Commit Graph

15 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty 2ee84af1c0 feat(grpc): PSK-authenticate the site gRPC control plane; drop the vestigial management receptionist registration
Phase 0 of the ClusterClient→gRPC migration
(docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md). Standalone hardening: it
closes a gap that exists today and is a precondition for moving command/control
onto gRPC in later phases.

T0.1 — delete the ManagementActor ClusterClientReceptionist registration.
It was built for an out-of-cluster CLI that was never written: the shipped CLI
speaks HTTP Basic to /management, which asks the actor in-process through
ManagementActorHolder. Nothing in the repo ever sent to /user/management. The
actor still runs there; only the cross-boundary advertisement is gone. Six
documents claimed the CLI used ClusterClient — including the CLI's own README
"Architecture Notes" — and are corrected here rather than left to rot.

T0.2 — record, do not port, the dead integration-routing path.
IntegrationCallRequest is unwired at BOTH ends: RouteIntegrationCallAsync has
zero callers anywhere, and RegisterLocalHandler(Integration, …) appears only in
a test, so production always answers "Integration handler not available". It is
excluded from the gRPC contract (28 of 29 commands migrate) rather than
enshrined on an additive-only wire format, and deleting it during a
transport migration would mix a behavioural change into a change whose whole
value is that behaviour is identical. See
docs/known-issues/2026-07-22-integration-call-routing-is-dead-code.md.

T0.3 — preshared-key authentication on SiteStreamService.
The service shipped with no auth at all: plaintext h2c, no interceptor, so
anything that could reach a site node's :8083 could open a live data stream or
read audit rows back via PullAuditEvents/PullSiteCalls. ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor
now gates /sitestream.SiteStreamService/ — modeled on LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor
(constant-time compare, fail-closed, PermissionDenied) but gating a SET of
service prefixes so phases 1A/1B add services rather than interceptors. LocalDb
sync keeps its own separate key: it authenticates the pair partner, not central,
and collapsing the two would make a site's central-facing key also admit writes
into its database.

Keys are per site (SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>), never fleet-wide, so a compromised
site yields only its own. Central attaches them through ControlPlaneCredentials,
which binds CallCredentials to the channel — covering unary and streaming
uniformly, and letting the key resolve asynchronously, which a client
interceptor could not do without blocking. All three central→site channel
creation sites go through it (SiteStreamGrpcClient and both audit pull invokers);
the pull invokers' channel caches are re-keyed by (site, endpoint) because
credentials are per-site and bound to the channel.

Two decisions beyond the plan:

  * StartupValidator now requires GrpcPsk on Site nodes. The plan specified only
    the runtime gate, but fail-closed with no boot check produces a node that
    joins, answers heartbeats and reports healthy while refusing every stream,
    audit pull and telemetry ingest — silent and total. Same reasoning as the
    existing inbound API-key pepper rule.

  * Added Communication:SitePsks as a central-side key map. The plan assumed
    central would read the store, seeded via a dev KEK; the docker rig
    deliberately boots with no master key, so store-only resolution would leave
    it unable to dial its own sites. The store stays primary — it is the only
    source that can serve a site added at runtime — with the map covering
    key-less hosts and one-off pins. Neither source falling back to
    "unauthenticated" is the invariant.

T0.4 — dev keys on both rigs and tests.
34 tests. The seven that matter most exercise a real in-process gRPC stack over
TestServer: the unit tests on either side of the wire would both stay green if
the halves disagreed, and gRPC refuses call credentials on a plaintext channel
by default — the UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials opt-in is only provable
by making a real call. They confirm correct key passes on unary AND streaming,
wrong key and no-credentials both get PermissionDenied, and an unresolvable key
fails the call with nothing reaching the service.

OPERATIONAL: a site node upgraded to this build without a key will not boot.
That includes the gitignored deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay.
2026-07-22 17:51:09 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 654df8abc2 docs(cluster): site-pair manual failover runbook + component spec 2026-07-22 07:49:51 -04:00
Joseph Doherty caf14a3e03 feat(ui): admin manual-failover control on the health page
CentralFailoverControl lives in Components/Health/ (matching AuditKpiTiles /
SiteCallKpiTiles) rather than inline in Health.razor, so it is testable without
standing up the whole dashboard's DI graph.

