Files
ScadaBridge/tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security.Tests/CookieSessionValidatorTests.cs
T
Joseph Doherty fddc69545f fix(security): M2.19 review nits — idle/refresh config guard + adapter tests + dead-var/doc cleanup (#15)
- Add SecurityOptionsValidator (IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>) enforcing
  RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes < IdleTimeoutMinutes; registered with ValidateOnStart in
  AddSecurity — startup FAILS if threshold >= idle, so the invariant cannot be silently
  misconfigured away.
- Update SecurityOptions XML-docs: class-level summary distinguishes JWT Bearer path
  (JwtSigningKey/JwtExpiryMinutes) from Blazor cookie session path (IdleTimeoutMinutes/
  RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes); both time fields document the ~45-min effective idle window
  and the new cross-field constraint.
- Remove dead jwtService variable from /auth/login lambda in AuthEndpoints.cs (resolved
  but never used since login moved to SessionClaimBuilder).
- Extract ApplyValidationResultAsync helper from OnValidatePrincipalAsync (pure
  decision-application step); add 3 adapter tests covering Reject → RejectPrincipal +
  SignOutAsync; Replace → ReplacePrincipal + ShouldRenew; Keep → no-op.
- Fix inaccurate TryRefreshAsync comment (dropped "OR last-activity needs advancing" —
  the code only returns non-null when roleRefreshDue).
- Add InternalsVisibleTo for Security.Tests in Security.csproj.
- Add IsRoleRefreshDue tests: missing claim → due; unparsable claim → due; plus integration
  test covering the full ValidateAsync path for a principal missing zb:lastrolerefresh
  (triggers refresh + re-stamps anchor rather than keeping stale principal forever).
- Add SecurityOptionsValidatorConfigGuardTests: default succeeds; equal fails; greater fails;
  boundary (idle-1) succeeds; wiring confirmed via AddSecurity container.
2026-06-16 08:12:11 -04:00

687 lines
31 KiB
C#

using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Roles;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.AspNetCore;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security.Tests;
#region M2.19 (#15): cookie session idle-timeout + LDAP-free role-mapping refresh
/// <summary>
/// Tests for the cookie <c>OnValidatePrincipal</c> core (<see cref="CookieSessionValidator"/>)
/// and the shared <see cref="SessionClaimBuilder"/>. These pin the always-achievable M2.19
/// layers: idle-timeout enforcement, mid-session role-mapping refresh from STORED groups
/// WITHOUT any LDAP call, the fail-soft refresh policy (errors keep the session), and claim
/// parity between the login path and the refresh path.
/// </summary>
public class CookieSessionValidatorTests
{
private static readonly DateTimeOffset Start = new(2026, 6, 15, 12, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero);
// A controllable clock (the central package list has no FakeTimeProvider, mirroring
// the Transport tests' hand-rolled TestTimeProvider).
private sealed class TestTimeProvider : TimeProvider
{
private DateTimeOffset _now;
public TestTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset start) => _now = start;
public override DateTimeOffset GetUtcNow() => _now;
public void Advance(TimeSpan by) => _now = _now.Add(by);
}
// A fake IGroupRoleMapper<string> that returns a programmable RoleMappingResult and
// counts how many times it was invoked — so a test can assert NO LDAP call happens
// (this mapper is DB-backed only; if it is hit, the result came from the DB seam, not
// LDAP) and that the refresh actually re-ran the mapping.
