fddc69545f
- Add SecurityOptionsValidator (IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>) enforcing RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes < IdleTimeoutMinutes; registered with ValidateOnStart in AddSecurity — startup FAILS if threshold >= idle, so the invariant cannot be silently misconfigured away. - Update SecurityOptions XML-docs: class-level summary distinguishes JWT Bearer path (JwtSigningKey/JwtExpiryMinutes) from Blazor cookie session path (IdleTimeoutMinutes/ RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes); both time fields document the ~45-min effective idle window and the new cross-field constraint. - Remove dead jwtService variable from /auth/login lambda in AuthEndpoints.cs (resolved but never used since login moved to SessionClaimBuilder). - Extract ApplyValidationResultAsync helper from OnValidatePrincipalAsync (pure decision-application step); add 3 adapter tests covering Reject → RejectPrincipal + SignOutAsync; Replace → ReplacePrincipal + ShouldRenew; Keep → no-op. - Fix inaccurate TryRefreshAsync comment (dropped "OR last-activity needs advancing" — the code only returns non-null when roleRefreshDue). - Add InternalsVisibleTo for Security.Tests in Security.csproj. - Add IsRoleRefreshDue tests: missing claim → due; unparsable claim → due; plus integration test covering the full ValidateAsync path for a principal missing zb:lastrolerefresh (triggers refresh + re-stamps anchor rather than keeping stale principal forever). - Add SecurityOptionsValidatorConfigGuardTests: default succeeds; equal fails; greater fails; boundary (idle-1) succeeds; wiring confirmed via AddSecurity container.
687 lines
31 KiB
C#
687 lines
31 KiB
C#
using System.Security.Claims;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Roles;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.AspNetCore;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security.Tests;
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#region M2.19 (#15): cookie session idle-timeout + LDAP-free role-mapping refresh
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/// <summary>
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/// Tests for the cookie <c>OnValidatePrincipal</c> core (<see cref="CookieSessionValidator"/>)
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/// and the shared <see cref="SessionClaimBuilder"/>. These pin the always-achievable M2.19
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/// layers: idle-timeout enforcement, mid-session role-mapping refresh from STORED groups
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/// WITHOUT any LDAP call, the fail-soft refresh policy (errors keep the session), and claim
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/// parity between the login path and the refresh path.
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/// </summary>
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public class CookieSessionValidatorTests
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{
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private static readonly DateTimeOffset Start = new(2026, 6, 15, 12, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero);
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// A controllable clock (the central package list has no FakeTimeProvider, mirroring
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// the Transport tests' hand-rolled TestTimeProvider).
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private sealed class TestTimeProvider : TimeProvider
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{
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private DateTimeOffset _now;
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public TestTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset start) => _now = start;
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public override DateTimeOffset GetUtcNow() => _now;
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public void Advance(TimeSpan by) => _now = _now.Add(by);
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}
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// A fake IGroupRoleMapper<string> that returns a programmable RoleMappingResult and
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// counts how many times it was invoked — so a test can assert NO LDAP call happens
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// (this mapper is DB-backed only; if it is hit, the result came from the DB seam, not
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// LDAP) and that the refresh actually re-ran the mapping.
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private sealed class FakeGroupRoleMapper : IGroupRoleMapper<string>
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{
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private RoleMappingResult _result;
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private readonly Exception? _throw;
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public int CallCount { get; private set; }
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public IReadOnlyList<string>? LastGroups { get; private set; }
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public FakeGroupRoleMapper(RoleMappingResult result) => _result = result;
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public FakeGroupRoleMapper(Exception toThrow) => (_result, _throw) =
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(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false), toThrow);
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public void SetResult(RoleMappingResult result) => _result = result;
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public Task<GroupRoleMapping<string>> MapAsync(IReadOnlyList<string> groups, CancellationToken ct)
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{
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CallCount++;
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LastGroups = groups;
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if (_throw is not null) throw _throw;
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return Task.FromResult(new GroupRoleMapping<string>(_result.Roles, Scope: _result));
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}
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}
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private static SecurityOptions Options() => new()
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{
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JwtSigningKey = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough",
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JwtExpiryMinutes = 15,
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IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
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JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes = 5,
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RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 15,
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};
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private static CookieSessionValidator CreateValidator(
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IGroupRoleMapper<string> mapper, TimeProvider clock, SecurityOptions? options = null) =>
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new(mapper, Microsoft.Extensions.Options.Options.Create(options ?? Options()), clock,
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NullLogger<CookieSessionValidator>.Instance);
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// Build a session the way login does (via SessionClaimBuilder), anchored at `at`.
