using Akka.Actor; using Akka.TestKit.Xunit2; using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection; using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions; using NSubstitute; using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Entities.Security; using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Interfaces.Repositories; using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Interfaces.Services; using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Management; using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security; namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ManagementService.Tests; /// /// Security-023 (membership-validation half): the LDAP-group-mapping Role arrives /// as a free string over the CLI/Management API. The single server-side write path /// (ManagementActor.HandleCreateRoleMapping / HandleUpdateRoleMapping) now /// rejects any role that is not in the canonical set, returning a /// COMMAND_FAILED error before any DB write. A non-canonical role never functioned /// (no authorization policy or ManagementActor check matched it), so rejecting it removes /// a silent-misconfiguration footgun rather than changing behaviour. /// /// /// Per Security-023's scope: only the membership check is added. The pre-existing /// case-sensitivity asymmetry (case-sensitive UI RequireClaim vs case-insensitive /// ManagementActor authz) is a separately-deferred change and is NOT touched — the /// membership check accepts a correctly-cased canonical role and stores it verbatim. /// public class RoleMappingValidationTests : TestKit, IDisposable { private readonly ISecurityRepository _securityRepo; private readonly IAuditService _auditService; private readonly ServiceCollection _services; public RoleMappingValidationTests() { _securityRepo = Substitute.For(); _auditService = Substitute.For(); _services = new ServiceCollection(); _services.AddScoped(_ => _securityRepo); _services.AddScoped(_ => _auditService); } private IActorRef CreateActor() { var sp = _services.BuildServiceProvider(); return Sys.ActorOf(Props.Create(() => new ManagementActor( sp, NullLogger.Instance))); } // CreateRoleMappingCommand / UpdateRoleMappingCommand both require Administrator // (see ManagementActor.GetRequiredRole), so the test principal carries that role. private static ManagementEnvelope Envelope(object command) => new(new AuthenticatedUser("admin", "admin", new[] { Roles.Administrator }, Array.Empty()), command, Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")); void IDisposable.Dispose() => Shutdown(); [Fact] public void CreateRoleMapping_UnknownRole_ReturnsError_NoRowInserted() { var actor = CreateActor(); actor.Tell(Envelope(new CreateRoleMappingCommand("SCADA-Admins", "Wizard"))); var response = ExpectMsg(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5)); Assert.Equal("COMMAND_FAILED", response.ErrorCode); Assert.Contains("Wizard", response.Error); _securityRepo.DidNotReceiveWithAnyArgs().AddMappingAsync(default!, default); } [Fact] public void CreateRoleMapping_MisspelledCanonicalRole_ReturnsError_NoRowInserted() { // A pure typo of a real role ("Deploer" for "Deployer") is exactly the silent // footgun Security-023 describes: it would stamp a role claim no policy matches. var actor = CreateActor(); actor.Tell(Envelope(new CreateRoleMappingCommand("SCADA-Deploy", "Deploer"))); var response = ExpectMsg(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5)); Assert.Equal("COMMAND_FAILED", response.ErrorCode); _securityRepo.DidNotReceiveWithAnyArgs().AddMappingAsync(default!, default); } [Fact] public void UpdateRoleMapping_UnknownRole_ReturnsError_NoRowUpdated() { var actor = CreateActor(); actor.Tell(Envelope(new UpdateRoleMappingCommand(7, "SCADA-Admins", "Wizard"))); var response = ExpectMsg(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5)); Assert.Equal("COMMAND_FAILED", response.ErrorCode); Assert.Contains("Wizard", response.Error); // Rejected before the mapping is even looked up. _securityRepo.DidNotReceiveWithAnyArgs().GetMappingByIdAsync(default, default); _securityRepo.DidNotReceiveWithAnyArgs().UpdateMappingAsync(default!, default); } [Fact] public void CreateRoleMapping_CanonicalRole_Succeeds_RowInserted() { LdapGroupMapping? inserted = null; _securityRepo .When(r => r.AddMappingAsync(Arg.Any(), Arg.Any())) .Do(ci => inserted = ci.Arg()); var actor = CreateActor(); actor.Tell(Envelope(new CreateRoleMappingCommand("SCADA-Deploy", Roles.Deployer))); ExpectMsg(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5)); Assert.NotNull(inserted); // A correctly-cased canonical role round-trips unchanged. Assert.Equal(Roles.Deployer, inserted!.Role); Assert.Equal("SCADA-Deploy", inserted.LdapGroupName); } [Fact] public void CreateRoleMapping_LowercaseRole_StoresCanonicalCasing() { // arch-review C5: ASP.NET RequireClaim policies compare Role ordinal // case-sensitively while the actor compares OrdinalIgnoreCase. A row stored // as "deployer" would pass every actor gate but fail every UI policy (a // CLI-works/UI-403s split-brain). The write path now canonicalizes to the // Roles.All casing, so the stored value is always "Deployer". LdapGroupMapping? inserted = null; _securityRepo .When(r => r.AddMappingAsync(Arg.Any(), Arg.Any())) .Do(ci => inserted = ci.Arg()); var actor = CreateActor(); actor.Tell(Envelope(new CreateRoleMappingCommand("SCADA-Deploy", "deployer"))); ExpectMsg(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5)); Assert.NotNull(inserted); Assert.Equal("Deployer", inserted!.Role); // canonical, not the verbatim "deployer" } [Fact] public void UpdateRoleMapping_LowercaseRole_StoresCanonicalCasing() { var existing = new LdapGroupMapping("SCADA-Deploy", Roles.Viewer) { Id = 7 }; _securityRepo.GetMappingByIdAsync(7, Arg.Any()).Returns(existing); LdapGroupMapping? updated = null; _securityRepo .When(r => r.UpdateMappingAsync(Arg.Any(), Arg.Any())) .Do(ci => updated = ci.Arg()); var actor = CreateActor(); actor.Tell(Envelope(new UpdateRoleMappingCommand(7, "SCADA-Deploy", "deployer"))); ExpectMsg(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5)); Assert.NotNull(updated); Assert.Equal("Deployer", updated!.Role); } }