private sealed class FakeGroupRoleMapper : IGroupRoleMapper<string>
{
private RoleMappingResult _result;
private readonly Exception? _throw;
public int CallCount { get; private set; }
public IReadOnlyList<string>? LastGroups { get; private set; }
public FakeGroupRoleMapper(RoleMappingResult result) => _result = result;
public FakeGroupRoleMapper(Exception toThrow) => (_result, _throw) =
(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false), toThrow);
public void SetResult(RoleMappingResult result) => _result = result;
public Task<GroupRoleMapping<string>> MapAsync(IReadOnlyList<string> groups, CancellationToken ct)
{
CallCount++;
LastGroups = groups;
if (_throw is not null) throw _throw;
return Task.FromResult(new GroupRoleMapping<string>(_result.Roles, Scope: _result));
}
}
private static SecurityOptions Options() => new()
{
JwtSigningKey = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough",
JwtExpiryMinutes = 15,
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes = 5,
RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 15,
};
private static CookieSessionValidator CreateValidator(
IGroupRoleMapper<string> mapper, TimeProvider clock, SecurityOptions? options = null) =>
new(mapper, Microsoft.Extensions.Options.Options.Create(options ?? Options()), clock,
NullLogger<CookieSessionValidator>.Instance);
// Build a session the way login does (via SessionClaimBuilder), anchored at `at`.
private static ClaimsPrincipal Session(
DateTimeOffset at,
IReadOnlyList<string> groups,
RoleMappingResult mapping) =>
SessionClaimBuilder.Build("alice", "Alice", groups, mapping, at);
// --- Idle timeout ---
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_PastIdleTimeout_Rejects()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"], new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
// 31 minutes idle (> 30-minute IdleTimeoutMinutes).
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(31));
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Reject, result.Action);
// An idle-timed-out session must never be refreshed instead of rejected.
Assert.Equal(0, mapper.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_WithinIdleWindow_KeptAndNotRejected()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"], new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
// 10 minutes idle — well inside the 30-minute window, and BEFORE the 15-minute
// role-refresh threshold, so the session is simply kept.
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10));
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, result.Action);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_MissingLastActivityClaim_TreatedAsIdleTimedOut()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
// A principal with no LastActivity anchor: fail-closed to rejected.
var identity = new ClaimsIdentity(new[]
{
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice"),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType, "alice"),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, Roles.Administrator),
}, CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Reject, result.Action);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_UnauthenticatedPrincipal_Kept()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, (await sut.ValidateAsync(null)).Action);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep,
(await sut.ValidateAsync(new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity()))).Action);
}
// --- Role-mapping refresh WITHOUT LDAP ---
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_AfterRoleRefreshThreshold_RemapsFromStoredGroups_NoLdap()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
// The user logged in as a system-wide Administrator.
var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
// The DB mapping CHANGED mid-session: the same groups now map to Viewer + site-scoped.
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], ["7"], IsSystemWideDeployment: false));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
// Past the 15-minute role-refresh threshold (still inside the 30-minute idle window).
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(16));
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Replace, result.Action);
Assert.NotNull(result.Principal);
// The mapper was invoked with EXACTLY the STORED groups — no LDAP re-query.
Assert.Equal(1, mapper.CallCount);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "SCADA-Admins" }, mapper.LastGroups);
// The rebuilt principal reflects the NEW DB mapping.
var newRoles = result.Principal!.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
Assert.Contains(Roles.Viewer, newRoles);
Assert.DoesNotContain(Roles.Administrator, newRoles);
Assert.Equal("7", result.Principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType)?.Value);
// The role-refresh anchor was advanced to now.
var refreshClaim = result.Principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType);
Assert.NotNull(refreshClaim);
Assert.True(DateTimeOffset.TryParse(refreshClaim!.Value, out var refreshedAt));
Assert.Equal(clock.GetUtcNow(), refreshedAt);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_RevokedGroupUser_LosesRolesOnRefresh()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
// The group's mapping was deleted in the DB: the same groups now map to NOTHING.
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], IsSystemWideDeployment: false));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(16));
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Replace, result.Action);
// The user has lost ALL roles mid-session — every authorization policy will now deny.
Assert.Empty(result.Principal!.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType));
Assert.Empty(result.Principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_BeforeRoleRefreshThreshold_DoesNotRefresh()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
// Even though the DB mapping would now return Viewer, a refresh BEFORE the
// 15-minute threshold must not happen — claims stay as they were at login.
