216 lines
11 KiB
C#
216 lines
11 KiB
C#
using System.Security.Claims;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Routing;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Roles;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CentralUI.Auth;
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/// <summary>
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/// Minimal API endpoints for login/logout. These run outside Blazor Server (standard HTTP POST).
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/// On success, signs in via ASP.NET Core cookie authentication and redirects to dashboard.
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/// </summary>
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public static class AuthEndpoints
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{
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/// <summary>Registers the <c>/auth/login</c>, <c>/auth/logout</c>, and <c>/auth/ping</c> endpoints on the given route builder.</summary>
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/// <param name="endpoints">The route builder to add the endpoints to.</param>
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public static IEndpointRouteBuilder MapAuthEndpoints(this IEndpointRouteBuilder endpoints)
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{
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endpoints.MapPost("/auth/login", async (HttpContext context) =>
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{
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var form = await context.Request.ReadFormAsync();
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var username = form["username"].ToString();
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var password = form["password"].ToString();
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if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(username) || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(password))
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{
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context.Response.Redirect("/login?error=Username+and+password+are+required.");
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return;
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}
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var ldapAuth = context.RequestServices.GetRequiredService<ILdapAuthService>();
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var jwtService = context.RequestServices.GetRequiredService<JwtTokenService>();
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var roleMapper = context.RequestServices.GetRequiredService<IGroupRoleMapper<string>>();
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var authResult = await ldapAuth.AuthenticateAsync(username, password, context.RequestAborted);
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if (!authResult.Succeeded)
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{
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var errorMsg = Uri.EscapeDataString(LdapAuthFailureMessages.ToMessage(authResult.Failure));
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context.Response.Redirect($"/login?error={errorMsg}");
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return;
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}
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// Map LDAP groups to roles via the shared IGroupRoleMapper<string> seam
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// (Task 1.1 ScadaBridgeGroupRoleMapper, wrapping the DB-backed RoleMapper).
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// The full RoleMappingResult — including PermittedSiteIds and the
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// system-wide flag — is carried in the mapping's opaque Scope so the
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// site-scope→SiteId claims below are built exactly as before.
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var roleMapping = await roleMapper.MapAsync(authResult.Groups, context.RequestAborted);
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// The ScadaBridge mapper carries the full RoleMappingResult in the seam's
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// opaque Scope (see ScadaBridgeGroupRoleMapper). Guard the unwrap (review I4):
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// a future/alternate IGroupRoleMapper<string> could leave Scope null or set a
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// different type. Rather than throw InvalidCastException mid-login, fall back to
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// the most restrictive interpretation — not a system-wide deployment and no
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// permitted sites — so no SiteId claims are stamped (deny-by-omission). The real
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// ScadaBridge mapper always supplies a RoleMappingResult, so behaviour is unchanged.
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var scope = roleMapping.Scope is RoleMappingResult mapped
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? mapped
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: new RoleMappingResult(roleMapping.Roles, [], IsSystemWideDeployment: false);
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// Build claims from LDAP auth + role mapping.
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// CentralUI-005: no fixed "expires_at" absolute-cap claim is stamped
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// — session expiry is owned by the cookie middleware's sliding window
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// (ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security AddCookie: ExpireTimeSpan = idle timeout,
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// SlidingExpiration = true). A frozen absolute claim would contradict
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// the documented sliding-refresh policy.
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var displayName = string.IsNullOrEmpty(authResult.DisplayName) ? username : authResult.DisplayName;
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var resolvedUsername = string.IsNullOrEmpty(authResult.Username) ? username : authResult.Username;
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var claims = new List<Claim>
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{
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new(ClaimTypes.Name, resolvedUsername),
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new(JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType, displayName),
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new(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType, resolvedUsername),
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};
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foreach (var role in roleMapping.Roles)
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{
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claims.Add(new Claim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, role));
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}
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if (!scope.IsSystemWideDeployment)
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{
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foreach (var siteId in scope.PermittedSiteIds)
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{
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claims.Add(new Claim(JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType, siteId));
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}
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}
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var identity = new ClaimsIdentity(claims, CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
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var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
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await context.SignInAsync(
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CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme,
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principal,
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BuildSignInProperties());
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context.Response.Redirect("/");
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}).DisableAntiforgery();
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endpoints.MapPost("/auth/token", async (HttpContext context) =>
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{
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var form = await context.Request.ReadFormAsync();
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var username = form["username"].ToString();
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var password = form["password"].ToString();
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if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(username) || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(password))
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{
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return Results.Json(new { error = "Username and password are required." }, statusCode: 400);
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}
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var ldapAuth = context.RequestServices.GetRequiredService<ILdapAuthService>();
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var jwtService = context.RequestServices.GetRequiredService<JwtTokenService>();
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var roleMapper = context.RequestServices.GetRequiredService<IGroupRoleMapper<string>>();
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var authResult = await ldapAuth.AuthenticateAsync(username, password, context.RequestAborted);
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if (!authResult.Succeeded)
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{
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return Results.Json(
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new { error = LdapAuthFailureMessages.ToMessage(authResult.Failure) },
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statusCode: 401);
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}
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var roleMapping = await roleMapper.MapAsync(authResult.Groups, context.RequestAborted);
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// Guard the opaque-Scope unwrap (review I4); see the matching note on
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// /auth/login. Fall back to no site-scope rather than throwing if a future
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// mapper leaves Scope null or sets a different type.