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private static ClaimsPrincipal Session(
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DateTimeOffset at,
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IReadOnlyList<string> groups,
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RoleMappingResult mapping) =>
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SessionClaimBuilder.Build("alice", "Alice", groups, mapping, at);
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// --- Idle timeout ---
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_PastIdleTimeout_Rejects()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"], new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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// 31 minutes idle (> 30-minute IdleTimeoutMinutes).
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(31));
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Reject, result.Action);
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// An idle-timed-out session must never be refreshed instead of rejected.
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Assert.Equal(0, mapper.CallCount);
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_WithinIdleWindow_KeptAndNotRejected()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"], new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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// 10 minutes idle — well inside the 30-minute window, and BEFORE the 15-minute
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// role-refresh threshold, so the session is simply kept.
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10));
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, result.Action);
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_MissingLastActivityClaim_TreatedAsIdleTimedOut()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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// A principal with no LastActivity anchor: fail-closed to rejected.
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var identity = new ClaimsIdentity(new[]
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{
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new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType, "alice"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, Roles.Administrator),
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}, CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
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var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Reject, result.Action);
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_UnauthenticatedPrincipal_Kept()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, (await sut.ValidateAsync(null)).Action);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep,
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(await sut.ValidateAsync(new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity()))).Action);
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}
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// --- Role-mapping refresh WITHOUT LDAP ---
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_AfterRoleRefreshThreshold_RemapsFromStoredGroups_NoLdap()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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// The user logged in as a system-wide Administrator.
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var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
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new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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// The DB mapping CHANGED mid-session: the same groups now map to Viewer + site-scoped.
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(
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new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], ["7"], IsSystemWideDeployment: false));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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// Past the 15-minute role-refresh threshold (still inside the 30-minute idle window).
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(16));
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Replace, result.Action);
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Assert.NotNull(result.Principal);
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// The mapper was invoked with EXACTLY the STORED groups — no LDAP re-query.
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Assert.Equal(1, mapper.CallCount);
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Assert.Equal(new[] { "SCADA-Admins" }, mapper.LastGroups);
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// The rebuilt principal reflects the NEW DB mapping.
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var newRoles = result.Principal!.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
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Assert.Contains(Roles.Viewer, newRoles);
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Assert.DoesNotContain(Roles.Administrator, newRoles);
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Assert.Equal("7", result.Principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType)?.Value);
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// The role-refresh anchor was advanced to now.
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var refreshClaim = result.Principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType);
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Assert.NotNull(refreshClaim);
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Assert.True(DateTimeOffset.TryParse(refreshClaim!.Value, out var refreshedAt));
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Assert.Equal(clock.GetUtcNow(), refreshedAt);
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_RevokedGroupUser_LosesRolesOnRefresh()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
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new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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// The group's mapping was deleted in the DB: the same groups now map to NOTHING.
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], IsSystemWideDeployment: false));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(16));
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Replace, result.Action);
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// The user has lost ALL roles mid-session — every authorization policy will now deny.
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Assert.Empty(result.Principal!.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType));
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Assert.Empty(result.Principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType));
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_BeforeRoleRefreshThreshold_DoesNotRefresh()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
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new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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// Even though the DB mapping would now return Viewer, a refresh BEFORE the
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// 15-minute threshold must not happen — claims stay as they were at login.
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], [], false));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(14)); // < 15-minute threshold
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, result.Action);
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Assert.Equal(0, mapper.CallCount); // no re-map at all
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}
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// --- Failure policy: a refresh exception keeps the existing principal ---
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_RefreshThrows_KeepsExistingPrincipal_NoSignOut_NoThrow()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var principal = Session(Start, ["SCADA-Admins"],
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new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true));
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// The DB-backed mapper faults (e.g. SQL unreachable) DURING a due refresh.
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new InvalidOperationException("db down"));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(16)); // refresh IS due
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal); // must NOT throw
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// The session is KEPT (current roles preserved) — never rejected, never broadened.