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], [], false));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(14)); // < 15-minute threshold
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, result.Action);
Assert.Equal(0, mapper.CallCount); // no re-map at all
}
// --- Failure policy: a refresh exception keeps the existing principal ---
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_RefreshThrows_KeepsExistingPrincipal_NoSignOut_NoThrow()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
// The DB-backed mapper faults (e.g. SQL unreachable) DURING a due refresh.
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new InvalidOperationException("db down"));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(16)); // refresh IS due
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal); // must NOT throw
// The session is KEPT (current roles preserved) — never rejected, never broadened.
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, result.Action);
Assert.Equal(1, mapper.CallCount);
}
// --- IsIdleTimedOut / IsRoleRefreshDue boundaries ---
[Fact]
public void IsIdleTimedOut_AtBoundary_NotTimedOut()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
var principal = Session(Start, [], new RoleMappingResult([], [], false));
// Exactly 30 minutes — NOT strictly greater, so not timed out.
Assert.False(sut.IsIdleTimedOut(principal, Start.AddMinutes(30)));
Assert.True(sut.IsIdleTimedOut(principal, Start.AddMinutes(30).AddSeconds(1)));
}
[Fact]
public void IsRoleRefreshDue_AtBoundary_NotDue()
{
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
var principal = Session(Start, [], new RoleMappingResult([], [], false));
Assert.False(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start.AddMinutes(15)));
Assert.True(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start.AddMinutes(15).AddSeconds(1)));
}
// --- Missing/unparsable zb:lastrolerefresh anchor treated as refresh-due ---
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateAsync_MissingLastRoleRefreshClaim_TreatedAsRefreshDue_RefreshesAndRestamps()
{
// Mirrors the existing MissingLastActivityClaim_TreatedAsIdleTimedOut test but for
// the role-refresh anchor. A principal whose zb:lastrolerefresh claim is absent or
// unparsable must be treated as "refresh due" (refresh now + re-stamp the anchor),
// NOT as "never refresh". This prevents a stale principal from coasting forever
// without a role re-check just because the claim was missing.
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
// The mapper returns a different mapping than the one encoded in the session, so we
// can confirm the refresh actually ran.
var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], [], false));
var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
// Build a principal that has a valid LastActivity (not timed out) but NO lastrolerefresh.
var identity = new ClaimsIdentity([
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice"),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType, "alice"),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType, "Alice"),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, Roles.Administrator),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.LastActivityClaimType, Start.ToString("o")),
// Deliberately NO zb:lastrolerefresh claim.
], CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme,
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType);
var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
// Must have triggered a refresh (Replace), NOT Keep.
Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Replace, result.Action);
Assert.Equal(1, mapper.CallCount);
// The rebuilt principal carries the new mapping (Viewer, not Administrator).
var newRoles = result.Principal!.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
Assert.Contains(Roles.Viewer, newRoles);
Assert.DoesNotContain(Roles.Administrator, newRoles);
// A new lastrolerefresh anchor was stamped.
var refreshClaim = result.Principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType);
Assert.NotNull(refreshClaim);
Assert.True(DateTimeOffset.TryParse(refreshClaim!.Value, out _));
}
[Fact]
public void IsRoleRefreshDue_MissingClaim_ReturnsDue()
{
// Direct helper test: a principal with no zb:lastrolerefresh claim returns true.
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
var identity = new ClaimsIdentity([new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice")],
CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
Assert.True(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start));
}
[Fact]
public void IsRoleRefreshDue_UnparsableClaim_ReturnsDue()
{
// A present but unparsable zb:lastrolerefresh claim is treated as due, not as a
// parse error that keeps the session stale forever.
