://+:5000"
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# DEV-ONLY local-cluster value — NOT a real secret. The Auth/Config normalization
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# (2026-06-03) made ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyPepper a hard Central startup
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# requirement (>=16 chars, per-environment). Distinct from the docker/ cluster's
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# pepper per the "different per environment" guidance; real deployments inject a
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# true secret out-of-band, never from source control. Both Central nodes share it.
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ScadaBridge__InboundApi__ApiKeyPepper: "dev-only-insecure-pepper-env2-cluster-0001"
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# DEV-ONLY gRPC control-plane preshared key for site-x — NOT a real secret.
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# Must match ScadaBridge:Communication:GrpcPsk in site-x-node-*/appsettings.Site.json.
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# Production seeds SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId> into the secret store instead.
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ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__site-x: "dev-grpc-psk-docker-env2-site-x"
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ports:
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- "9101:5000" # Web UI + Inbound API
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- "9111:8081" # Akka remoting
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volumes:
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- ./central-node-a/appsettings.Central.json:/app/appsettings.Central.json:ro
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- ./central-node-a/logs:/app/logs
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networks:
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- scadabridge-net
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restart: unless-stopped
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central-b:
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image: scadabridge:latest
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# CoordinatedShutdown needs cluster-leave (15s budget) + cluster-exiting +
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# actor-system-terminate + Serilog flush; the 10s SIGTERM default SIGKILLed
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# mid-drain, turning every redeploy into the crash path (review 01 [Medium]).
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stop_grace_period: 30s
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container_name: scadabridge-env2-central-b
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environment:
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SCADABRIDGE_CONFIG: Central
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ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT: Development
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ASPNETCORE_URLS: "http://+:5000"
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# DEV-ONLY local-cluster value — NOT a real secret. The Auth/Config normalization
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# (2026-06-03) made ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyPepper a hard Central startup
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# requirement (>=16 chars, per-environment). Distinct from the docker/ cluster's
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# pepper per the "different per environment" guidance; real deployments inject a
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# true secret out-of-band, never from source control. Both Central nodes share it.
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ScadaBridge__InboundApi__ApiKeyPepper: "dev-only-insecure-pepper-env2-cluster-0001"
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# DEV-ONLY gRPC control-plane preshared key for site-x — NOT a real secret.
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# Must match ScadaBridge:Communication:GrpcPsk in site-x-node-*/appsettings.Site.json.
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# Production seeds SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId> into the secret store instead.
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ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__site-x: "dev-grpc-psk-docker-env2-site-x"
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ports:
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- "9102:5000" # Web UI + Inbound API
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- "9112:8081" # Akka remoting
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volumes:
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- ./central-node-b/appsettings.Central.json:/app/appsettings.Central.json:ro
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- ./central-node-b/logs:/app/logs
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networks:
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- scadabridge-net
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restart: unless-stopped
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site-x-a:
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image: scadabridge:latest
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# CoordinatedShutdown needs cluster-leave (15s budget) + cluster-exiting +
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# actor-system-terminate + Serilog flush; the 10s SIGTERM default SIGKILLed
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# mid-drain, turning every redeploy into the crash path (review 01 [Medium]).
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stop_grace_period: 30s
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container_name: scadabridge-env2-site-x-a
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environment:
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SCADABRIDGE_CONFIG: Site
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ports:
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- "9121:8082" # Akka remoting
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- "9123:8083" # gRPC streaming
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volumes:
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- ./site-x-node-a/appsettings.Site.json:/app/appsettings.Site.json:ro
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- ./site-x-node-a/data:/app/data
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- ./site-x-node-a/logs:/app/logs
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networks:
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- scadabridge-net
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restart: unless-stopped
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site-x-b:
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image: scadabridge:latest
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# CoordinatedShutdown needs cluster-leave (15s budget) + cluster-exiting +
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# actor-system-terminate + Serilog flush; the 10s SIGTERM default SIGKILLed
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# mid-drain, turning every redeploy into the crash path (review 01 [Medium]).
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stop_grace_period: 30s
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container_name: scadabridge-env2-site-x-b
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environment:
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SCADABRIDGE_CONFIG: Site
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ports:
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- "9122:8082" # Akka remoting
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- "9124:8083" # gRPC streaming
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volumes:
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- ./site-x-node-b/appsettings.Site.json:/app/appsettings.Site.json:ro
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- ./site-x-node-b/data:/app/data
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- ./site-x-node-b/logs:/app/logs
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networks:
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- scadabridge-net
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restart: unless-stopped
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traefik:
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image: traefik:v3.4
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container_name: scadabridge-env2-traefik
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ports:
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- "9100:80" # Env2 central load-balanced entrypoint
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- "8181:8080" # Env2 Traefik dashboard
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volumes:
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- ./traefik/traefik.yml:/etc/traefik/traefik.yml:ro
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- ./traefik/dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
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networks:
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- scadabridge-net
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restart: unless-stopped
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networks:
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scadabridge-net:
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external: true
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