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Keep, result.Action);
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Assert.Equal(1, mapper.CallCount);
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}
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// --- IsIdleTimedOut / IsRoleRefreshDue boundaries ---
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[Fact]
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public void IsIdleTimedOut_AtBoundary_NotTimedOut()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
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var principal = Session(Start, [], new RoleMappingResult([], [], false));
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// Exactly 30 minutes — NOT strictly greater, so not timed out.
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Assert.False(sut.IsIdleTimedOut(principal, Start.AddMinutes(30)));
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Assert.True(sut.IsIdleTimedOut(principal, Start.AddMinutes(30).AddSeconds(1)));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void IsRoleRefreshDue_AtBoundary_NotDue()
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{
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
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var principal = Session(Start, [], new RoleMappingResult([], [], false));
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Assert.False(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start.AddMinutes(15)));
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Assert.True(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start.AddMinutes(15).AddSeconds(1)));
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}
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// --- Missing/unparsable zb:lastrolerefresh anchor treated as refresh-due ---
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidateAsync_MissingLastRoleRefreshClaim_TreatedAsRefreshDue_RefreshesAndRestamps()
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{
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// Mirrors the existing MissingLastActivityClaim_TreatedAsIdleTimedOut test but for
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// the role-refresh anchor. A principal whose zb:lastrolerefresh claim is absent or
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// unparsable must be treated as "refresh due" (refresh now + re-stamp the anchor),
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// NOT as "never refresh". This prevents a stale principal from coasting forever
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// without a role re-check just because the claim was missing.
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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// The mapper returns a different mapping than the one encoded in the session, so we
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// can confirm the refresh actually ran.
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var mapper = new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], [], false));
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var sut = CreateValidator(mapper, clock);
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// Build a principal that has a valid LastActivity (not timed out) but NO lastrolerefresh.
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var identity = new ClaimsIdentity([
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new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType, "alice"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType, "Alice"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, Roles.Administrator),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.LastActivityClaimType, Start.ToString("o")),
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// Deliberately NO zb:lastrolerefresh claim.
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], CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme,
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nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
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roleType: JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType);
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var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
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var result = await sut.ValidateAsync(principal);
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// Must have triggered a refresh (Replace), NOT Keep.
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Assert.Equal(SessionValidationAction.Replace, result.Action);
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Assert.Equal(1, mapper.CallCount);
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// The rebuilt principal carries the new mapping (Viewer, not Administrator).
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var newRoles = result.Principal!.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
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Assert.Contains(Roles.Viewer, newRoles);
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Assert.DoesNotContain(Roles.Administrator, newRoles);
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// A new lastrolerefresh anchor was stamped.
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var refreshClaim = result.Principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType);
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Assert.NotNull(refreshClaim);
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Assert.True(DateTimeOffset.TryParse(refreshClaim!.Value, out _));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void IsRoleRefreshDue_MissingClaim_ReturnsDue()
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{
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// Direct helper test: a principal with no zb:lastrolerefresh claim returns true.
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
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var identity = new ClaimsIdentity([new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice")],
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CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
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var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
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Assert.True(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void IsRoleRefreshDue_UnparsableClaim_ReturnsDue()
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{
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// A present but unparsable zb:lastrolerefresh claim is treated as due, not as a
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// parse error that keeps the session stale forever.
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var clock = new TestTimeProvider(Start);
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var sut = CreateValidator(new FakeGroupRoleMapper(new RoleMappingResult([], [], false)), clock);
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var identity = new ClaimsIdentity([
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new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "alice"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType, "not-a-date"),
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], CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
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var principal = new ClaimsPrincipal(identity);
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Assert.True(sut.IsRoleRefreshDue(principal, Start));
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}
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Claim-parity tests: the shared <see cref="SessionClaimBuilder"/> must produce EXACTLY
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/// the claim shape the login endpoint historically minted (plus the M2.19 group +
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/// refresh-anchor additions), and the refresh path — which also goes through the builder —
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/// must therefore be identical. This is the load-bearing anti-drift guarantee.
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/// </summary>
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public class SessionClaimBuilderParityTests
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{
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private static readonly DateTimeOffset At = new(2026, 6, 15, 9, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero);
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[Fact]
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public void Build_ProducesCanonicalIdentityRoleAndScopeClaims_LikeLogin()
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{
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var mapping = new RoleMappingResult(
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[Roles.Administrator, Roles.Designer], ["3", "4"], IsSystemWideDeployment: false);
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var principal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("janer", "Jane Roe", ["G1", "G2"], mapping, At);
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// Identity claims — identical to the historical /auth/login set.