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
var identity = new ClaimsIdentity([
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice"),
new Claim(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType, "not-a-date"),
], CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
Assert.True(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start));
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Claim-parity tests: the shared <see cref="SessionClaimBuilder"/> must produce EXACTLY
/// the claim shape the login endpoint historically minted (plus the M2.19 group +
/// refresh-anchor additions), and the refresh path — which also goes through the builder —
/// must therefore be identical. This is the load-bearing anti-drift guarantee.
/// </summary>
public class SessionClaimBuilderParityTests
{
private static readonly DateTimeOffset At = new(2026, 6, 15, 9, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero);
[Fact]
public void Build_ProducesCanonicalIdentityRoleAndScopeClaims_LikeLogin()
{
var mapping = new RoleMappingResult(
[Roles.Administrator, Roles.Designer], ["3", "4"], IsSystemWideDeployment: false);
var principal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("janer", "Jane Roe", ["G1", "G2"], mapping, At);
// Identity claims — identical to the historical /auth/login set.
Assert.Equal("janer", principal.Identity?.Name); // ClaimTypes.Name resolves Identity.Name
Assert.Equal("Jane Roe", principal.FindFirst(ZbClaimTypes.DisplayName)?.Value);
Assert.Equal("janer", principal.FindFirst(ZbClaimTypes.Username)?.Value);
// Roles — one per mapped role, canonical type, and IsInRole resolves.
var roles = principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
Assert.Equal(new[] { Roles.Administrator, Roles.Designer }.OrderBy(r => r), roles.OrderBy(r => r));
Assert.True(principal.IsInRole(Roles.Administrator));
// Scope — one SiteId per permitted site (non-system-wide).
var sites = principal.FindAll(ZbClaimTypes.ScopeId).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
Assert.Equal(new[] { "3", "4" }.OrderBy(s => s), sites.OrderBy(s => s));
}
[Fact]
public void Build_SystemWideMapping_OmitsSiteIdClaims()
{
var mapping = new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Deployer], [], IsSystemWideDeployment: true);
var principal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("op", "Operator", ["GlobalDeployers"], mapping, At);
// Deny-by-omission preserved: a system-wide mapping stamps NO SiteId claims.
Assert.Empty(principal.FindAll(ZbClaimTypes.ScopeId));
Assert.Contains(Roles.Deployer, principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value));
}
[Fact]
public void Build_StoresGroupsAndRefreshAnchor_M219Additions()
{
var mapping = new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true);
var principal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("janer", "Jane Roe", ["G1", "G2"], mapping, At);
// M2.19: one zb:group claim per LDAP group, round-trippable via ReadGroups.
Assert.Equal(new[] { "G1", "G2" }, SessionClaimBuilder.ReadGroups(principal));
// M2.19: refresh anchor AND idle anchor seeded from the same instant.
Assert.Equal(At.ToString("o"), principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType)?.Value);
Assert.Equal(At.ToString("o"), principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastActivityClaimType)?.Value);
}
[Fact]
public void Build_LoginThenRefresh_ProduceIdenticalClaimShape()
{
// The anti-drift guarantee: login and the refresh path both call Build with the
// same inputs, so the resulting role/scope/group claim SETS are identical (only
// the timestamp anchors differ by design).
var mapping = new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Designer], ["9"], IsSystemWideDeployment: false);
var login = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("u", "User", ["G"], mapping, At);
var refresh = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("u", "User", ["G"], mapping, At.AddMinutes(16));
static IEnumerable<string> Pairs(ClaimsPrincipal p, string type) =>
p.FindAll(type).Select(c => c.Value).OrderBy(v => v);
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, ClaimTypes.Name), Pairs(refresh, ClaimTypes.Name));
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType));
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType));
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType));
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType));
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.GroupClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.GroupClaimType));
// The refresh anchors moved forward (that is the ONLY intended difference).
