using ZB.MOM.WW.Configuration;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Host;
///
/// Validates required configuration before Akka.NET actor system creation.
/// Runs early in startup to fail fast with clear error messages.
///
public static class StartupValidator
{
/// Validates required configuration values and throws listing all errors if any are found.
/// The application configuration to validate.
public static void Validate(IConfiguration configuration)
{
// Resolve the same locals the original imperative validator used, so the
// cross-field predicates below can close over them. ConfigPreflight.Require
// passes config[key] to each predicate, but the cross-field rules ignore that
// argument and read these resolved values instead — preserving the exact
// conditions (and therefore the byte-identical failure messages and ordering)
// of the original StartupValidator.
var nodeSection = configuration.GetSection("ScadaBridge:Node");
var role = nodeSection["Role"];
var portStr = nodeSection["RemotingPort"];
bool portValid = int.TryParse(portStr, out var port) && port >= 1 && port <= 65535;
var seedNodes = configuration.GetSection("ScadaBridge:Cluster:SeedNodes").Get>();
// GrpcPort: default 8083 when absent; only fails the range rule when the key is
// present AND invalid. The out-param assignment mirrors the original so the
// resolved grpcPort feeds the cross-field rules even on a parse failure.
var grpcPortStr = nodeSection["GrpcPort"];
int grpcPort = 8083; // NodeOptions default when the key is absent
bool grpcValid = !(grpcPortStr != null && (!int.TryParse(grpcPortStr, out grpcPort) || grpcPort < 1 || grpcPort > 65535));
// MetricsPort: default 8084 when absent; same parse-or-default contract as GrpcPort.
var metricsPortStr = nodeSection["MetricsPort"];
int metricsPort = 8084; // NodeOptions default when the key is absent
bool metricsValid = !(metricsPortStr != null && (!int.TryParse(metricsPortStr, out metricsPort) || metricsPort < 1 || metricsPort > 65535));
ConfigPreflight.For(configuration)
// Role / NodeHostname / RemotingPort (unconditional)
.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:Role",
_ => !(string.IsNullOrEmpty(role) || (role != "Central" && role != "Site")),
"must be 'Central' or 'Site'")
.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:NodeHostname",
_ => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(nodeSection["NodeHostname"]),
"is required")
.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:RemotingPort",
_ => portValid,
"must be 1-65535")
// SiteId (Site only) — note: OUTSIDE the big Site block in the original,
// so it must run before the unconditional SeedNodes-count rule.
.When(role == "Site", p => p
.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:SiteId",
_ => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(nodeSection["SiteId"]),
"is required for Site nodes"))
// Central-only database/security rules.
.When(role == "Central", p => p
.Require("ScadaBridge:Database:ConfigurationDb",
_ => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(configuration.GetSection("ScadaBridge:Database")["ConfigurationDb"]),
"connection string required for Central")
.Require("ScadaBridge:Database:MachineDataDb",
_ => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(configuration.GetSection("ScadaBridge:Database")["MachineDataDb"]),
"connection string required for Central")
// The LDAP server key moved into the nested Security:Ldap
// sub-section (bound to the shared LdapOptions). Validate the nested key so
// the pre-host preflight still fails fast on a missing LDAP server for
// Central. The full LDAP option set (SearchBase / ServiceAccountDn /
// transport) is additionally validated post-host by the shared
// LdapOptionsValidator (registered with ValidateOnStart by AddZbLdapAuth).
.Require("ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap:Server",
_ => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(configuration.GetSection("ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap")["Server"]),
"required for Central")
.Require("ScadaBridge:Security:JwtSigningKey",
_ => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(configuration.GetSection("ScadaBridge:Security")["JwtSigningKey"]),
"required for Central")
// The inbound API-key pepper
// backs the peppered-HMAC secret compare in the shared
// ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys verifier (wired by AddZbApiKeyAuth at the
// Central composition root). A missing or too-short pepper does not
// fault at boot — the verifier just fails every secret compare, so the
// inbound API silently serves 401s to otherwise-valid keys. Validate it
// here (Central-only, pre-host) so a misconfigured pepper fails fast at
// startup with a clear message instead of as a runtime auth blackout.
// The Require predicate receives config[key] directly; the >=16-char
// floor matches the test pepper's minimum and the secret-strength
// baseline used elsewhere.
