Both central nodes gain a root AuditLog:PerChannelRetentionDays:ScriptTrace=30 (validator
floor). verify-delmia-notifier.sh step H: finds DelmiaRecipeDownload via api-method list,
runs flow-debug run-method with the drill parameters and asserts completed=true plus the
kind set {InboundRequest, RouteCall, ScriptRun, AttributeWrite, AttributeWait} from each
event's detailsJson, then flow-debug replay on the root ExecutionId with the same check,
retried up to 40 s for the 5 s site telemetry push; prints 'H live+replay -> YES'.
VERIFICATION PENDING: the image scadabridge:latest was built from this branch
(docker/build.sh, exit 0) but the containers have not been recreated and step H has not
run yet — the next step is a recreate through the MAIN checkout's compose file (deploy.sh
refuses a worktree, register row 68: bind-mounted appsettings would rehome), a fresh
DelmiaRecipeDownload-scoped key, and the drill.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GSLkkHKz9JrAtmJjmQK3cP
First run (docker stop) found two things: SIGTERM is a graceful CoordinatedShutdown handover (takeover 0 s), so the drill now uses docker kill; and inbound API keys are a PER-NODE SQLite store (/app/data/inbound-api-keys.sqlite on each central's own volume, written by whichever node serves the management call), so the key minted through the active node did not exist on the survivor and every post-takeover call answered 401 KeyNotFound. The sync script is a rig-only workaround; the verify script's preflight refuses to start unless both nodes list the key. Second run: A/B/E/F YES, C/G NO, D 503 in the takeover window, takeover 27 s, victim rejoined as standby.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013L3XdmVii9i5sY4FChU8pB
P8-7: docker/README.md and docker-env2/README.md still listed the retired
scadabridge-ldap container. Verified against the running config
(central-node-*/appsettings.Central.json): both rigs actually bind to the
local redundant GLAuth pair (zb-ldap-primary :3893 + zb-ldap-backup :3894 on
host.docker.internal, source of truth scadaproj/infra/glauth-redundant), not
the shared 10.100.0.35 GLAuth the infra/docker-compose.yml retirement comment
claimed — that binding is itself stale, its serviceaccount password having
been rotated away by SEC-36. Corrected all three docs to name the actual
config each rig uses.
P8-10: docker-env2 mapped no host port for the central gRPC control plane
(docker/ maps 9013/9014->8083); added 9113/9114->8083 on both env2 centrals,
matching the free 91XX slots, plus the README port table. teardown.sh's
"preserved in node directories" data note predates the named-volume
migration; rewrote it honestly and added an explicit `docker volume rm`
recipe scoped to the env2 volume prefix, clearly labeled destructive,
mirroring docker/teardown.sh's existing pattern.
Gate: bash docker-env2/deploy.sh from this worktree — both centrals + both
site-x nodes recreated and came up with the new 9113/9114 ports open. The
simultaneous force-recreate split both pairs into independent 1-node
clusters (expected: BootstrapGuard is default-OFF on docker-env2, per
CLAUDE.md); a single restart of the b-side of each pair joined it to its
already-formed peer and both pairs converged (central: memberCount=2,
leader=central-a; site-x: node-b Welcome + singleton Younger). docker/ (the
primary rig) was not touched.
Row 79 executed its own prescribed remedy without waiting for a second
corruption: all ten rig data dirs (8 docker/ nodes + 2 docker-env2/ site
nodes) move from virtiofs bind mounts to named docker volumes
(scadabridge-<node>-data), seeded in place with both rigs stopped and
live-verified (site-a localDbReplicationConnected=true / backlog 0 over
the migrated files; env2 stable, 0 restarts). The feared inspectability
loss is moot — OrbStack exposes volumes at ~/OrbStack/docker/volumes/.
The rebuild surfaced latent env2 drift (pre-Secrets-0.6.2 image): env2
now carries the x-secrets-store-env posture + central data volumes.
Row 93's silent maintenance trap is now loud: SiteEventsSchemaCalibrationTests
pins the site_events columns/indexes the EventLogPurgeService size model is
calibrated against, failing with a pointer to the memo §4 recalibration on
any schema drift. Rows 92 (accepted by design) and 94 (standing tripwire)
annotated accordingly.