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Assert.Equal("janer", principal.Identity?.Name); // ClaimTypes.Name resolves Identity.Name
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Assert.Equal("Jane Roe", principal.FindFirst(ZbClaimTypes.DisplayName)?.Value);
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Assert.Equal("janer", principal.FindFirst(ZbClaimTypes.Username)?.Value);
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// Roles — one per mapped role, canonical type, and IsInRole resolves.
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var roles = principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
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Assert.Equal(new[] { Roles.Administrator, Roles.Designer }.OrderBy(r => r), roles.OrderBy(r => r));
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Assert.True(principal.IsInRole(Roles.Administrator));
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// Scope — one SiteId per permitted site (non-system-wide).
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var sites = principal.FindAll(ZbClaimTypes.ScopeId).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
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Assert.Equal(new[] { "3", "4" }.OrderBy(s => s), sites.OrderBy(s => s));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Build_SystemWideMapping_OmitsSiteIdClaims()
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{
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var mapping = new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Deployer], [], IsSystemWideDeployment: true);
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var principal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("op", "Operator", ["GlobalDeployers"], mapping, At);
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// Deny-by-omission preserved: a system-wide mapping stamps NO SiteId claims.
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Assert.Empty(principal.FindAll(ZbClaimTypes.ScopeId));
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Assert.Contains(Roles.Deployer, principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Select(c => c.Value));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Build_StoresGroupsAndRefreshAnchor_M219Additions()
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{
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var mapping = new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true);
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var principal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("janer", "Jane Roe", ["G1", "G2"], mapping, At);
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// M2.19: one zb:group claim per LDAP group, round-trippable via ReadGroups.
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Assert.Equal(new[] { "G1", "G2" }, SessionClaimBuilder.ReadGroups(principal));
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// M2.19: refresh anchor AND idle anchor seeded from the same instant.
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Assert.Equal(At.ToString("o"), principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType)?.Value);
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Assert.Equal(At.ToString("o"), principal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastActivityClaimType)?.Value);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Build_LoginThenRefresh_ProduceIdenticalClaimShape()
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{
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// The anti-drift guarantee: login and the refresh path both call Build with the
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// same inputs, so the resulting role/scope/group claim SETS are identical (only
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// the timestamp anchors differ by design).
|
|
var mapping = new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Designer], ["9"], IsSystemWideDeployment: false);
|
|
|
|
var login = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("u", "User", ["G"], mapping, At);
|
|
var refresh = SessionClaimBuilder.Build("u", "User", ["G"], mapping, At.AddMinutes(16));
|
|
|
|
static IEnumerable<string> Pairs(ClaimsPrincipal p, string type) =>
|
|
p.FindAll(type).Select(c => c.Value).OrderBy(v => v);
|
|
|
|
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, ClaimTypes.Name), Pairs(refresh, ClaimTypes.Name));
|
|
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType));
|
|
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType));
|
|
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType));
|
|
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType));
|
|
Assert.Equal(Pairs(login, JwtTokenService.GroupClaimType), Pairs(refresh, JwtTokenService.GroupClaimType));
|
|
|
|
// The refresh anchors moved forward (that is the ONLY intended difference).
|
|
Assert.NotEqual(
|
|
login.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType)?.Value,
|
|
refresh.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.LastRoleRefreshClaimType)?.Value);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endregion
|
|
|
|
#region M2.19 (#15): OnValidatePrincipalAsync adapter — translation from SessionValidationResult to cookie context calls
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Tests for the <c>ApplyValidationResultAsync</c> helper extracted from
|
|
/// <see cref="ServiceCollectionExtensions.OnValidatePrincipalAsync"/>: verifies that each
|
|
/// <see cref="SessionValidationResult"/> case is correctly translated into the
|
|
/// corresponding <see cref="CookieValidatePrincipalContext"/> mutations.
|
|
/// The pure decision-application step is tested in isolation — the DI-resolution of
|
|
/// <see cref="CookieSessionValidator"/> is a separate concern covered by the integration
|
|
/// wiring tests in <see cref="SecurityReviewRegressionTests"/>.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public class OnValidatePrincipalAdapterTests
|
|
{
|
|
private static readonly DateTimeOffset AdapterStart = new(2026, 6, 15, 12, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero);
|
|
|
|
// A minimal IAuthenticationService stub that records SignOut calls so we can assert
|
|
// the Reject path actually invokes SignOutAsync.
