Commit Graph

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty 61a14bccab fix(management): CAS-guard secured-write reject (WHERE Status='Pending') so reject can never falsify an executed two-person write (arch-review 2026-08-19 P6-1 High)
Reject read the row as Pending, then landed a blind full-row UpdateAsync. A
concurrent approve could win its own Pending->Approved CAS in that gap and enter
the multi-second WriteTagAsync relay; the reject's update then stamped
Status/ExecutedAtUtc/ExecutionError to Rejected mid-relay, so the two-person-control
record said Rejected for a write that physically executed at the plant. Works
cross-node (both centrals share one MS SQL).

- ISecuredWriteRepository/SecuredWriteRepository: new TryMarkRejectedAsync,
  mirroring TryMarkApprovedAsync exactly (conditional UPDATE ... WHERE
  Status='Pending', writes only the columns the reject transition owns). No schema
  change, no migration, no rowversion column.
- HandleRejectSecuredWrite: uses the CAS; on loss re-reads the row and returns the
  status that actually won (same UX shape as approve's lost-race error), and emits
  the SecuredWriteReject audit row ONLY on a won CAS.
- Audited the other lifecycle writes: approve/reject/expiry (inline + the
  opportunistic list sweep) now ALL transition only out of Pending, so winning the
  approve CAS gives that leg exclusive ownership of the row and its post-relay
  Executed/Failed update stays safe as an unconditional write. Documented in place.
- Tests: repository-level approve-vs-reject races in both orders (exactly one wins,
  loser false, row reflects the winner only) plus reject-vs-expiry; handler-level
  lost-race reject (conflict error, no write, no audit row) and approve on an
  already-rejected row (no CAS, no relay, no audit).
2026-08-19 13:54:45 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 1fcfa4fb16 fix(security): scope-filter secured-write listing + align spec with enforced site scoping (plan R2-07 T6) 2026-07-13 10:53:16 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 9b9222d223 fix(security): enforce LDAP-mapping site scope on secured-write submit/approve/reject (plan R2-07 T4) 2026-07-13 10:46:08 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 8d4ffa7ef1 feat(management): secured-write list paging with TotalCount (arch-review P3)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MtdgwpEeCUn6cUA5f1LMPj
2026-07-10 05:42:35 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 03295e91bb feat(management): opportunistic expiry sweep on secured-write list (arch-review S2)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MtdgwpEeCUn6cUA5f1LMPj
2026-07-10 05:39:29 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 064a7d9415 feat(management): server-side secured-write TTL — stale pending writes expire, never execute (arch-review S2)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MtdgwpEeCUn6cUA5f1LMPj
2026-07-10 05:38:19 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 6c9de9f7ab feat(management): any-of role gates; restrict ListSecuredWrites to Operator/Verifier/Admin (arch-review UA1)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MtdgwpEeCUn6cUA5f1LMPj
2026-07-10 05:03:51 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 69e0d546b5 fix(audit): route SecuredWrite audit via ICentralAuditWriter for SourceNode stamping (#206) 2026-06-19 02:37:48 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 0c7774acdc fix(mgmt): re-assert MxGateway protocol at secured-write execute (D2 TOCTOU guard, T14b) 2026-06-18 04:24:53 -04:00
Joseph Doherty b08bfae329 feat(audit): SecuredWrite audit kinds + best-effort per-lifecycle central direct-write; guard approve Decode (T14b) 2026-06-18 03:17:56 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 1f7bb7ace3 feat(mgmt): secured-write approve relays to site MxGateway write with CAS race guard (T14b) 2026-06-18 02:59:43 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 25c9240415 feat(mgmt): secured-write submit/reject/list handlers + Operator/Verifier gating (T14b) 2026-06-18 02:29:29 -04:00