.Require("ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyPepper",
value => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(value) && value.Length >= 16,
"is required and must be at least 16 characters for Central (backs the inbound API-key peppered-HMAC verifier)"))
// SeedNodes count (unconditional, after SiteId).
.Require("ScadaBridge:Cluster:SeedNodes",
_ => seedNodes != null && seedNodes.Count >= 2,
"must have at least 2 entries")
// Self-first seed ordering (decision 2026-07-22). Akka runs FirstSeedNodeProcess —
// the ONLY bootstrap path that can form a new cluster when no peer answers InitJoin —
// exclusively when seed-nodes[0] is this node's own address. Every other node runs
// JoinSeedNodeProcess and retries InitJoin forever, so a node listing its partner
// first cannot cold-start alone: that is the "registered outage gap"
// (docker/README.md), and it is a silent failure at boot rather than a loud one.
// Enforced here rather than in ClusterOptionsValidator because only this validator
// sees both the node identity and the seed list.
.Require("ScadaBridge:Cluster:SeedNodes",
_ => seedNodes is not { Count: >= 1 }
|| SeedNodeIsSelf(seedNodes[0], nodeSection["NodeHostname"], port),
"must list this node itself first: seed-nodes[0] has to be this node's own "
+ $"'akka.tcp://scadabridge@{nodeSection["NodeHostname"]}:{port}'. Akka only lets "
+ "seed-nodes[0] form a new cluster, so with the partner listed first this node "
+ "can never start while its peer is down (Component-ClusterInfrastructure.md → "
+ "Seed Node Ordering)")
// The big Site-only block: GrpcPort/MetricsPort validity + cross-field
// collisions + seed-node-port loop, in the original order.
.When(role == "Site", p =>
{
// GrpcPort range, then GrpcPort vs RemotingPort.
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:GrpcPort", _ => grpcValid, "must be 1-65535");
// Identical GrpcPort/RemotingPort make Kestrel and Akka.Remote contend
// for the same TCP port. Uses the resolved GrpcPort, including 8083.
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:GrpcPort", _ => port != grpcPort, "must differ from RemotingPort");
// MetricsPort range, then MetricsPort vs both ports.
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:MetricsPort", _ => metricsValid, "must be 1-65535");
// The Kestrel metrics (HTTP/1.1) listener port must differ from BOTH the
// Akka remoting port and the gRPC port. Uses the resolved MetricsPort (8084 default).
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:MetricsPort", _ => metricsPort != port, "must differ from RemotingPort");
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Node:MetricsPort", _ => metricsPort != grpcPort, "must differ from GrpcPort");
// The gRPC control-plane preshared key. Same argument as the inbound
// API-key pepper above: without it the node boots and looks healthy, but
// ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor is fail-closed, so every SiteStream call —
// live subscriptions, audit pulls, cached-telemetry ingest — is refused
// with PermissionDenied. A silent, total loss of the site's central-facing
// surface is far worse than a loud boot failure, so require it here.
// Central holds the matching value per site in its secret store as
// SB-GRPC-PSK-{SiteId}; production supplies this one as
// ${secret:SB-GRPC-PSK-}, expanded before the host is built.
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Communication:GrpcPsk",
value => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value),
"is required for Site nodes: it is the preshared key the gRPC control "
+ "plane authenticates with, and the interceptor is fail-closed, so an "
+ "unset key refuses every SiteStream call. Set the same value here (in "
+ "production as ${secret:SB-GRPC-PSK-}) and under the secret "
+ "name SB-GRPC-PSK- in central's secret store");
// gRPC (CentralControlService) is the only site→central transport after the
// ClusterClient→gRPC migration's Phase 4 — the Akka ClusterClient path and its
// CentralContactPoints option are gone. A site with no central gRPC endpoint has
// nothing to dial: heartbeats, health reports, notification forwards and audit
// ingest all silently fail. The shared CommunicationOptionsValidator only rejects
// BLANK entries (it is role-agnostic, and central nodes legitimately leave the list
// empty), so the "a Site must have at least one" rule lives here, where the role is
// known. The predicate reads index :0 directly, so its non-empty presence proves the
// list has a usable first endpoint.
