Rebuilt scadabridge:latest from main @ 8524a7f7 and recreated only the
env2 containers. All three gate checks pass on site-x:
1. both site nodes boot with the key (StartupValidator fail-closed →
reaching 'Application started' proves the key present);
2. control-plane PSK auth: no-header / wrong-key ⇒ PermissionDenied,
correct key ⇒ success, on both nodes (:9123, :9124);
3. LocalDb unaffected (local-only; 0 errors, healthy boot).
Bonus: central registers site-x online via gRPC heartbeat; no real
ClusterClient/receptionist (only the benign ClusterClientSiteAuditClient
label, same as the primary rig). Noted a seed-data gap (ScadaBridgeConfig2
dbo.Sites is empty) — orthogonal to the transport.
Central flipped to SiteTransport=Grpc (both nodes, central-wide flag), sites
kept on gRPC from Phase 2 → both directions on gRPC at once. Central logs
'central→site command transport: gRPC (SiteCommandService)'; 0 ClusterClient-to-
site on either central.
Command matrix over SiteCommandService (all 200):
- ExecuteQuery (event-log) + ExecuteParked (parked) — all 3 sites
- ExecuteLifecycle disable/enable #95 on site-a — NEW live coverage vs 1B/P2
(SoakNotify instances survived the recreate as Enabled)
Resilience:
- hard-kill the ACTIVE site-a node mid-query-loop → in-flight call returned
TIMEOUT at exactly the 30s QueryTimeout deadline (bounded, no hang; deadline≠
retry — an in-flight call can't be safely re-sent)
- next + all subsequent queries recovered automatically via site-a-b
(SitePairChannelProvider NodeA→NodeB); site→central S&F never stopped
(notif 619→715, still no dupes)
- 0 PermissionDenied across all 8 nodes
ExecuteOpcUa/ExecuteRoute/TriggerFailover deferred (no OPC-bound instance / no
CLI verb; unit-proven). Rig left both-gRPC; git reverted to Akka default.
All 6 site nodes flipped to CentralTransport=Grpc; whole control plane
(heartbeat/health/notification S&F/audit) rides gRPC CentralControlService,
196 RPCs/90s 0 non-200, 0 PermissionDenied, 0 health-sequence regressions.
Soak driven by a live SoakNotify workload (3 instances, 3 notifs/5s):
- single-node active-kill (central-a): sticky failover central-a:8083→b:8083
logged instantly, central-b active in 29s, buffer drained 72→101, every 5s
bucket = exactly 3 through the gap, 101==101 distinct
- failback: central-a rejoined ready ~5s as standby, central-b kept active
(oldest-Up, no flap), traffic uninterrupted
- full outage (both central down ~59s): count frozen, cold re-form central-b
active ~14s, ~42 buffered drained, every 5s bucket = exactly 3 across the
whole dead window, 216==216 distinct — zero loss, zero dupes
Also previews Phase 5 checks 4 (failover/failback) and 5 (mid-drain kill).
Rig config reverted to Akka default (defaults stay Akka until Phase 4).
Phase 0's gate doc now carries the full suite picture, not just the rig checks.
Playwright: 170 pass / 2 fail / 1 skip of 173. Both failures were run down to
root cause and both are pre-existing on main, unrelated to this branch (which
touches no EF, CentralUI, Transport or ManagementService file):
- TransportImportTests is a REAL production bug: BundleImporter.cs:1298 opens a
user-initiated transaction while the central context has EnableRetryOnFailure,
so SqlServerRetryingExecutionStrategy refuses the split query inside it and
bundle import fails against real MS SQL. The unit/integration suite cannot see
it -- the in-memory EF provider has no retrying strategy and BeginTransaction
is a no-op there.
- SmsNotificationE2ETests is a stale fixture: SID 'ACtest123' (2026-06-19) vs the
^AC[0-9a-fA-F]{32}$ guard added 2026-07-10 (40088a21). Failing since then, which
has also silenced everything after the toast assertion -- including the
secret-non-leak check on the Auth Token.
Also records that the earlier 44-failure run is void: a concurrent deploy.sh was
recreating the cluster underneath it.
Neither is fixed here; both are out of scope for a PSK-auth branch.
The gate's first run failed on a defect the green suite could not see: two public
constructors on ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor made Grpc.AspNetCore's activation
throw per call, so correct key, wrong key and no key all produced identical
errors. Recorded in full because the symptom (Unknown / "Exception was thrown by
handler") points at the handler, not at auth, and because phases 1A/1B both add
services to this same interceptor — they must extend DefaultGatedPrefixes rather
than add a second public constructor.
Also records what the gate does NOT cover: live streaming under load, key
rotation on a running pair, and docker-env2 (keyed but neither redeployed nor
gated).