- Admin-gated via AuthorizeView + RequireAdmin. The Health page itself is
  intentionally all-roles, so the gate belongs on the control, not the page.
- Disabled with an explanatory title when the pair has no online standby;
  the authoritative guard remains server-side against live cluster membership.
- Confirmation dialog (IDialogService, the page idiom) warns that singletons
  hand over, in-flight work on the active node is interrupted, and THIS PAGE
  will disconnect and reconnect against the new active node -- Traefik routes
  the UI to the node being restarted, so a working failover otherwise reads as
  a crash the admin caused.
- A refused failover (service returns null) surfaces the refusal; the UI never
  reports a failover that did not happen.

7 bUnit tests. Two harness requirements that bit first: AuthorizeView needs a
cascading AuthenticationState (the app supplies it from the layout), and
BunitContext pre-registers a placeholder IAuthorizationService that throws on
policy evaluation -- both handled the same way NavMenuTests documents.

Runbook paragraphs added to Component-ClusterInfrastructure.md (new Manual
Failover section) and docker/README.md.
2026-07-22 07:00:10 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 4a6341d871 feat(cluster): self-first seed ordering closes the boot-alone outage gap
Every node now lists ITSELF as seed-nodes[0] and its partner second. Akka runs
FirstSeedNodeProcess -- the only bootstrap path that can form a NEW cluster when
no peer answers InitJoin -- exclusively for seed-nodes[0]; every other node runs
JoinSeedNodeProcess and retries InitJoin forever. That is why a lone cold-starting
central-b never came Up (the "registered outage gap"), and self-first ordering
closes it using Akka's own protocol.

- 6 node appsettings swapped (the *-node-b configs; the -a nodes were already
  self-first). All 14 shipped node configs now satisfy the invariant.
- StartupValidator enforces it at boot, comparing host AND port -- the invariant
  fails silently when broken, so it is enforced loudly. NOTE: the gitignored
  deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay must be reordered before its next deploy or
  that node will refuse to boot.
- SelfFirstSeedBootstrapTests: real in-process clusters at production
  failure-detection timings, incl. a falsifiability control proving the OLD
  peer-first ordering never forms.

Rejected alternative (implemented, measured, discarded): an external self-form
timer calling Cluster.Join(SelfAddress) after a window. It sits outside Akka's
join handshake and so cannot tell "no seed answered" from "a seed answered and
the join is in flight". On a routine standby restart the peer is alive but the
join stalls behind removal of the node's own stale incarnation; a Join(self)
during TryingToJoin abandons the in-flight join and forms a second cluster at
the same address -- still split after 90s. Docs that claimed self-first ordering
was unsafe for simultaneous cold start are corrected: while mutually reachable
the InitJoin handshake converges them to one cluster (measured).
2026-07-22 06:32:00 -04:00
Joseph Doherty cf3bd52f93 feat(cluster): auto-down downing strategy — either-node crash now fails over (owner decision 2026-07-21: availability over partition-safety)
Two-node keep-oldest could NEVER survive a crash of the oldest/active node:
Akka.NET 1.5.62 KeepOldest.OldestDecision only lets down-if-alone rescue a
side with >= 2 members, so the 1-vs-1 survivor takes DownReachable and downs
ITSELF — proven live on the rig ('SBR took decision ... including myself')
before this change. static-quorum(1) is worse (IsTooManyMembers -> DownAll);
keep-majority just re-keys the fatal crash to the lowest address.

SplitBrainResolverStrategy gains 'auto-down' (new default): BuildHocon emits
Akka's AutoDowning provider with auto-down-unreachable-after = StableAfter.
The leader among the REACHABLE members downs the unreachable peer, so the
survivor takes over singletons and /health/active in ~25s regardless of which
node died. Accepted trade (explicit owner decision): a real network partition
runs dual-active until an operator restarts one side. keep-oldest remains
supported; DownIfAlone validation is now scoped to it.

