Owner decisions recorded: the archive destination stays a directory/UNC
(no object-storage client; share + permissions named at enablement),
parquet-tools-only reading (no re-import), unsigned like the chain (#107).
AuditLog:Archive:RetentionDays (default 0 = never delete; else must exceed
AuditLog:RetentionDays, counted from the archived month's end) and
DeleteSupersededStaleArchives (default true) run after every purge tick.
A retried purge's stale Archived archive is deleted only when a later,
verifying, Purged archive of the same partition provably holds every row:
same prior anchor and the stale chain-end hash at its chain-end sequence
(row or tombstone), every unchained row present by EventId; otherwise it is
reported KeptStale. A sole copy left at Archived is never touched. Deletion
removes only the archive name's own three files in its folder, manifest
first, never a manifest-supplied path. `audit archive cleanup [--dry-run]`
= CleanupAuditArchives (Administrator).
AuditLogArchiveCleanupTests (MSSQL) cover retried purge, kept stale copy,
sole copy, retention and the path guard; each safety rule mutation-checked.
Follow-ups filed: #113, #114, #115.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Item 1 (owner decision: no signing). AuditLog:HashChain:HeadExport (default
off): both centrals periodically read every month's chain head (LastSeq,
LastHash, purge anchor, chained rows, tombstones; one snapshot under the
chain lock SHARED) and append the changed heads to a sink the DB login cannot
write - File (append-only JSONL per node per day, local or UNC) or Syslog
(RFC 5424 over UDP / TCP octet counting). `audit verify-heads --path` reads
those records back (file or syslog-collector lines) and the new
VerifyAuditChainHeads command checks each against the database: Matches /
Extended / Purged, or Mismatch / Regressed / MissingHead / MissingLink /
CountMismatch (exit 3). AuditChainHeadStoreTests forges a chain with the
production hasher: verify-chain says Intact, verify-heads says Mismatch.
Item 3. AuditLog:MaintenanceConnectionString (${secret:}-capable, unset =
today's single login) runs the chain job, chain verify / head export, the
partition switch-out + archive and the per-channel purge on
AuditMaintenanceContext (keyed audit-maintenance repository/archive, purge
actor prefers them). AuditMaintenanceLoginTests runs the hardened setup on
SQL Server: writer (datareader/datawriter/audit_writer) ingests and is
refused chaining and deleting; the chainer+purger login does the full cycle.
Two-login grants documented in Component-AuditLog.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
GET /api/audit/export?format=parquet returned 501. It now streams the same 24
columns as csv/jsonl (AuditExportRow, CsvHeader order) as one Parquet file,
one 10,000-row row group at a time. Each row group is encoded into a small
non-seekable staging buffer and copied to the response asynchronously, because
Kestrel rejects the synchronous writes the Parquet writer issues.
New management commands, with CLI parity:
- ListAuditArchives -> `audit archive list` (AuditArchiveListResult: enabled
flag + every manifest).
- VerifyAuditArchive(Name) -> `audit archive verify --name` (files, chain,
purge anchor); exit 0 verified, 3 not verified, 1 error, 2 unauthorized.
Both carry verify-chain's gate: OperationalAudit roles (Administrator, Viewer),
site-scoped non-Administrator refused because an archive spans every site.
VerifyAuditArchive uses the long-running Ask timeout. Error codes
ARCHIVE_NOT_CONFIGURED, INVALID_ARGUMENT, NOT_FOUND.
RequiredRoleMatrixTests freezes both gates; ManagementSurfaceParityTests now
probes `audit archive list|verify` alongside `audit verify-chain`.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
verify-chain was a no-op stub that printed "not enabled" and exited 0 without
contacting the server. It now sends VerifyAuditChain(Month) over
POST /management and maps the verdict to the exit code: 0 intact or not
chained, 3 broken (first break: partition, ChainSeq, EventId, kind), 1 error,
2 unauthorized. Table and JSON renderings.
ManagementActor: new HandleVerifyAuditChain arm, gated on the OperationalAudit
roles (Administrator, Viewer) and refusing a site-scoped caller because a
month's chain spans every site; INVALID_ARGUMENT for a bad month, CHAIN_BUSY
when the chain lock is held; long-running Ask timeout. Result enums serialise
as names.
Parity: RequiredRoleMatrixTests freezes the gate; ManagementSurfaceParityTests
now probes `audit verify-chain` (the one audit leaf that is a management
contract) instead of skipping the whole audit group.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Comment/XML-doc changes only, no code logic:
- strip project-tracking references (WP*, P*-*, row-NN, #NN, Task N) from
comments, keeping the explanatory rationale
- add missing summaries, <param>, <returns>, <typeparam> and <inheritdoc/>
- replace misused <inheritdoc/> with real docs; where <inheritdoc/> was
combined with useful remarks, move the rationale into // comments
- drop stale replicationActor <param> on DeploymentManagerActor ctor
Remaining 5 are false positives (CWE-1236 x2, failures-1, year-0001, M365).
Build 0 errors / 0 warnings.
P6-7 (CWE-1236): AuditEndpoints CSV export quoted cells on comma/quote/CR/LF
but never neutralized a leading =, +, -, @, TAB, or CR — inbound-API-caller
text landing in Target/ErrorMessage/RequestSummary/ResponseSummary/Extra
could execute as a formula/DDE trigger when opened in Excel. AppendField now
prefixes a literal single quote on free-text columns only (never the
GUID/enum/numeric/date/bool columns the exporter formats itself), applied
before RFC 4180 quoting. The CSV was also missing ExecutionId/
ParentExecutionId/SourceNode that the JSONL export already carried; both are
now 24 columns in the same AuditExportRow order. A second, independently
maintained CSV writer (CentralUI's AuditLogExportService, feeding the Audit
Log page's bulk-export button) had the identical gap and got the identical
fix + column alignment.
