Full-scale run executed on this machine: 10 sites x 500 instances x 75 tags =
375,000 live tag subscriptions, 37,518 updates/s achieved vs 37,500 nominal,
45,021,375 updates over a 20-minute steady-state window (M4 Pro, 14 cores, 48 GB,
with the 8-node docker rig still running so the figures are pessimistic).
11 clean passes, 1 pass with a caveat, 0 failures:
tag latency P50 0.88ms P99 4.57ms max 37.41ms (1.1M samples, end-to-end)
stream 900,675 delivered, 0 dropped at 100 live subscribers
health collect+ingest P99 0.31ms, 10/10 sites tracked
debug view P99 2.19ms, 264 completed, 0 timeouts
deploy 500 instances to a site in 2.6s
cpu 41% of ONE core = 2.9% of the box
memory working-set slope +8.83 MB/min
Three findings, reported rather than tuned away:
F1 (Low) 20 min with ZERO gen-2 collections cannot fully settle the leak
question; the heap demonstrably sawtooths but an uncompacted gen-2 makes a
positive slope ambiguous. The 1-hour run would settle it. Not tuned.
F2 (informational, by design) a deferred S&F backlog sits for one full
DefaultRetryInterval (28.9s measured) before anything drains --
EnqueueAsync(attemptImmediateDelivery:false) stamps LastAttemptAt. Easy to
misread as slow drainage, so drain is reported as two numbers: retry wait,
then 3,533 msg/s of actual capacity.
F3 (positive) slow-subscriber isolation is TOTAL: 4 healthy subscribers at
100.00% with zero drops while a peer lost 197,028/200,000 events entirely
within its own bounded channel. Mechanism recorded link by link.
Also records what the run does NOT prove (not clustered, not real-network, not
real OPC UA, not 1 hour) and the four WP-4 sub-criteria this harness does not
cover, so the evidence is not over-read.
Register rows 25 and 50 -> RESOLVED 2026-08-15; remediation execution-log
residual 7 -> resolved; phase-8-checklist WP-4 section replaced with the
measured numbers.
Records harness architecture, the real-vs-faked table with a justification per fake,
metric definitions, falsifiable pass/fail thresholds derived from the WP-4 acceptance
criteria, and the eight deviations from the WP-4 protocol with reasons — including the
1-hour to 20-minute sustained-window shortening (memory reported as a slope so a
shorter window still answers the leak question) and the four [xc-*] criteria this
harness does not cover.
Final consistency sweep per plan §6: verified component docs against shipped
WP1-WP3 + adversarial-review-fix state, corrected drift found in SiteRuntime
(recursion-exempt run cap, stale ScriptExecutionActor/AlarmExecutionActor
references), TemplateEngine (BundleImporter watermark path), DeploymentManager
(phase-2 PendingDeployment staging), CentralUI (shared KPI cache, dedup'd alarm
poll, render coalescing), StoreAndForward (rate-limited drop logging), and
ConfigurationDatabase (documented DbContext-pooling non-adoption). Updated the
docs/components/ developer-reference set (SiteRuntime, SiteEventLogging,
InboundAPI) to drop the deleted per-run actor classes. Amended one known-issue
for the superseding MaxBatchSize:64 read-page pin. Added CLAUDE.md bullets for
stream graceful-completion reconnect, the required site audit DB path, honest
CLI HTTP timeouts, bulk DeploySiteAsync, and LocalDb 0.2.1. New execution log
records the phase→commit map, gate results, adversarial-review tally, the
three test-flake root causes, and the nine-item residuals register.
Six adversarial-review findings in the central SQL/ingest layer.
F1 (AuditLogRepository.InsertChunkAsync) — the set-based ingest declared each
string parameter at its COLUMN width (Actor/Target 256, Action 64, Outcome 16,
Category 32, SourceNode 64), so SqlClient truncated an over-long value at bind
time and committed the mutilated row — silent, in an append-only store, with no
PayloadTruncated flag — while the per-row and reconciliation paths sent the same
value in full and let the server reject it with 2628. Bind at the value's own
length instead; explicit SqlDbType is kept (it fixes the VALUES constructor's
derived column types and datetime2 precision). Design: reject everywhere,
truncate nowhere — matching today's per-row behaviour.