Live drill on the rebuilt rig: active-crash TAKEOVER in 28s (victim still
down; all 7 singletons Younger->Oldest), standby-crash removal 27s with 0
routing blips; victims rejoin as standby in 2s. New real-cluster tests pin
both directions (SbrFailoverTests.AutoDown_*); TwoNodeClusterFixture gains a
strategy knob. All 16 appsettings flipped (src, docker, docker-env2, and the
gitignored wonder-app-vd03 overlay on disk — owner must sync to the host).
Docs: decision record docs/plans/2026-07-21-auto-down-availability-decision.md,
Component-ClusterInfrastructure downing section rewritten, drill + README
reworked (active mode now asserts takeover), deferred-work SBR row resolved.
2026-07-21 10:53:40 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 040cd9a66c docs(docker): record live failover-drill results — standby PASS (27s removal, 0 routing blips), active outage 9s + 4s recovery (R2-01 live drill on 99544985) 2026-07-13 12:01:00 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 30356803e7 docs(docker): mark failover-drill results table PENDING — live drill run (plan R2-01 T3) deferred to avoid disrupting the running docker cluster 2026-07-13 10:34:24 -04:00
Joseph Doherty d536450611 docs(cluster): per-direction failover truth — first-seed bootstrap constraint + operator recovery actions; drop the undeliverable ~25s active-crash promise (plan R2-01 T2) 2026-07-13 10:33:56 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 5117fa97b9 test(docker): failover drill script — SIGKILL the active central node, assert Traefik recovery 2026-07-08 17:05:31 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 7b0b9c7365 refactor: rename ScadaLink → ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge (code + projects + namespaces)
Solution + 23 src projects + 26 test projects renamed; folders, csproj,
namespaces, and ScadaLinkDbContext/ScadaBridgeDbContext class updated.
ActorSystem "scadalink" → "scadabridge", Akka seed-node URLs migrated.
SQL roles/logins, LDAP domains, CLI command name, and CLI config dir
(~/.scadalink → ~/.scadabridge) also renamed.

Build green; 5 Host.Tests fail awaiting SQL login rename in next commit.
Pre-existing StaleTagMonitor timing flakes unchanged.

Rename script committed at tools/rename-to-scadabridge.sh.
2026-05-28 09:37:45 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 416a03b782 feat: complete gRPC streaming channel — site host, docker config, docs, integration tests
Switch site host to WebApplicationBuilder with Kestrel HTTP/2 gRPC server,
add GrpcPort/keepalive config, wire SiteStreamManager as ISiteStreamSubscriber,
expose gRPC ports in docker-compose, add site seed script, update all 10
requirement docs + CLAUDE.md + README.md for the new dual-transport architecture.
2026-03-21 12:38:33 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 0a85a839a2 feat(infra): add Traefik load balancer with active node health check for central cluster failover
Add ActiveNodeHealthCheck that returns 200 only on the Akka.NET cluster
leader, enabling Traefik to route traffic to the active central node and
automatically fail over when the leader changes. Also fixes AkkaClusterHealthCheck
to resolve ActorSystem from AkkaHostedService (was always null via DI).
2026-03-21 00:44:37 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 1a540f4f0a feat: add HTTP Management API, migrate CLI from Akka ClusterClient to HTTP
Replace the CLI's Akka.NET ClusterClient transport with a simple HTTP client
targeting a new POST /management endpoint on the Central Host. The endpoint
handles Basic Auth, LDAP authentication, role resolution, and ManagementActor
dispatch in a single round-trip — eliminating the CLI's Akka, LDAP, and
Security dependencies.

Also fixes DCL ReSubscribeAll losing subscriptions on repeated reconnect by
deriving the tag list from _subscriptionsByInstance instead of _subscriptionIds.
2026-03-20 23:55:31 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 7740a3bcf9 feat: add JoeAppEngine OPC UA nodes, fix DCL auto-reconnect and quality push
- Add JoeAppEngine folder to OPC UA nodes.json (BTCS, AlarmCntsBySeverity, Scheduler/ScanTime)
- Fix DataConnectionActor: capture Self in PreStart for use from non-actor threads,
  preventing Self.Tell failure in Disconnected event handler
- Implement InstanceActor.HandleConnectionQualityChanged to mark attributes Bad on disconnect
- Fix LmxFakeProxy TagMapper to serialize arrays as JSON instead of "System.Int32[]"
- Allow DataType and DataSourceReference updates in TemplateService.UpdateAttributeAsync
- Update test_infra_opcua.md with JoeAppEngine documentation
2026-03-19 13:27:54 -04:00
Joseph Doherty eb8d5ca2c0 feat: add Docker infrastructure for 8-node cluster topology (2 central + 3 sites)
Multi-stage Dockerfile with NuGet restore layer caching, per-node appsettings
with Docker hostnames, shared bridge network with infra services, and
build/deploy/teardown scripts. Ports use 90xx block to avoid conflicts.
2026-03-17 22:12:50 -04:00