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Communication:CentralGrpcEndpoints:0",
value => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value),
"is required for Site nodes: gRPC (CentralControlService) is the only "
+ "site→central transport, so each site must list at least one central gRPC "
+ "endpoint under ScadaBridge:Communication:CentralGrpcEndpoints "
+ "(e.g. http://scadabridge-central-a:8083). Central nodes leave it empty.");
// The site hot-path audit writer's SQLite file (arch-review remediation
// WP1.2). SqliteAuditWriterOptions.DatabasePath has no default (mirrors
// LocalDb:Path) — an unset value would previously fall back to a bare
// "auditlog.db" resolved relative to the process CWD, which on the docker
// rig is the container's ephemeral overlayfs, not the mounted /app/data
// volume: the file, and every pending (not-yet-forwarded) audit row in it,
// was silently discarded on every container recreate. AddAuditLog binds
// this options type on BOTH roles (SqliteAuditWriterOptionsValidator
// deliberately does not check DatabasePath there, so Central's boot is
// unaffected — see that validator's remarks), so the Site-only requirement
// lives here, the same way GrpcPsk is gated just above. NOTE: unlike every
// other key in this method, AuditLog:SiteWriter is a TOP-LEVEL config
// section (AddAuditLog binds "AuditLog:SiteWriter" off the configuration
// root, not "ScadaBridge:AuditLog:SiteWriter") — no ScadaBridge: prefix.
p.Require("AuditLog:SiteWriter:DatabasePath",
value => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value),
"is required for Site nodes: the SQLite hot-path audit writer has no "
+ "default path (mirrors LocalDb:Path) — an unset value would silently "
+ "resolve to a CWD-relative file on the container's ephemeral overlayfs "
+ "and lose the pending audit backlog on every redeploy. Point it at the "
+ "mounted data volume, e.g. /app/data/auditlog.db.");
// ScadaBridge:Database:SiteDbPath was required here until LocalDb
// Phase 2. The site's tables now live in the consolidated LocalDb
// database (LocalDb:Path, which SiteServiceRegistration requires),
// and SiteDbPath survives only as the legacy migration source — so
// its absence means "nothing to migrate", not a misconfiguration.
// DatabaseOptionsValidator still rejects a present-but-blank value.
// A seed node must reference an Akka.Remote endpoint, never the
// Kestrel HTTP/2 gRPC port. A seed entry whose port equals this node's
// GrpcPort would make a joining node attempt an Akka.Remote TCP
// association against the gRPC listener and fail.
foreach (var seed in seedNodes ?? Enumerable.Empty())
{
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Cluster:SeedNodes",
_ => SeedNodePort(seed) != grpcPort,
$"entry '{seed}' must not target the gRPC port " +
$"({grpcPort}); seed nodes must reference Akka remoting ports");
// Same failure mode as the gRPC guard: the Kestrel HTTP/1.1
// metrics listener is not an Akka.Remote endpoint, so a seed on
// it dials a doomed association forever.
p.Require("ScadaBridge:Cluster:SeedNodes",
_ => SeedNodePort(seed) != metricsPort,
$"entry '{seed}' must not target the metrics port " +
$"({metricsPort}); seed nodes must reference Akka remoting ports");
}
})
.ThrowIfInvalid();
}
///
/// Extracts the TCP port from an Akka seed-node address of the form
/// akka.tcp://system@host:port. Returns -1 when no port can be parsed.
///
private static int SeedNodePort(string seedNode)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(seedNode))
return -1;
var lastColon = seedNode.LastIndexOf(':');
if (lastColon < 0 || lastColon == seedNode.Length - 1)
return -1;
return int.TryParse(seedNode[(lastColon + 1)..], out var port) ? port : -1;
}
///
/// Extracts the host from an Akka seed-node address of the form
/// akka.tcp://system@host:port. Returns an empty string when no host can be parsed.
///
private static string SeedNodeHost(string seedNode)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(seedNode))
return string.Empty;
var at = seedNode.LastIndexOf('@');
var lastColon = seedNode.LastIndexOf(':');
if (at < 0 || lastColon <= at)
return string.Empty;
return seedNode[(at + 1)..lastColon];
}
///
/// True when addresses this node itself (host AND port).
/// Host comparison is case-insensitive because DNS names are; it is otherwise exact —
/// Akka does no DNS canonicalisation either, so node-a and
/// node-a.example.com are genuinely different seed identities to the cluster.
///
private static bool SeedNodeIsSelf(string seedNode, string? nodeHostname, int remotingPort)
{
return SeedNodePort(seedNode) == remotingPort
&& string.Equals(SeedNodeHost(seedNode), nodeHostname, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
}