Security-sensitive batch, handled main-thread for careful judgment on
secret-leak and pepper-bypass paths.
Secret leak / pepper bypass:
- CD-016 (pepper bypass): InboundApiRepository's GetApiKeyByValueAsync no
longer hashes the candidate with the unpeppered ApiKeyHasher.Default —
ctor takes a lazy Func<IApiKeyHasher> accessor (lazy so test composition
roots without a pepper still bring up the repository), and the DI
registration wires sp.GetService<IApiKeyHasher>() so the production
peppered hasher matches the stored KeyHash. Regression test asserts
positive (peppered roundtrip) AND negative (Default hasher misses the
same key — proving the lookup uses the injected hasher).
- MgmtSvc-020 (SMTP credential leak): UpdateSmtpConfig/ListSmtpConfigs
now project through SmtpConfigPublicShape so the response payload and
audit-row afterState never carry the Credentials field — only a
HasCredentials bool. The SMTP password / OAuth2 client secret no
longer leaves the Admin-only UpdateSmtpConfig boundary the caller
already supplied it to.
Redaction:
- AuditLog-008 (test-fixture under-redact): new
SafeDefaultAuditPayloadFilter (stateless singleton) does HTTP header
redaction for the always-sensitive defaults (Authorization, X-Api-Key,
Cookie, Set-Cookie). FallbackAuditWriter, CentralAuditWriter, and
AuditLogIngestActor (both ingest paths) default to it instead of null
— composition roots that bypass AddAuditLog can no longer write
unredacted auth headers to the audit store.
- NotifService-025 (over-mask): CredentialRedactor.Scrub now only masks
the last colon-separated component (password / clientSecret) AND only
if it's >= 12 chars (typical password heuristic). Short user names
like "root" no longer become global redaction tokens that eat unrelated
diagnostic text. The full packed string is always masked regardless of
length. 3 new negative tests pin the no-over-mask contract.
Audit-row correctness / fail-loud:
- InboundAPI-025: Program.cs UseWhen predicate now excludes /api/audit,
/api/management, /api/centralui, /api/script-analysis AND requires POST
— the AuditWriteMiddleware no longer emits spurious ApiInbound rows
for audit-log query/export endpoints (write-on-read recursion broken).
- ESG-021: ApplyAuth now logs Warning (not silent) on empty
AuthConfiguration for apikey/basic, unknown AuthType, and malformed
Basic config. AuthConfiguration value NEVER logged. AuthType=none
remains silent (documented unauthenticated sentinel).
- Security-021: AddSecurity now logs a startup Warning when
RequireHttpsCookie=false — an HTTP-only deployment that previously
transmitted the cookie-embedded JWT silently in cleartext is now
audible in the log.
Defensive:
- CD-021: SwitchOutPartitionAsync's monthBoundary format string now
yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.fffffff (datetime2(7) precision) so a future
sub-second / non-midnight boundary doesn't silently round to the
wrong partition.
Plus reconciled stale per-module Open-findings counters that had drifted
from earlier sessions (AuditLog, CD, ESG, IAPI, MgmtSvc, NotifService,
Security).
Build clean; all affected test projects green (Host 208, ConfigDB 242,
ESG 69, IAPI 151, MgmtSvc 100, NotifService 55, Security 85, AuditLog
247/248 — 1 pre-existing date-sensitive integration test flake on
PartitionPurgeTests, unrelated). README regenerated: 46 open (was 54).
Joseph Doherty