OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client and the test-only .Server move
1.5.378.182 -> 2.0.1, the version OtOpcUa master runs (lmxopcua#782; #799
and #801 closed). Transitive Core/Core.Types/Types/Configuration/
Security.Certificates resolve to 2.0.1.
API breaks fixed in the DCL adapter:
- Built-in types are immutable structs (Variant, DataValue, NodeId,
LocalizedText, StatusCode, ArrayOf<T>). New OpcUaValueBoundary restores
the SDK 1.5 CLR shapes for every read, subscription and alarm-event
value (byte[], UTC DateTime with no-timestamp = MinValue, Guid,
detached arrays) and builds write variants with SDK 1.5's
new Variant(object) semantics (byte[] = ByteString scalar).
- StatusCodes members are no longer constants: switches/patterns over
them (verify-outcome mapping, connection-level classification,
BadResourceUnavailable) match by value.
- CertificateIdentifier no longer caches a certificate and the
CertificateValidator/CertificateValidation event is gone: the
configuration's CertificateManager owns trust lists and the loaded
application certificate and is disposed with the session; auto-accept
and the verify probe's capture-and-reject use AcceptError.
- new UserIdentity(X509Certificate2) is gone: X509 user identities use
X509IdentityTokenHandler with an on-demand PFX provider (still fails
fast on a missing file/key).
- DefaultSessionFactory takes the telemetry context; collections are
ArrayOf<T>; EventFilter select clauses and ContentFilter operands are
built immutably.
UserName identity (lmxopcua#880): SDK 2's default handler sends a
password over 64 bytes - every 65-character OtOpcUa API key - as an
RsaEncryptedSecret that SDK 1.5 servers reject with BadIdentityTokenInvalid
and SDK 2 servers accept only within a 5-minute clock window (#873). The
DCL now always uses LegacyRsaUserNameIdentityTokenHandler (ported from
OtOpcUa be28aa44), i.e. exactly what it sent on SDK 1.5, so it logs in to
both server generations during a mixed rollout.
Tests: the in-process secured test server is ported to SDK 2 and can
admit an API key; new tests cover the handler (mutation-checked: 5 of 7
fail with the SDK default handler), the value boundary, and a 65-char key
end to end over None/Sign/SignAndEncrypt with a wrong key reaching the
key check (BadIdentityTokenRejected).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
The site's DataConnectionManagerActor handed VerifyEndpointAsync a NullLogger. A secured
probe is usually what first creates a node's application certificate, so the creation
Warning carrying the thumbprint every server must trust was silently discarded (found on the
rig live gate). The actor takes an optional probe logger; the Host supplies one. Test pins
creation logged once (Warning, thumbprint), not on reuse.
Sign/SignAndEncrypt sessions failed before activation with "ApplicationCertificate
for the security profile ... cannot be found" (BadConfigurationError): both
RealOpcUaClient.ConnectAsync and the verify probe built an empty CertificateIdentifier.
- New OpcUaApplicationIdentity builds the client ApplicationConfiguration for both
paths. Secured modes load the application certificate from a configurable own
store (subject + ApplicationUri), auto-creating a self-signed RSA-2048 cert only
when none exists. A persisted cert is reused across reconnect/restart and never
silently rotated: one that no longer validates (e.g. ApplicationUri mismatch)
fails closed. First-time creation is serialised per own store and logged at
Warning with the thumbprint. None mode is unchanged and never touches the store.
- New OpcUaGlobalOptions: ApplicationUri, ApplicationCertificateSubject,
OwnCertificateStorePath, AutoCreateApplicationCertificate,
ApplicationCertificateLifetimeMonths (validated).
- Owned resources: the private-key cert is disposed on disconnect, failed connect
and at probe end; sessions are now disposed after close, and a reconnect on the
same instance closes the previous session first.
- CertStoreActor wrote trusted server certs to the store ROOT, which the SDK never
reads (it uses {store}/certs), so an operator Trust never affected validation and
SDK-rejected certs never listed. It now uses certs/ and migrates legacy root files
on start.
- Rig: all site nodes (docker/, docker-env2/) put the four PKI stores on the
persistent /app/data volume with a pinned ApplicationUri.
- Tests: in-process strict-trust StandardServer (test-only Opc.Ua.Server 1.5.378.106)
exercising the real adapter through ConnectAsync and VerifyEndpointAsync for Sign
and SignAndEncrypt: allow + read + reconnect + restart on one identity, deny when
the client doesn't trust the server (BadCertificateUntrusted), deny when the server
doesn't trust the client (BadSecurityChecksFailed), None untouched, concurrent
provisioning creates one cert, URI mismatch fails without rotating, auto-create off.
Against the pre-fix client these tests fail with the exact #121 error.
Joseph Doherty