|
|
private sealed class StubAuthenticationService : IAuthenticationService
|
|
{
|
|
public int SignOutCallCount { get; private set; }
|
|
|
|
public Task<AuthenticateResult> AuthenticateAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme) =>
|
|
Task.FromResult(AuthenticateResult.NoResult());
|
|
|
|
public Task ChallengeAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, AuthenticationProperties? properties) =>
|
|
Task.CompletedTask;
|
|
|
|
public Task ForbidAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, AuthenticationProperties? properties) =>
|
|
Task.CompletedTask;
|
|
|
|
public Task SignInAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, ClaimsPrincipal principal, AuthenticationProperties? properties) =>
|
|
Task.CompletedTask;
|
|
|
|
public Task SignOutAsync(HttpContext context, string? scheme, AuthenticationProperties? properties)
|
|
{
|
|
SignOutCallCount++;
|
|
return Task.CompletedTask;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static (CookieValidatePrincipalContext Context, StubAuthenticationService AuthService)
|
|
BuildContext(ClaimsPrincipal principal)
|
|
{
|
|
var authService = new StubAuthenticationService();
|
|
|
|
var services = new ServiceCollection();
|
|
services.AddSingleton<IAuthenticationService>(authService);
|
|
services.AddLogging();
|
|
var serviceProvider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
|
|
|
|
var httpContext = new DefaultHttpContext { RequestServices = serviceProvider };
|
|
var ticket = new AuthenticationTicket(
|
|
principal,
|
|
new AuthenticationProperties(),
|
|
CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
|
|
var scheme = new AuthenticationScheme(
|
|
CookieAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme,
|
|
displayName: null,
|
|
handlerType: typeof(CookieAuthenticationHandler));
|
|
|
|
var context = new CookieValidatePrincipalContext(
|
|
httpContext,
|
|
scheme,
|
|
new CookieAuthenticationOptions(),
|
|
ticket);
|
|
|
|
return (context, authService);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static ClaimsPrincipal AuthenticatedPrincipal() =>
|
|
SessionClaimBuilder.Build(
|
|
"alice", "Alice",
|
|
["SCADA-Admins"],
|
|
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Administrator], [], true),
|
|
AdapterStart);
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public async Task ApplyResult_Reject_CallsRejectPrincipalAndSignsOut()
|
|
{
|
|
// The Reject result is the idle-timeout path: the adapter must call RejectPrincipal
|
|
// (sets Principal = null) AND SignOutAsync so the cookie is cleared for the next request.
|
|
var principal = AuthenticatedPrincipal();
|
|
var (ctx, authService) = BuildContext(principal);
|
|
|
|
await ServiceCollectionExtensions.ApplyValidationResultAsync(ctx, SessionValidationResult.Reject);
|
|
|
|
// RejectPrincipal() sets Principal to null.
|
|
Assert.Null(ctx.Principal);
|
|
// SignOutAsync must have been invoked exactly once.
|
|
Assert.Equal(1, authService.SignOutCallCount);
|
|
// ShouldRenew must NOT be set — we are expiring, not renewing.
|
|
Assert.False(ctx.ShouldRenew);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public async Task ApplyResult_Replace_ReplacesAndSetsRenew()
|
|
{
|
|
// The Replace result is the role-refresh path: the adapter must swap in the new
|
|
// principal and set ShouldRenew = true so the cookie is re-issued with the new claims.
|
|
var newPrincipal = SessionClaimBuilder.Build(
|
|
"alice", "Alice",
|
|
["SCADA-Admins"],
|
|
new RoleMappingResult([Roles.Viewer], [], false),
|
|
AdapterStart.AddMinutes(16));
|
|
var originalPrincipal = AuthenticatedPrincipal();
|
|
var (ctx, authService) = BuildContext(originalPrincipal);
|
|
|
|
await ServiceCollectionExtensions.ApplyValidationResultAsync(ctx, SessionValidationResult.Replace(newPrincipal));
|
|
|
|
Assert.Same(newPrincipal, ctx.Principal);
|
|
Assert.True(ctx.ShouldRenew);
|
|
Assert.Equal(0, authService.SignOutCallCount);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public async Task ApplyResult_Keep_LeavesContextUnchanged()
|
|
{
|
|
// The Keep result is the no-op path (no refresh due, or a swallowed refresh fault):
|
|
// the adapter must leave the principal and ShouldRenew completely untouched.