F2 (SiteCallAuditRepository.UpsertAsync) — the single-statement upsert ran the
monotonic UPDATE first and INSERTed only if nothing matched. Two writers racing
the first packet of one TrackedOperationId (the cached dual-write and the
reconciliation pull carry DIFFERENT lifecycle states) both matched nothing, and
the loser then skipped its INSERT or swallowed a 2627 — dropping its
Status/RetryCount/HttpStatus/TerminalAtUtc. Legs swapped to
`IF NOT EXISTS … INSERT; UPDATE <monotonic>` — still one round trip, and the
loser's UPDATE now lands on the winner's row. The duplicate-key catch re-runs
the monotonic UPDATE for the same reason. Moved to raw SQL with explicitly-typed
parameters so the intricate rank predicate exists in exactly one place (an
untyped DateTime would bind as `datetime` and round the freshness tiebreaker).
F3 (docs/plans/sql/*.sql) — filtered-index DDL failed with error 1934 under the
documented `docker exec … sqlcmd` path, which defaults QUOTED_IDENTIFIER OFF;
once IX_Notifications_Delivered exists, QI-OFF DML on Notifications fails too.
All four scripts now open with `SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON; SET ANSI_NULLS ON; GO`
(own batch, so it is in force when the next batch parses), and the migration
convention in Component-ConfigurationDatabase.md documents `sqlcmd -I`. Verified
live: the pre-fix script fails 1934 without -I, the fixed one applies.
F4 (SiteCallAuditActor) — the off-mailbox reconciliation/purge passes reuse the
injected repository, so tests drove one DbContext from the pass and a mailbox
handler concurrently. Serialized at the CALL via a private SerializedRepository
wrapper applied only by the test constructors, rather than running the pass
on-mailbox: production keeps its PipeTo shape untouched, and the existing
"a blocked drain does not stall ingest/query/KPI" regression tests stay
meaningful (they would have been invalidated by suspending the mailbox).
F5 (AuditLogIngestActor) — when the batch failed because the 20 s IngestBudget
expired, the per-row fallback reused the same expired token: N instant failures,
N counter bumps, zero accepted. The fallback now gets a fresh 5 s budget (inside
the 30 s outer Ask), and a blown budget bumps the failure counter ONCE for the
batch instead of once per row.
F6 (NotificationOutboxRepository.UpdateAsync) — ExecuteUpdate's row count was
discarded, so an operator Retry/Discard of a notification the retention purge had
already deleted reported success (the pre-ExecuteUpdate code threw
DbUpdateConcurrencyException). UpdateAsync now returns whether a row matched; the
operator one-shots answer "notification not found" and emit no audit row for the
action that did not happen, while the dispatcher logs a warning (its delivery
already happened; nothing to retry). GetByIdAsync switched to AsNoTracking since
the write is out-of-band.
Tests: 5 new SQL-backed regressions (over-long Target rejected on both paths +
boundary round-trip; concurrent first-write and already-created-by-another-writer
upserts; vanished-row UpdateAsync), a token-identity pin on the ingest fallback,
a repository-concurrency detector for the SiteCallAudit passes, and vanished-row
operator-path tests. The F1/F2/F4 regressions were each confirmed failing against
the pre-fix code. Suites: ConfigurationDatabase 369, AuditLog 378, SiteCallAudit
66, NotificationOutbox 152 — all green, solution builds with 0 warnings.
The sweep's modal re-key (holding the row's id and re-resolving it, rather than
holding the record) also used that resolve as the modal's visibility gate. That
makes the modal's existence a function of list contents: any render where the
row is momentarily unresolvable unmounts the whole subtree and disposes every
event-handler id inside it, Close's included. A click already in flight against
a disposed handler makes the renderer throw GetRequiredEventBindingEntry during
DispatchEventAsync — which is how this surfaced, as an intermittent failure of
CloseButton_DismissesModal (989/990 on one run, green on re-run).
