1d2170a152
ManagementAuthenticator — the only identity source for POST /management, the audit REST endpoints and the debug-stream hub — now enforces "no role, no login" the way #144 does for /auth/login and /auth/token: - HTTP Basic: a bind whose groups map to zero roles, or whose role mapping throws, answers the bad-password 401 AUTH_FAILED body and counts as a LoginThrottle failure. RecordSuccess moved after the mapping, so a refusal no longer clears earlier failures. Request cancellation still propagates. - Bearer: a token with no role claim (minted before #144 shipped) gets the invalid-token 401; no throttle, as for every bearer failure. - Each refusal is logged at Warning (category ManagementAuthenticator) with the request path, the username and the reason. Before this, a zero-role Basic caller reached every command that ManagementActor.GetRequiredRoles opens to any authenticated user. DisableLogin is unchanged. Tests: ManagementZeroRoleRefusalTests — zero roles / mapper throws / one role over Basic and Bearer for /management (ListSites), /api/audit/query and the debug-stream hub; every null-role command is unreachable by a zero-role principal; throttle accounting. 47 of the 58 fail against the old authenticator (the 11 that pass are the one-role/bypass regression guards). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AFKC45MBz1wPZnVbX8