Assert.NotEqual(
login.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType)?.Value,
refresh.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType)?.Value);
}
}
#endregion
#region M2.19 (#15): OnValidatePrincipalAsync adapter translation from SessionValidationResult to cookie context calls
/// <summary>
/// Tests for the <c>ApplyValidationResultAsync</c> helper extracted from
/// <see cref="ServiceCollectionExtensions.OnValidatePrincipalAsync"/>: verifies that each
/// <see cref="SessionValidationResult"/> case is correctly translated into the
/// corresponding <see cref="CookieValidatePrincipalContext"/> mutations.
/// The pure decision-application step is tested in isolation — the DI-resolution of
/// <see cref="CookieSessionValidator"/> is a separate concern covered by the integration
/// wiring tests in <see cref="SecurityReviewRegressionTests"/>.
/// </summary>
public class OnValidatePrincipalAdapterTests
{
private static readonly DateTimeOffset AdapterStart = new(2026, 6, 15, 12, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero);
// A minimal IAuthenticationService stub that records SignOut calls so we can assert
// the Reject path actually invokes SignOutAsync.
private sealed class StubAuthenticationService : IAuthenticationService
{
public int SignOutCallCount { get; private set; }
public Task<AuthenticateResult> AuthenticateAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme) =>
Task.FromResult(AuthenticateResult.NoResult());
public Task ChallengeAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, AuthenticationProperties? properties) =>
Task.CompletedTask;
public Task ForbidAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, AuthenticationProperties? properties) =>
Task.CompletedTask;
public Task SignInAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, ClaimsPrincipal principal, AuthenticationProperties? properties) =>
Task.CompletedTask;
public Task SignOutAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, AuthenticationProperties? properties)
{
SignOutCallCount++;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
private static (CookieValidatePrincipalContext Context, StubAuthenticationService AuthService)
BuildContext(ClaimsPrincipal principal)
{
var authService = new StubAuthenticationService();
var services = new ServiceCollection();
services.AddSingleton<IAuthenticationService>(authService);
services.AddLogging();
var serviceProvider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
var httpContext = new DefaultHttpContext { RequestServices = serviceProvider };
var ticket = new AuthenticationTicket(
principal,
new AuthenticationProperties(),
CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
var scheme = new AuthenticationScheme(
CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme,
displayName: null,
handlerType: typeof(CookieAuthenticationHandler));
var context = new CookieValidatePrincipalContext(
httpContext,
scheme,
new CookieAuthenticationOptions(),
ticket);
return (context, authService);
}
private static ClaimsPrincipal AuthenticatedPrincipal() =>
SessionClaimBuilder.Build(
"alice", "Alice",
["SCADA-Admins"],
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true),
AdapterStart);
[Fact]
public async Task ApplyResult_Reject_CallsRejectPrincipalAndSignsOut()
{
// The Reject result is the idle-timeout path: the adapter must call RejectPrincipal
// (sets Principal = null) AND SignOutAsync so the cookie is cleared for the next request.
var principal = AuthenticatedPrincipal();
var (ctx, authService) = BuildContext(principal);
await ServiceCollectionExtensions.ApplyValidationResultAsync(ctx, SessionValidationResult.Reject);
// RejectPrincipal() sets Principal to null.
Assert.Null(ctx.Principal);
// SignOutAsync must have been invoked exactly once.
Assert.Equal(1, authService.SignOutCallCount);
// ShouldRenew must NOT be set — we are expiring, not renewing.
Assert.False(ctx.ShouldRenew);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ApplyResult_Replace_ReplacesAndSetsRenew()
{
// The Replace result is the role-refresh path: the adapter must swap in the new
// principal and set ShouldRenew = true so the cookie is re-issued with the new claims.