|
|
var principal = AuthenticatedPrincipal();
|
|
var (ctx, authService) = BuildContext(principal);
|
|
|
|
await ServiceCollectionExtensions.ApplyValidationResultAsync(ctx, SessionValidationResult.Keep);
|
|
|
|
Assert.Same(principal, ctx.Principal);
|
|
Assert.False(ctx.ShouldRenew);
|
|
Assert.Equal(0, authService.SignOutCallCount);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endregion
|
|
|
|
#region M2.19 (#15): SecurityOptionsValidator — config-guard fails startup on misconfiguration
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Tests for <see cref="SecurityOptionsValidator"/>: the startup validator that prevents
|
|
/// idle-timeout enforcement from being silently defeated by a misconfigured
|
|
/// <c>RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes >= IdleTimeoutMinutes</c>.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public class SecurityOptionsValidatorConfigGuardTests
|
|
{
|
|
private static SecurityOptions ValidOptions() => new()
|
|
{
|
|
JwtSigningKey = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough",
|
|
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
|
|
RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 15,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public void Validate_DefaultOptions_Succeeds()
|
|
{
|
|
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, ValidOptions());
|
|
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public void Validate_RefreshEqualsIdle_Fails()
|
|
{
|
|
// Equal is invalid: a refresh cycle at t=30 would advance LastActivity to t=30 which
|
|
// equals the idle timeout — enforcement is defeated.
|
|
var options = ValidOptions();
|
|
options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = options.IdleTimeoutMinutes; // 30 == 30
|
|
|
|
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, options);
|
|
|
|
Assert.True(result.Failed);
|
|
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
|
|
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.IdleTimeoutMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public void Validate_RefreshGreaterThanIdle_Fails()
|
|
{
|
|
// Inverted: refresh threshold LARGER than the idle window is clearly wrong and
|
|
// must fail loudly at startup.
|
|
var options = ValidOptions();
|
|
options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 60; // 60 > 30
|
|
|
|
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, options);
|
|
|
|
Assert.True(result.Failed);
|
|
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public void Validate_RefreshOneLessThanIdle_Succeeds()
|
|
{
|
|
// Boundary: threshold = idle - 1 is the tightest VALID configuration.
|
|
var options = ValidOptions();
|
|
options.IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30;
|
|
options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 29;
|
|
|
|
var result = new SecurityOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, options);
|
|
|
|
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public void AddSecurity_RegistersSecurityOptionsValidator_WithValidateOnStart()
|
|
{
|
|
// End-to-end wiring: AddSecurity registers SecurityOptionsValidator as
|
|
// IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>. ValidateOnStart is what makes the DI container
|
|
// call Validate on startup. We confirm the validator is present in the container.
|
|
var services = new ServiceCollection();
|
|
services.AddLogging();
|
|
services.AddDataProtection();
|
|
services.AddSecurity();
|
|
|
|
using var provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
|
|
var validators = provider.GetServices<IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>>().ToList();
|
|
Assert.Contains(validators, v => v is SecurityOptionsValidator);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[Fact]
|
|
public void AddSecurity_RegisteredValidator_DetectsMisconfiguration_WhenCalledDirectly()
|
|
{
|
|
// Confirm that the SecurityOptionsValidator registered by AddSecurity actually
|
|
// catches a bad configuration. We resolve the validator from the container and
|
|
// call it directly — the ValidateOnStart pipeline would fire the same validator
|
|
// during IHost.StartAsync in a real deployment.
|
|
var services = new ServiceCollection();
|
|
services.AddLogging();
|
|
services.AddDataProtection();
|
|
services.AddSecurity();
|
|
|
|
using var provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
|
|
var validator = provider.GetServices<IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>>()
|
|
.OfType<SecurityOptionsValidator>()
|
|
.Single();
|
|
|
|
// A configuration where RoleRefreshThreshold == IdleTimeout defeats idle enforcement.
|
|
var badOptions = new SecurityOptions
|
|
{
|
|
JwtSigningKey = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough",
|
|
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
|
|
RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes = 30, // == IdleTimeoutMinutes — invalid
|
|
};
|
|
var result = validator.Validate(name: null, badOptions);
|
|
|
|
Assert.True(result.Failed);
|
|
Assert.Contains(nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes), result.FailureMessage);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endregion
|