The record-held form made that structurally impossible: the modal existed
because the user opened it, and no list mutation could retract that. This
restores the property while keeping the re-key's actual benefit. Visibility now
gates on the held id; the resolve drives only content. An unresolvable row
degrades to an explicit notice and hides the row-scoped actions, while the frame
and Close stay mounted. Detail fetched by id still renders, so the user does not
lose the body they opened.
Applied to all four surfaces that shared the construction: NotificationReport,
ConfigurationAuditLog, ParkedMessages (offcanvas drawer) and SiteCallsReport.
Modal_StaysOpen_WhenItsRowLeavesThePage drops the opened row from the next query
and asserts the modal survives, keeps its fetched body, hides Retry/Discard, and
that Close still works. It was run against a deliberately restored defective
gate and failed there before passing here — a regression test that passes both
ways would be worthless against a race. 20 consecutive runs of the previously
flaky class: no failures. CentralUI.Tests 991/991, solution build 0/0.
The plan doc gains a section recording that the sweep was reported as
behaviour-preserving when it was not, and why the merge review missed it.
Applies the family-wide admin-UI cleanup playbook to the Central UI so the
Blazor surfaces stop diverging from the shared kit: buttons are grouped rather
than individually sized, long cell values are contained instead of widening
tables, and hard-coded colours give way to theme tokens.
The headline fix is that MainLayout passed Accent="#2f5fd0" to ThemeShell,
which the kit emits as an inline style on the shell root. Being a descendant of
<html>, it beat the [data-bs-theme="dark"] override for the entire app, so the
dark accent had never rendered. Declaring --accent in site.css :root instead
lets both schemes resolve; light is unchanged because the value already matched
the kit's light default.
Theme pins to 0.4.1, which upstreams the local .btn sizing block verbatim, so
that block is deleted here rather than duplicated. Verified byte-identical
before removal; the repo now declares no --bs-btn-* anywhere.
NOT purely cosmetic, contrary to the sweep's stated scope: four detail-modal
surfaces (NotificationReport, ConfigurationAuditLog, ParkedMessages,
SiteCallsReport) were additionally refactored from holding the selected record
to holding its id and re-resolving from the current page each render, with the
resolve doubling as the visibility gate. A background refresh that drops the
row now closes the modal instead of showing a stale snapshot. This is a
behaviour change and is called out rather than buried: a full-suite run turned
up one intermittent CentralUI failure, CloseButton_DismissesModal, whose stack
(GetRequiredEventBindingEntry during DispatchEventAsync) indicates the handler
was disposed between render and click — a window the previous field-held record
made structurally impossible. Treat the modal lifecycle here as unreviewed.
Build 0/0; suite green apart from that one intermittent failure.
On-prem Exchange 2013 EWS (Basic over HTTPS, live-probed) becomes a second
selectable email transport beside SMTP: additive SmtpConfiguration.Transport
discriminator, hand-rolled CreateItem SOAP sender (no SDK, BCC-only,
SendOnly), EwsErrorClassifier mirroring the SMTP transient/permanent split,
CLI/UI transport selector, fake-EWS unit stub + one-off live gate. The
pending O365 SMTP-OAuth2 verification (Q12) is superseded — real mail infra
is on-prem EWS. Design only; no implementation. Also gitignore the untracked
dev-credential file email_details.txt.
0.5.1 (scadaproj 31ca940) fixes the virgin-DB concurrent migrator race this gate
found: the retry filter now covers 2714/1913/2627 alongside deadlock 1205. Rig
rebuilt on the bumped pins and the exact trigger re-drilled — ZbSecretsHub dropped
and recreated empty, both centrals started in one docker invocation — and both
booted clean in the same second (schema provisioned once, /health/ready 200 both,
no 2714, no wedge), where 0.5.0 crashed central-a under identical conditions.