var newPrincipal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build(
"alice", "Alice",
["SCADA-Admins"],
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], [], false),
AdapterStart.AddMinutes(16));
var originalPrincipal = AuthenticatedPrincipal();
var (ctx, authService) = BuildContext(originalPrincipal);
await ServiceCollectionExtensions.ApplyValidationResultAsync(ctx, SessionValidationResult.Replace(newPrincipal));
Assert.Same(newPrincipal, ctx.Principal);
Assert.True(ctx.ShouldRenew);
Assert.Equal(0, authService.SignOutCallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ApplyResult_Keep_LeavesContextUnchanged()
{
// The Keep result is the no-op path (no refresh due, or a swallowed refresh fault):
// the adapter must leave the principal and ShouldRenew completely untouched.
var principal = AuthenticatedPrincipal();
var (ctx, authService) = BuildContext(principal);
await ServiceCollectionExtensions.ApplyValidationResultAsync(ctx, SessionValidationResult.Keep);
Assert.Same(principal, ctx.Principal);
Assert.False(ctx.ShouldRenew);
Assert.Equal(0, authService.SignOutCallCount);
}
}
#endregion
#region M2.19 (#15): SecurityOptionsValidator config-guard fails startup on misconfiguration
/// <summary>
/// Tests for <see cref="SecurityOptionsValidator"/>: the startup validator that prevents
/// idle-timeout enforcement from being silently defeated by a misconfigured
/// <c>RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes &gt;= IdleTimeoutMinutes</c>.
/// </summary>
public class SecurityOptionsValidatorConfigGuardTests
{
private static SecurityOptions ValidOptions() => new()
{
JwtSigningKey = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough",
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 15,
};
[Fact]
public void Validate_DefaultOptions_Succeeds()
{
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, ValidOptions());
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
}
[Fact]
public void Validate_RefreshEqualsIdle_Fails()
{
// Equal is invalid: a refresh cycle at t=30 would advance LastActivity to t=30 which
// equals the idle timeout — enforcement is defeated.
var options = ValidOptions();
options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = options.IdleTimeoutMinutes; // 30 == 30
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, options);
Assert.True(result.Failed);
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.IdleTimeoutMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
}
[Fact]
public void Validate_RefreshGreaterThanIdle_Fails()
{
// Inverted: refresh threshold LARGER than the idle window is clearly wrong and
// must fail loudly at startup.
var options = ValidOptions();
options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 60; // 60 > 30
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, options);
Assert.True(result.Failed);
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
}
[Fact]
public void Validate_RefreshOneLessThanIdle_Succeeds()
{
// Boundary: threshold = idle - 1 is the tightest VALID configuration.
var options = ValidOptions();
options.IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30;
options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 29;
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, options);
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
}
[Fact]
public void AddSecurity_RegistersSecurityOptionsValidator_WithValidateOnStart()
{
// End-to-end wiring: AddSecurity registers SecurityOptionsValidator as
// IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>. ValidateOnStart is what makes the DI container
// call Validate on startup. We confirm the validator is present in the container.
var services = new ServiceCollection();
services.AddLogging();
services.AddDataProtection();
services.AddSecurity();
using var provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
var validators = provider.GetServices<IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>>().ToList();
Assert.Contains(validators, v => v is SecurityOptionsValidator);
}
[Fact]
public void AddSecurity_RegisteredValidator_DetectsMisconfiguration_WhenCalledDirectly()
{
// Confirm that the SecurityOptionsValidator registered by AddSecurity actually
// catches a bad configuration. We resolve the validator from the container and
// call it directly — the ValidateOnStart pipeline would fire the same validator
// during IHost.StartAsync in a real deployment.
var services = new ServiceCollection();
services.AddLogging();
services.AddDataProtection();
services.AddSecurity();
using var provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
var validator = provider.GetServices<IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>>()
.OfType<SecurityOptionsValidator>()
.Single();
// A configuration where RoleRefreshThreshold == IdleTimeout defeats idle enforcement.
var badOptions = new SecurityOptions
{
JwtSigningKey = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough",
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 30, // == IdleTimeoutMinutes — invalid
};
var result = validator.Validate(name: null, badOptions);
Assert.True(result.Failed);
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
}
}
#endregion