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var scope = roleMapping.Scope is RoleMappingResult mapped
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? mapped
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: new RoleMappingResult(roleMapping.Roles, [], IsSystemWideDeployment: false);
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var displayName = string.IsNullOrEmpty(authResult.DisplayName) ? username : authResult.DisplayName;
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var resolvedUsername = string.IsNullOrEmpty(authResult.Username) ? username : authResult.Username;
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var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
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displayName,
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resolvedUsername,
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roleMapping.Roles,
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scope.IsSystemWideDeployment ? null : scope.PermittedSiteIds);
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return Results.Json(new
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{
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access_token = token,
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token_type = "Bearer",
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username = resolvedUsername,
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display_name = displayName,
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roles = roleMapping.Roles,
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});
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}).DisableAntiforgery();
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// Logout is a state-changing authenticated action (CentralUI-017): it
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// keeps antiforgery validation enabled so it cannot be triggered
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// cross-site. The NavMenu sign-out form includes the antiforgery token
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// (rendered by the <AntiforgeryToken /> component). There is deliberately
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// no GET /logout route — a state-changing GET is itself a CSRF vector
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// (an <img src="/logout"> would forcibly log a user out).
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endpoints.MapPost("/auth/logout", async (HttpContext context) =>
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{
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await context.SignOutAsync(CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
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context.Response.Redirect("/login");
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});
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// CentralUI-020: liveness probe for the client-side idle-logout check.
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// The Blazor circuit's CookieAuthenticationStateProvider serves a frozen
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// constructor-time principal (CentralUI-004), so a circuit can never
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// observe a server-side cookie expiry by polling the auth state.
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// SessionExpiry instead polls this endpoint via fetch(): being a normal
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// HTTP request, the cookie middleware re-validates (and slides) the
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// cookie on every hit. It deliberately does NOT use RequireAuthorization
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// — that would make the middleware answer a lapsed request with a 302 to
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// /login, which fetch() follows transparently and reads as a 200 login
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// page. Allowing anonymous access and returning 200/401 ourselves gives
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// the client an unambiguous expiry signal.
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endpoints.MapGet("/auth/ping", HandlePing);
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return endpoints;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Handler for <c>GET /auth/ping</c>. Returns <c>200</c> while the caller's
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/// cookie session is still valid and <c>401</c> once it has lapsed
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/// server-side. See CentralUI-020.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="context">The current HTTP context used to check authentication state and write the response.</param>
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public static Task HandlePing(HttpContext context)
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{
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context.Response.StatusCode = context.User.Identity?.IsAuthenticated == true
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? StatusCodes.Status200OK
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: StatusCodes.Status401Unauthorized;
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return Task.CompletedTask;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Builds the <see cref="AuthenticationProperties"/> for the login sign-in.
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/// CentralUI-005: deliberately does <b>not</b> set <see cref="AuthenticationProperties.ExpiresUtc"/>.
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/// Session expiry is owned by the cookie authentication middleware's sliding
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/// window (configured in <c>ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security</c>'s <c>AddCookie</c>:
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/// <c>ExpireTimeSpan</c> = the idle timeout, <c>SlidingExpiration = true</c>).
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/// Setting a fixed <c>ExpiresUtc</c> here would re-impose a hard absolute cap
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/// that overrides the sliding window and contradicts the documented
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/// "sliding refresh, 30-minute idle timeout" policy. <see cref="AuthenticationProperties.IsPersistent"/>
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/// is true so the cookie survives a browser restart within the idle window;
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/// <see cref="AuthenticationProperties.AllowRefresh"/> is left unset (null)
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/// so the middleware is free to slide the expiry on activity.
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/// </summary>
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public static AuthenticationProperties BuildSignInProperties() => new()
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{
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IsPersistent = true
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};
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}
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