Convergence re-smoked on the new image (13 s, decrypt-verified). Gate doc amended:
defect 1 disposition FIXED in 0.5.1 with the re-drill evidence; defect 2
(pre-Serilog wedge) remains open pending its own issue.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Rig config: central pair gains Secrets__SqlServer__ConnectionString (dedicated
ZbSecretsHub database on the existing scadabridge-mssql, dev credentials); site-a
pair gains Secrets__GrpcHub__FallbackEndpoints__0 = central-b. Gate doc records
5/5 PASS (parity-by-construction, both-direction failover incl. recovered-primary
wrap, delete-while-follower-offline with no resurrection, Layer-A expander
provably reading the shared store via a stale-SQLite decoy discrimination, and
fail-closed negatives), discharging the Program.cs SQL-expander offline-test
residual, plus two defects documented NOT patched: the SqlServer migrator's
concurrent virgin-DB CREATE SCHEMA race (error 2714 not in the retry filter) and
the Host's pre-Serilog crash path wedging at 100% CPU instead of exiting.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Second pass on the 0.4.1 image, from a clean start with zero denial warnings on
central-a. Both auth negatives are still refused with a byte-identical
Unauthenticated status and detail - 0.4.1 changed what the server writes down,
not what a caller sees - and the no-bearer call now produces a WRN in the same
second it is refused, with the cause attributed. No interval has to elapse for
the first denial to be visible, which is the whole point: a follower with a
mis-rotated token is refused on every sweep, and central now says so immediately.
The rate limit was proven to DEFER rather than drop, not assumed to. The
wrong-bearer call one second later fell inside the 60 s window and produced no
line of its own; the window was waited out and one further wrong-bearer call
issued, whose summary reported TWO wrong-credential denials - the deferred one
plus the new one. Summing the two lines gives exactly the three negatives issued,
correctly attributed by cause. N is a per-window delta, so a reader must sum the
lines rather than quote the last one; that is recorded as a follow-up because it
is the kind of thing an alert gets wrong.
Log hygiene re-run fleet-wide and widened: all eight nodes' docker logs and every
on-disk Serilog file were grepped for the dev token, the dev KEK, all three secret
plaintexts AND both wrong tokens the negatives presented. Zero hits everywhere.
The presented-credential check is deliberate - echoing a rejected credential back
into a log is its own leak and a free oracle, and the new warning counts denials
by cause without carrying any credential material.
Checks 2 and 3 were not repeated: 0.4.1 touches the hub's denial logging and
nothing else - no wire change, no store change, no sweep change. Convergence was
re-smoked instead so the new image is not merely assumed to replicate: a fresh
secret reached both followers in 17 s, byte-identical and decrypt-verified on
both, and the first pass's live secret and tombstone survived the image swap
unchanged on all three nodes.
The first-pass FAIL evidence is kept intact rather than overwritten. The fix only
means anything against the failure it answers, and a gate doc that shows only the
green run cannot be audited.
Residuals stand as recorded: the hub client dials a single endpoint with no
failover, and the central pair does not converge with itself - central-b answered
an authenticated GetManifest with an empty manifest for the whole run. Those are
one question, not two.
4/4. Merging.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Rig config enabling the pull-only hub on the docker cluster (central pair hosts,
site-a pair follows; site-b and site-c deliberately left off so the default-OFF
posture is proven side by side), plus the gate record.
Checks 1-3 PASS. A central write reaches both site-a nodes in 5 s with a
byte-identical ciphertext row and decrypts correctly on both; a site pair boots
and serves its full last-known-good store with the entire central pair stopped,
warning once per interval without crashing, and resumes convergence unaided when
central returns; a tombstone propagates in under 9 s and survives a pair restart
with central up and sweeping, without resurrecting.
Check 4 FAILS one clause of three. Both auth negatives - absent bearer and wrong
bearer - are denied with a byte-identical Unauthenticated status and detail, and
a fleet-wide grep of all eight nodes' docker logs and on-disk Serilog files finds
ZERO occurrences of the dev token, the dev KEK or either plaintext. But the
criterion also asks for a server-side WARNING on denial, and there is none: the
only record is one Information line per call from Grpc.AspNetCore.Server, because
SecretsHubAuthInterceptor deliberately logs nothing on a denial and warns only
when no token is configured at all. That is a property of the 0.4.0 library, not
of this branch, and it is not patched here - a host-side interceptor would
contradict a documented library decision at the wrong layer and put an unbounded
log write on an unauthenticated endpoint.