P6-8: `audit export` was the one CLI HTTP path with no deadline at all — a
residual gap from the ManagementHttpClient timeout-honesty fix, which made
HttpClient.Timeout infinite and the per-call token the single deadline
everywhere except this streamed GET. RunExportAsync now takes a headers-
received deadline (CancelAfter, reusing ManagementHttpClient.
DefaultConnectTimeout) around the initial GetAsync, an inactivity deadline
around the streaming copy (rearmed on every successful read, so large exports
are bounded by silence, not total size), and an external CancellationToken
wired to Console.CancelKeyPress in AuditCommands so Ctrl-C cancels promptly.
A stalled/faulted stream now produces a friendly error noting the partial
output file instead of hanging or dumping a stack trace.
Register row 98 — the site-scope authorization gate was FAIL-OPEN on an
unresolvable target. The resolve-then-check shape was written as
`if (target != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`, so a null resolve skipped the
check entirely and a site-scoped caller passed the gate for any id in the
system. Authorization now fails CLOSED: a target that cannot be PROVEN to sit
inside the caller's scope is treated as outside it.
The defect turned out to have THREE more instances than the register recorded.
Besides `EnforceSiteScopeForInstance` and `EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier`, the
same inline shape sat in `HandleGetInstance`, `HandleGetSite` and
`HandleGetDataConnection` — read handlers that resolve their own target and so
never call the helpers. Those were the sharper half of the bug: they answered
success-with-null for a nonexistent id and Unauthorized for an out-of-scope
one, making the pair an id-enumeration oracle over the whole fleet. All five
now route through one shared `DenyUnresolvedTargetIfScoped` arm.
Two properties are load-bearing and pinned by tests:
- System-wide callers (Administrator, or a Deployer with no site grants) are
untouched — they return at the guards above the lookup and keep the
handler's ordinary "not found" / null answer.
- The denial is indistinguishable from an out-of-scope denial: same
ManagementUnauthorized shape, and a message that never states whether the
target exists.
Register row 99 — CLI `audit query --status delivered` failed client-side while
the server would have accepted it: `AcceptOnlyFromAmong` matches ordinally
against the capitalised literals. Same treatment row 88 gave `deploy status` —
the client-side gate is removed, the valid set moves into the option help text,
and the server becomes the single authoritative check.
That required ADDING the server check, not just relying on one: the shared
audit filter parser was LAX, silently dropping an unrecognised value and
leaving the dimension unconstrained — so removing the CLI gate alone would have
turned a loud client-side failure into a plausible, complete-looking page that
did not answer the question asked. New `ParseEnumListStrict` (case-insensitive,
rejects ordinals — `Enum.TryParse` accepts "3", and a filter is a name-based
contract) backs the ManagementService /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export
endpoints, which now return 400 BAD_REQUEST naming the valid set.
Other AcceptOnlyFromAmong sites surveyed in the audit group: `--channel`,
`--kind`, `--status` on BOTH `query` and `export` (6 uses) plus `export
--format` (rejected `--format CSV` though the server lowercases it) — all seven
fixed here. Deliberately left alone: `template folder reorder --direction`
(pure client-side literal, no server-side parse to defer to) and the global
`--format json|table` (CLI-local output selection, never sent to a server).
The CentralUI AuditLogPage drill-in parser and the CentralUI export endpoint it
feeds deliberately KEEP the lax parse — they read a query string a human may
have bookmarked, where a stale fragment must still render the page. Both
contracts now live side by side in AuditQueryParamParsers and are documented as
non-reconcilable.
Docs: Component-ManagementService.md gains a "Site-scope gate: fail-closed on
an unresolvable target" section and a strict-filter note on the audit
endpoints; Component-Security.md records the fail-closed shape under Deployer
site scoping; the CLI README marks the audit filter values case-insensitive and
states the no-silent-drop / no-ordinals contract.
Tests: 5 new ManagementActorTests fail before the row-98 fix (verified by
reverting ManagementActor.cs) and cover scoped+nonexistent -> denied,
system-wide+nonexistent -> unchanged (both Administrator and no-grant Deployer),
scoped+in-scope -> allowed, and the indistinguishability property. 21 CLI tests
fail before the row-99 fix. Four pre-existing tests that pinned the removed
client-side gate were rewritten to pin the new contract.
Remove project bookkeeping citations from shipped code comments across the
solution: hyphenated task IDs (WP-14, StoreAndForward-025), milestone/task/
issue refs (M3, Task 4, Audit Log #23, #21), Bundle X task-bundle labels,
and C/D/K/S/T phase labels.
Comment text only — no code logic, string/log literals, or XML-doc structure
changed. Genuine descriptions are preserved (only the citation is stripped),
and technical lookalikes are retained (UTF-8, SHA-256, T00:00:00, M365,
UTC-5, pre-C4/pre-C5 schema versions). Flagged by the new CommentChecker
TaskReferenceInComment / TrackingReferenceInComment checks plus targeted
grep passes; full solution builds clean, append-only guard tests pass.
Resolve all 622 issues flagged by the enhanced CommentChecker: add missing
<returns> tags (incl. the standard phrasing on non-generic Task methods),
add missing <summary> tags, and replace misused/redundant <inheritdoc/> on
members that override or implement nothing with real documentation.
Documentation-only — no behavior change; solution builds clean.
Joseph Doherty