The row read 'central nodes expose no Prometheus endpoint'. That is not quite
what was wrong, and the difference matters. Central already maps /metrics
(Program.cs central branch) and telemetry is registered for both roles through
the shared BindSharedOptions, so the endpoint rides endpoint routing and has
always been served on central's web port (:5000 on the rig, anonymous — there
is no FallbackPolicy). What central lacked was the site branch's dedicated
MetricsPort, which is the port the established live-scrape recipe probes:
docker exec <node> bash -c 'exec 3<>/dev/tcp/localhost/8084 ...'
So a probe of central on 8084 failed and central-only series (KPI/outbox
counters, the bundle-import session gauge + its new rejection counter,
alarm-cache gauges) read as unscrapeable while they were in fact being
exported on a different port.
Central now binds a dedicated HTTP/1.1 listener on ScadaBridge:Node:MetricsPort,
so one probe recipe covers all eight rig nodes. HTTP/1.1-capable because a
standard Prometheus scraper cannot negotiate h2c, which is why this cannot
share the gRPC port.
Read as a PRESENCE check, not GetValue's defaulted read. NodeOptions defaults
MetricsPort to 8084, so a defaulted read would make every existing central node
start binding a new port on upgrade — and a port already in use is a hard boot
failure, not a degraded one. Central gains the listener only where an operator
asked for it; site nodes are unchanged and still bind theirs unconditionally.
The bind is also skipped when the port would collide with the gRPC port or an
ASPNETCORE_URLS port, since Kestrel throws on a duplicate ListenAnyIP and
/metrics is reachable on those ports anyway.
Config only — no host port mapping added, because the probe runs inside the
container. Applied to both docker/ centrals and both docker-env2/ centrals.
FILE EDITS ONLY: no docker command was run, and deploy.sh was not invoked.
Deferred-work register row 48. The rig had no deployable instance — all seven
soak-* rows fail pre-deployment validation (their bound data connections no longer
exist on the sites) — so debug snapshot returned instanceNotFound, no gRPC site
stream was ever opened, and the R2 batching histogram
scadabridge.site.stream.batch_size had nothing to record. Any live probe of the
data or streaming path was unverifiable.
seed-live-probe.sh rebuilds the minimum working set via the CLI only (no DB edits):
RigProbe template (Spike <- ns=3;s=SpikeData, RandomInt <- ns=3;s=RandomSignedInt32,
both ~1 Hz; Heartbeat static attribute + a trust-clean 5s interval script) and a
deployed rig-probe-1 on site-a against connection 1.
Records the two traps that cost time here:
- The custom tags in infra/opcua/nodes.json (Motor.*, Tank.*, Valve.*,
TestChildObject.*) are DECLARED but not simulated by opc-plc — they read 0/false/
epoch forever, so binding to them yields a Connected, Good-quality connection with
zero event traffic. Only the built-in nodes move.
- scadabridge_site_connection_up counts open central->site gRPC SUBSCRIBER STREAMS,
not OPC UA data connections. It reads 0 on a healthy site with no subscriber, which
is how row 48 read it as a data-connection fault. Data-connection health lives in
the health report's dataConnectionEndpoints / dataConnectionTagQuality.
Phase 0 of the ClusterClient→gRPC migration
(docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md). Standalone hardening: it
closes a gap that exists today and is a precondition for moving command/control
onto gRPC in later phases.
T0.1 — delete the ManagementActor ClusterClientReceptionist registration.
It was built for an out-of-cluster CLI that was never written: the shipped CLI
speaks HTTP Basic to /management, which asks the actor in-process through
ManagementActorHolder. Nothing in the repo ever sent to /user/management. The
actor still runs there; only the cross-boundary advertisement is gone. Six
documents claimed the CLI used ClusterClient — including the CLI's own README
"Architecture Notes" — and are corrected here rather than left to rot.
T0.2 — record, do not port, the dead integration-routing path.
IntegrationCallRequest is unwired at BOTH ends: RouteIntegrationCallAsync has
zero callers anywhere, and RegisterLocalHandler(Integration, …) appears only in
a test, so production always answers "Integration handler not available". It is
excluded from the gRPC contract (28 of 29 commands migrate) rather than
enshrined on an additive-only wire format, and deleting it during a
transport migration would mix a behavioural change into a change whose whole
value is that behaviour is identical. See
docs/known-issues/2026-07-22-integration-call-routing-is-dead-code.md.
T0.3 — preshared-key authentication on SiteStreamService.