The merge condition is 4/4, so this branch is NOT merged. The library's denial
logging is the only thing between this result and a merge.
Two residuals worth carrying: the hub client dials a single endpoint and does not
fail over (observed live, and contrasted against CentralGrpcEndpoints failing over
on the same node in the same minute), and the central pair does not converge with
itself - central-b answered an authenticated GetManifest with an empty manifest
for the whole run while central-a held both secrets. Together those make "which
central node is authoritative for secrets" one question, not two.
Rig config notes: Secrets__SqlitePath points at /app/data because the appsettings
default resolves to /app inside the image's writable layer, so the central pair
gained the per-node data volume the site pairs already had. All values are
dev-only and committed under the same exception the mesh PSKs already use.
Also recorded: a gate-METHOD defect. Seeding the bind-mounted store from the macOS
host is not coherent with the running container - the row was visible to the host
and to a fresh container but never to the node, and was lost outright on restart.
Every store access was redone from a throwaway container. The failure mode is a
convincing false negative that looks exactly like a broken hub.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Design doc and code travel together (CLAUDE.md editing rules), so this records
what the two preceding commits shipped and, more usefully, WHY the non-obvious
choices were made -- the parts a future reader would otherwise re-litigate:
- Component-SiteRuntime.md: the Alarms.CurrentAsync() runtime API entry (why
it is not scope-prefixed, why it is read-only, why placeholder rows are
included), the full ScriptAlarm shape, AckTime on the enriched
AlarmStateChanged, proto field 24, and the metadata_json-vs-new-column
persistence rationale (native_alarm_state is RegisterReplicated; LocalDb
builds its CDC triggers from the column list at registration time).
- Component-DataConnectionLayer.md already carried the AckTime section in the
first commit; this adds the SiteRuntime/ScriptAnalysis/InboundAPI halves.
- Component-ScriptAnalysis.md: accessors returning domain types return the
SAME type on both surfaces, and the trust-model note that a deny-list needs
no entry for a new globals member -- only that its return type resolves in
a permitted namespace.
- Component-InboundAPI.md records the NEGATIVE decision: there is
deliberately no Route.To(...).GetAlarms(...) verb. Alarm state is
per-instance and lives on the site's Instance Actor, so the read goes
through a routed site script and the filtering happens where the data is;
central stays a thin router.
- CLAUDE.md native-alarm bullet gains the enrichment + accessor summary.
- The plan's §7 Phase 1 rows are ticked with 2026-08-01 and annotated with
what was actually built (incl. the two choices that differ from the plan's
"or" options: a dedicated snapshot message rather than DebugSnapshotRequest,
and the extra SandboxScriptHost mirror the plan did not list). Phases 2-4
stay open -- they are deployed config and need a live rig.
T34c only fixed the bounded modal-surface offenders. Bootstrap 5.3's bg-light
and bg-white are fixed light values that do NOT flip under [data-bs-theme=dark],
so every remaining use was a dark-mode contrast break. 35 swaps across 19 files:
surface / <pre> / <code> bg-light -> bg-body-secondary
panel bg-white -> bg-body
neutral badge bg-light text-dark -> bg-secondary-subtle text-secondary-emphasis
muted badge / input group bg-light text-muted -> bg-body-secondary text-body-secondary
DELIBERATELY LEFT (7 sites): the neutral member of a status-badge switch or
ternary whose siblings are all solid, non-theme-aware colours (bg-success,
bg-danger, bg-warning) — swapping only the neutral one to a subtle token breaks
the visual weight of the set, so these stay until the whole family is retoned:
Topology.razor:513 (Current badge) and :588 (InstanceState.NotDeployed)
InstanceConfigure.razor:1520 (same InstanceState switch)
NotificationReport.razor StatusBadgeClass fallback
TransportImport.razor ConflictKind badge fallback
SecuredWrites.razor text-bg-light fallback (a text-bg-* family with no
theme-aware member at all)
Health.razor:377 depth ternary
Also untouched by design: SchemaBuilder.razor:88 (already bg-light-subtle,
theme-aware), bg-dark text-light console panels, and site.css / #reconnect-modal.
