fix(security): M2.19 review nits — idle/refresh config guard + adapter tests + dead-var/doc cleanup (#15)
- Add SecurityOptionsValidator (IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>) enforcing RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes < IdleTimeoutMinutes; registered with ValidateOnStart in AddSecurity — startup FAILS if threshold >= idle, so the invariant cannot be silently misconfigured away. - Update SecurityOptions XML-docs: class-level summary distinguishes JWT Bearer path (JwtSigningKey/JwtExpiryMinutes) from Blazor cookie session path (IdleTimeoutMinutes/ RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes); both time fields document the ~45-min effective idle window and the new cross-field constraint. - Remove dead jwtService variable from /auth/login lambda in AuthEndpoints.cs (resolved but never used since login moved to SessionClaimBuilder). - Extract ApplyValidationResultAsync helper from OnValidatePrincipalAsync (pure decision-application step); add 3 adapter tests covering Reject → RejectPrincipal + SignOutAsync; Replace → ReplacePrincipal + ShouldRenew; Keep → no-op. - Fix inaccurate TryRefreshAsync comment (dropped "OR last-activity needs advancing" — the code only returns non-null when roleRefreshDue). - Add InternalsVisibleTo for Security.Tests in Security.csproj. - Add IsRoleRefreshDue tests: missing claim → due; unparsable claim → due; plus integration test covering the full ValidateAsync path for a principal missing zb:lastrolerefresh (triggers refresh + re-stamps anchor rather than keeping stale principal forever). - Add SecurityOptionsValidatorConfigGuardTests: default succeeds; equal fails; greater fails; boundary (idle-1) succeeds; wiring confirmed via AddSecurity container.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,10 +1,21 @@
|
||||
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Non-LDAP security configuration: the cookie-embedded JWT signing/lifetime
|
||||
/// settings and the session idle-timeout / cookie-security policy.
|
||||
/// Non-LDAP security configuration for the ScadaBridge Central UI.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// <b>JWT Bearer path (<c>/auth/token</c>)</b>: <see cref="JwtSigningKey"/> and
|
||||
/// <see cref="JwtExpiryMinutes"/> govern the short-lived Bearer token issued to
|
||||
/// the CLI / Inbound API. They have no effect on the Blazor cookie session.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// <b>Blazor cookie session</b>: <see cref="IdleTimeoutMinutes"/> and
|
||||
/// <see cref="RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes"/> govern the cookie-only session used by
|
||||
/// the Blazor Server UI. There is no embedded JWT in this path — the cookie is
|
||||
/// HttpOnly/Secure and managed entirely by ASP.NET Core cookie authentication.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Task 1.2/1.4 cutover: the LDAP connection settings that used to live here as
|
||||
/// flat <c>Ldap*</c> keys (server, port, transport, search base, service account,
|
||||
/// attributes, timeout) moved into a nested <c>ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap</c>
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +23,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
|
||||
/// and registered via <c>AddZbLdapAuth</c>. This is a BREAKING config-key change —
|
||||
/// see CHANGELOG. The non-LDAP fields below are unchanged and still bound from
|
||||
/// <c>ScadaBridge:Security</c>.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
public class SecurityOptions
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +39,19 @@ public class SecurityOptions
|
||||
public const int MinJwtSigningKeyBytes = 32;
|
||||
/// <summary>Cookie-embedded JWT lifetime in minutes before it must be refreshed.</summary>
|
||||
public int JwtExpiryMinutes { get; set; } = 15;
|
||||
/// <summary>Session idle timeout in minutes; sessions inactive beyond this are expired.</summary>
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Session idle timeout in minutes for the Blazor cookie session; sessions inactive
|
||||
/// beyond this are expired and the user is redirected to <c>/login</c>. Default: <b>30</b>.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// Because <see cref="RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes"/> is the only operation that advances
|
||||
/// the <c>LastActivity</c> anchor, the effective maximum idle window before a session is
|
||||
/// guaranteed to be rejected is approximately
|
||||
/// <c>IdleTimeoutMinutes + RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes</c> (~45 minutes with defaults).
|
||||
/// This is intentional and mirrors the cookie middleware's own <c>SlidingExpiration</c>
|
||||
/// fuzziness. Must be strictly greater than <see cref="RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes"/>
|
||||
/// (enforced at startup by <see cref="SecurityOptionsValidator"/>).