The service shipped with no auth at all: plaintext h2c, no interceptor, so
anything that could reach a site node's :8083 could open a live data stream or
read audit rows back via PullAuditEvents/PullSiteCalls. ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor
now gates /sitestream.SiteStreamService/ — modeled on LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor
(constant-time compare, fail-closed, PermissionDenied) but gating a SET of
service prefixes so phases 1A/1B add services rather than interceptors. LocalDb
sync keeps its own separate key: it authenticates the pair partner, not central,
and collapsing the two would make a site's central-facing key also admit writes
into its database.
Keys are per site (SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>), never fleet-wide, so a compromised
site yields only its own. Central attaches them through ControlPlaneCredentials,
which binds CallCredentials to the channel — covering unary and streaming
uniformly, and letting the key resolve asynchronously, which a client
interceptor could not do without blocking. All three central→site channel
creation sites go through it (SiteStreamGrpcClient and both audit pull invokers);
the pull invokers' channel caches are re-keyed by (site, endpoint) because
credentials are per-site and bound to the channel.
Two decisions beyond the plan:
* StartupValidator now requires GrpcPsk on Site nodes. The plan specified only
the runtime gate, but fail-closed with no boot check produces a node that
joins, answers heartbeats and reports healthy while refusing every stream,
audit pull and telemetry ingest — silent and total. Same reasoning as the
existing inbound API-key pepper rule.
* Added Communication:SitePsks as a central-side key map. The plan assumed
central would read the store, seeded via a dev KEK; the docker rig
deliberately boots with no master key, so store-only resolution would leave
it unable to dial its own sites. The store stays primary — it is the only
source that can serve a site added at runtime — with the map covering
key-less hosts and one-off pins. Neither source falling back to
"unauthenticated" is the invariant.
T0.4 — dev keys on both rigs and tests.
34 tests. The seven that matter most exercise a real in-process gRPC stack over
TestServer: the unit tests on either side of the wire would both stay green if
the halves disagreed, and gRPC refuses call credentials on a plaintext channel
by default — the UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials opt-in is only provable
by making a real call. They confirm correct key passes on unary AND streaming,
wrong key and no-credentials both get PermissionDenied, and an unresolvable key
fails the call with nothing reaching the service.
OPERATIONAL: a site node upgraded to this build without a key will not boot.
That includes the gitignored deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay.
CentralFailoverControl lives in Components/Health/ (matching AuditKpiTiles /
SiteCallKpiTiles) rather than inline in Health.razor, so it is testable without
standing up the whole dashboard's DI graph.
- Admin-gated via AuthorizeView + RequireAdmin. The Health page itself is
intentionally all-roles, so the gate belongs on the control, not the page.
- Disabled with an explanatory title when the pair has no online standby;
the authoritative guard remains server-side against live cluster membership.
- Confirmation dialog (IDialogService, the page idiom) warns that singletons
hand over, in-flight work on the active node is interrupted, and THIS PAGE
will disconnect and reconnect against the new active node -- Traefik routes
the UI to the node being restarted, so a working failover otherwise reads as
a crash the admin caused.
- A refused failover (service returns null) surfaces the refusal; the UI never
reports a failover that did not happen.
7 bUnit tests. Two harness requirements that bit first: AuthorizeView needs a
cascading AuthenticationState (the app supplies it from the layout), and
BunitContext pre-registers a placeholder IAuthorizationService that throws on
policy evaluation -- both handled the same way NavMenuTests documents.
Runbook paragraphs added to Component-ClusterInfrastructure.md (new Manual
Failover section) and docker/README.md.
Every node now lists ITSELF as seed-nodes[0] and its partner second. Akka runs
FirstSeedNodeProcess -- the only bootstrap path that can form a NEW cluster when
no peer answers InitJoin -- exclusively for seed-nodes[0]; every other node runs
JoinSeedNodeProcess and retries InitJoin forever. That is why a lone cold-starting
central-b never came Up (the "registered outage gap"), and self-first ordering
closes it using Akka's own protocol.
- 6 node appsettings swapped (the *-node-b configs; the -a nodes were already
self-first). All 14 shipped node configs now satisfy the invariant.
- StartupValidator enforces it at boot, comparing host AND port -- the invariant
fails silently when broken, so it is enforced loudly. NOTE: the gitignored
deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay must be reordered before its next deploy or
that node will refuse to boot.