InstanceConfigure.razor is edited concurrently elsewhere; its change here is 5
pure class-string swaps on existing lines, no reflow. No test asserted any of
these classes. Also marks all four M10 residuals done in the plan doc.
Two verified-absent parity gaps between the service layer and the CLI /
ManagementActor command surface, both left as follow-ups by the 2026-05-11
design plans.
(1) area move. AreaService.MoveAreaAsync had existed since the deployment
topology page shipped but was reachable only from the Blazor UI. Adds
MoveAreaCommand(AreaId, NewParentAreaId?) to Commons, a ManagementActor
dispatch arm delegating straight to AreaService.MoveAreaAsync (not-found /
self-parent / descendant-cycle / cross-site / name-collision all surface as
the standard curated ManagementCommandException failure response; the service
writes its own "Move" audit row), and the CLI verb `site area move --id
[--parent-id]`. Omitting --parent-id moves the area to the site root, matching
the command's nullable NewParentAreaId. The command carries the SAME any-of
[Designer, Deployer] gate as CreateArea/UpdateArea/DeleteArea (arch-review C6):
re-parenting is the same structural authoring act, exposed on the same two
surfaces. Placed under the existing `site area` group rather than a new
top-level `area` group, alongside its create/update/delete siblings.
(2) template folder verbs. The five folder management commands have been
handled by ManagementActor since the folder-hierarchy plan, but the promised
CLI surface was never written. Adds `template folder
list|create|rename|move|reorder|delete` mapping 1:1 onto ListTemplateFolders /
CreateTemplateFolder / RenameTemplateFolder / MoveTemplateFolder /
ReorderTemplateFolder / DeleteTemplateFolder. --parent-id is omitted to target
the tree root; --direction takes the lowercase literals up/down, validated at
parse time by AcceptOnlyFromAmong (same case-sensitive contract as the audit
--channel/--kind/--status options).
Follow-on updates: the frozen authorization matrix gains its MoveArea entry
(reflection-driven, so a missing entry would have failed CI); CommandTreeTests
pins both new verb sets plus the omit-parent-id-means-root parse behaviour and
registry round-trips; ManagementActorTests covers the MoveArea role gate and
the delegate-to-service success/root/cycle/not-found paths; the CLI README and
Component-ManagementService.md document the new surface (the latter also gained
the previously-undocumented ReorderTemplateFolder); both plan docs' follow-up
lines are marked done.
Adds rows 23-26 to the deferred-work register: live LDAP group-membership
re-query (blocked on ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap gaining a passwordless group
search), M8 large-bundle perf hardening (logged in the M9 completion design,
never given a plan or perf test), the Phase-8 WP-4 target-scale load test
(claimed complete by a 107-byte checklist stub with no evidence), and the
Ipsen MES MoveIn tail (-LT routing, PLC-output flags, Z28062 data).
Splits the review-08 "Failover-timing + broader perf envelope" row: the
failover-timing half is resolved by FailoverTimingTests, now a live [Fact]
on TwoNodeClusterFixture at production timings (PLAN-R2-01 T4); the S&F
drain-rate + per-subscriber backpressure half stays open as its own row.
Moves the closed folder drag-drop row (18, [PERM]) out of Deferred into the
Resolved table per the register's own rule.
Design review 2026-08-01: (1) MES relevance = dedicated severity band 900-999
(script constants, real IsFlaggedForMES predicate); (2) MESReceiver version
DROPPED — CvdReactor is the only implementation, router returns a clean
not-supported error elsewhere; (3) Description = Message else AlarmTypeName;
(4) enrich the native mirror NOW with an additive AckTime (proto +
native_alarm_state + DCL stamping); (5) script names match the endpoints;
(6) shared ReactorAlarms on both sides, suffix behavior as planned;
(7) existing MES API key, no new roles. Plan is now ready to execute.