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
public int IdleTimeoutMinutes { get; set; } = 30;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
@@ -38,15 +62,23 @@ public class SecurityOptions
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// M2.19 (#15): how long a cookie session's role-mapping projection may be stale
|
||||
/// before <c>OnValidatePrincipal</c> re-runs the DB-backed <c>RoleMapper</c> on the
|
||||
/// session's stored LDAP group claims and rebuilds the role/scope claims (default
|
||||
/// <b>15 minutes</b>, matching the documented sliding-refresh cadence). This is a
|
||||
/// purely central (database) refresh — it picks up LDAP-group→role mapping changes
|
||||
/// and scope-rule changes WITHOUT contacting LDAP, so revoked roles take effect
|
||||
/// session's stored LDAP group claims and rebuilds the role/scope claims. Default:
|
||||
/// <b>15 minutes</b>, matching the documented sliding-refresh cadence.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// This is a purely central (database) refresh — it picks up LDAP-group→role mapping
|
||||
/// changes and scope-rule changes WITHOUT contacting LDAP, so revoked roles take effect
|
||||
/// within this window. It does NOT pick up live LDAP group-membership changes (the
|
||||
/// shared LDAP library exposes no passwordless group-search; that remains a
|
||||
/// next-login refresh — see Component-Security.md). Kept <= the cookie idle
|
||||
/// window so a refresh never outlives the session it refreshes.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// next-login refresh — see Component-Security.md).
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Because a role-refresh is also the only operation that advances the
|
||||
/// <c>LastActivity</c> anchor, the effective maximum idle window is approximately
|
||||
/// <c><see cref="IdleTimeoutMinutes"/> + RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes</c> (~45 minutes
|
||||
/// with defaults). Must be strictly less than <see cref="IdleTimeoutMinutes"/>
|
||||
/// (enforced at startup by <see cref="SecurityOptionsValidator"/>).
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
public int RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes { get; set; } = 15;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
@@ -73,3 +105,38 @@ public class SecurityOptions
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
public string CookieName { get; set; } = DefaultCookieName;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// M2.19 (#15): startup validator for <see cref="SecurityOptions"/>. Fails fast at boot
|
||||
/// on any configuration that would defeat idle-timeout enforcement.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// Registered with <c>ValidateOnStart()</c> by
|
||||
/// <see cref="ServiceCollectionExtensions.AddSecurity"/> so a misconfigured appsettings
|
||||
/// section is caught at application startup rather than silently misapplied at runtime.
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
public sealed class SecurityOptionsValidator : Microsoft.Extensions.Options.IValidateOptions<SecurityOptions>
|
||||
{
|
||||
/// <inheritdoc/>
|
||||
public Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ValidateOptionsResult Validate(string? name, SecurityOptions options)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// SECURITY: RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes must be strictly less than IdleTimeoutMinutes.
|
||||
// The role-refresh cycle is the ONLY operation that advances the LastActivity anchor,
|
||||
// so a single un-refreshed cycle must not be able to exhaust the entire idle window.
|
||||
// If threshold >= idle, a user who triggers exactly one refresh at t=0 would have
|
||||
// their anchor advanced to t=threshold while the idle check only fires at t>idle —
|
||||
// meaning t=threshold >= t=idle is already past (or at) the expiry, defeating enforcement.
|
||||
if (options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes >= options.IdleTimeoutMinutes)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ValidateOptionsResult.Fail(
|
||||
$"{nameof(SecurityOptions.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes)} " +
|
||||
$"({options.RoleRefreshThresholdMinutes}) must be strictly less than " +
|
||||
$"{nameof(SecurityOptions.IdleTimeoutMinutes)} " +
|
||||
$"({options.IdleTimeoutMinutes}). " +
|
||||
$"A single refresh cycle must not equal or exceed the idle window or idle " +
|
||||
$"enforcement is defeated.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ValidateOptionsResult.Success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user