- SelfFirstSeedBootstrapTests: real in-process clusters at production
failure-detection timings, incl. a falsifiability control proving the OLD
peer-first ordering never forms.
Rejected alternative (implemented, measured, discarded): an external self-form
timer calling Cluster.Join(SelfAddress) after a window. It sits outside Akka's
join handshake and so cannot tell "no seed answered" from "a seed answered and
the join is in flight". On a routine standby restart the peer is alive but the
join stalls behind removal of the node's own stale incarnation; a Join(self)
during TryingToJoin abandons the in-flight join and forms a second cluster at
the same address -- still split after 90s. Docs that claimed self-first ordering
was unsafe for simultaneous cold start are corrected: while mutually reachable
the InitJoin handshake converges them to one cluster (measured).
Two-node keep-oldest could NEVER survive a crash of the oldest/active node:
Akka.NET 1.5.62 KeepOldest.OldestDecision only lets down-if-alone rescue a
side with >= 2 members, so the 1-vs-1 survivor takes DownReachable and downs
ITSELF — proven live on the rig ('SBR took decision ... including myself')
before this change. static-quorum(1) is worse (IsTooManyMembers -> DownAll);
keep-majority just re-keys the fatal crash to the lowest address.
SplitBrainResolverStrategy gains 'auto-down' (new default): BuildHocon emits
Akka's AutoDowning provider with auto-down-unreachable-after = StableAfter.
The leader among the REACHABLE members downs the unreachable peer, so the
survivor takes over singletons and /health/active in ~25s regardless of which
node died. Accepted trade (explicit owner decision): a real network partition
runs dual-active until an operator restarts one side. keep-oldest remains
supported; DownIfAlone validation is now scoped to it.
Live drill on the rebuilt rig: active-crash TAKEOVER in 28s (victim still
down; all 7 singletons Younger->Oldest), standby-crash removal 27s with 0
routing blips; victims rejoin as standby in 2s. New real-cluster tests pin
both directions (SbrFailoverTests.AutoDown_*); TwoNodeClusterFixture gains a
strategy knob. All 16 appsettings flipped (src, docker, docker-env2, and the
gitignored wonder-app-vd03 overlay on disk — owner must sync to the host).
Docs: decision record docs/plans/2026-07-21-auto-down-availability-decision.md,
Component-ClusterInfrastructure downing section rewritten, drill + README
reworked (active mode now asserts takeover), deferred-work SBR row resolved.
Switch site host to WebApplicationBuilder with Kestrel HTTP/2 gRPC server,
add GrpcPort/keepalive config, wire SiteStreamManager as ISiteStreamSubscriber,
expose gRPC ports in docker-compose, add site seed script, update all 10
requirement docs + CLAUDE.md + README.md for the new dual-transport architecture.
Add ActiveNodeHealthCheck that returns 200 only on the Akka.NET cluster
leader, enabling Traefik to route traffic to the active central node and
automatically fail over when the leader changes. Also fixes AkkaClusterHealthCheck
to resolve ActorSystem from AkkaHostedService (was always null via DI).
Replace the CLI's Akka.NET ClusterClient transport with a simple HTTP client
targeting a new POST /management endpoint on the Central Host. The endpoint
handles Basic Auth, LDAP authentication, role resolution, and ManagementActor
dispatch in a single round-trip — eliminating the CLI's Akka, LDAP, and
Security dependencies.
Also fixes DCL ReSubscribeAll losing subscriptions on repeated reconnect by
deriving the tag list from _subscriptionsByInstance instead of _subscriptionIds.
- Add JoeAppEngine folder to OPC UA nodes.json (BTCS, AlarmCntsBySeverity, Scheduler/ScanTime)
- Fix DataConnectionActor: capture Self in PreStart for use from non-actor threads,
preventing Self.Tell failure in Disconnected event handler
- Implement InstanceActor.HandleConnectionQualityChanged to mark attributes Bad on disconnect
- Fix LmxFakeProxy TagMapper to serialize arrays as JSON instead of "System.Int32[]"
- Allow DataType and DataSourceReference updates in TemplateService.UpdateAttributeAsync
- Update test_infra_opcua.md with JoeAppEngine documentation
Multi-stage Dockerfile with NuGet restore layer caching, per-node appsettings
with Docker hostnames, shared bridge network with infra services, and
build/deploy/teardown scripts. Ports use 90xx block to avoid conflicts.
Joseph Doherty