Rebuilt scadabridge:latest from main @ 8524a7f7 and recreated only the
env2 containers. All three gate checks pass on site-x:
1. both site nodes boot with the key (StartupValidator fail-closed →
reaching 'Application started' proves the key present);
2. control-plane PSK auth: no-header / wrong-key ⇒ PermissionDenied,
correct key ⇒ success, on both nodes (:9123, :9124);
3. LocalDb unaffected (local-only; 0 errors, healthy boot).
Bonus: central registers site-x online via gRPC heartbeat; no real
ClusterClient/receptionist (only the benign ClusterClientSiteAuditClient
label, same as the primary rig). Noted a seed-data gap (ScadaBridgeConfig2
dbo.Sites is empty) — orthogonal to the transport.
ClusterClient→gRPC migration Phase 4 (docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md).
Phases 2/3 proved both directions on gRPC; this removes the Akka transport underneath.
Deleted:
- AkkaCentralTransport, AkkaSiteTransport (+ their dedicated tests)
- ISiteClientFactory + DefaultSiteClientFactory; CentralCommunicationActor legacy
ctor + SelectTransport (Host now builds GrpcSiteTransport and injects it)
- ClusterClient creation + both ClusterClientReceptionist.RegisterService calls in
AkkaHostedService; the RegisterCentralClient message + receive block
- CommunicationOptions.CentralContactPoints; the CentralTransport/SiteTransport
coexistence flags; the CentralTransportMode/SiteTransportKind enums
gRPC is now the only site↔central transport (site→central CentralControlService via
GrpcCentralTransport; central→site SiteCommandService via GrpcSiteTransport), both
built unconditionally by the Host. NoOpCentralTransport is the fail-loud null-default
so TestKit command-dispatch suites still construct the site actor without a wired
transport; production always injects GrpcCentralTransport.
Config: CentralGrpcEndpoints is now unconditional — CommunicationOptionsValidator
rejects blank entries (role-agnostic), and StartupValidator requires a Site node to
list >=1 endpoint (fail-fast, mirrors GrpcPsk). Rig configs moved
CentralContactPoints -> CentralGrpcEndpoints (docker x6, docker-env2 x2, Host default,
deploy/wonder-app-vd03). Kept Akka.Cluster.Tools (ClusterSingleton still used).
Tests: build 0/0; Communication.Tests 640, Host.Tests 421 green. Removed the
ClusterClient.Send per-site-routing tests (covered by the transport suites), swapped
the ISiteClientFactory-based ctors to a substitute ISiteCommandTransport, converted
the audit-push integration relay to an in-process bridge transport.
Docs: Component-Communication/Host/StoreAndForward, components/Communication,
topology-guide, grpc_streams (SUPERSEDED note), the frame-size known-issue (retired
amendment), and CLAUDE.md transport decisions.
Not included: the dead IntegrationCallRequest path (#32) is a separate user-owned
behavioral decision — SiteEnvelope routing is transport-agnostic so it still compiles.
Central flipped to SiteTransport=Grpc (both nodes, central-wide flag), sites
kept on gRPC from Phase 2 → both directions on gRPC at once. Central logs
'central→site command transport: gRPC (SiteCommandService)'; 0 ClusterClient-to-
site on either central.
Command matrix over SiteCommandService (all 200):
- ExecuteQuery (event-log) + ExecuteParked (parked) — all 3 sites
- ExecuteLifecycle disable/enable #95 on site-a — NEW live coverage vs 1B/P2
(SoakNotify instances survived the recreate as Enabled)
Resilience:
- hard-kill the ACTIVE site-a node mid-query-loop → in-flight call returned
TIMEOUT at exactly the 30s QueryTimeout deadline (bounded, no hang; deadline≠
retry — an in-flight call can't be safely re-sent)
- next + all subsequent queries recovered automatically via site-a-b
(SitePairChannelProvider NodeA→NodeB); site→central S&F never stopped
(notif 619→715, still no dupes)
- 0 PermissionDenied across all 8 nodes
ExecuteOpcUa/ExecuteRoute/TriggerFailover deferred (no OPC-bound instance / no
CLI verb; unit-proven). Rig left both-gRPC; git reverted to Akka default.
Joseph Doherty