fix(auth+cli): fail-closed site-scope gate (row 98); case-insensitive audit filter values with a strict server-side check (row 99)

Register row 98 — the site-scope authorization gate was FAIL-OPEN on an
unresolvable target. The resolve-then-check shape was written as
`if (target != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`, so a null resolve skipped the
check entirely and a site-scoped caller passed the gate for any id in the
system. Authorization now fails CLOSED: a target that cannot be PROVEN to sit
inside the caller's scope is treated as outside it.

The defect turned out to have THREE more instances than the register recorded.
Besides `EnforceSiteScopeForInstance` and `EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier`, the
same inline shape sat in `HandleGetInstance`, `HandleGetSite` and
`HandleGetDataConnection` — read handlers that resolve their own target and so
never call the helpers. Those were the sharper half of the bug: they answered
success-with-null for a nonexistent id and Unauthorized for an out-of-scope
one, making the pair an id-enumeration oracle over the whole fleet. All five
now route through one shared `DenyUnresolvedTargetIfScoped` arm.

Two properties are load-bearing and pinned by tests:
  - System-wide callers (Administrator, or a Deployer with no site grants) are
    untouched — they return at the guards above the lookup and keep the
    handler's ordinary "not found" / null answer.
  - The denial is indistinguishable from an out-of-scope denial: same
    ManagementUnauthorized shape, and a message that never states whether the
    target exists.

Register row 99 — CLI `audit query --status delivered` failed client-side while
the server would have accepted it: `AcceptOnlyFromAmong` matches ordinally
against the capitalised literals. Same treatment row 88 gave `deploy status` —
the client-side gate is removed, the valid set moves into the option help text,
and the server becomes the single authoritative check.

That required ADDING the server check, not just relying on one: the shared
audit filter parser was LAX, silently dropping an unrecognised value and
leaving the dimension unconstrained — so removing the CLI gate alone would have
turned a loud client-side failure into a plausible, complete-looking page that
did not answer the question asked. New `ParseEnumListStrict` (case-insensitive,
rejects ordinals — `Enum.TryParse` accepts "3", and a filter is a name-based
contract) backs the ManagementService /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export
endpoints, which now return 400 BAD_REQUEST naming the valid set.

Other AcceptOnlyFromAmong sites surveyed in the audit group: `--channel`,
`--kind`, `--status` on BOTH `query` and `export` (6 uses) plus `export
--format` (rejected `--format CSV` though the server lowercases it) — all seven
fixed here. Deliberately left alone: `template folder reorder --direction`
(pure client-side literal, no server-side parse to defer to) and the global
`--format json|table` (CLI-local output selection, never sent to a server).

The CentralUI AuditLogPage drill-in parser and the CentralUI export endpoint it
feeds deliberately KEEP the lax parse — they read a query string a human may
have bookmarked, where a stale fragment must still render the page. Both
contracts now live side by side in AuditQueryParamParsers and are documented as
non-reconcilable.

Docs: Component-ManagementService.md gains a "Site-scope gate: fail-closed on
an unresolvable target" section and a strict-filter note on the audit
endpoints; Component-Security.md records the fail-closed shape under Deployer
site scoping; the CLI README marks the audit filter values case-insensitive and
states the no-silent-drop / no-ordinals contract.

Tests: 5 new ManagementActorTests fail before the row-98 fix (verified by
reverting ManagementActor.cs) and cover scoped+nonexistent -> denied,
system-wide+nonexistent -> unchanged (both Administrator and no-grant Deployer),
scoped+in-scope -> allowed, and the indistinguishability property. 21 CLI tests
fail before the row-99 fix. Four pre-existing tests that pinned the removed
client-side gate were rewritten to pin the new contract.

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Tests/Types/AuditQueryParamParsersTests.cs

@@ -4,11 +4,17 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Enums;
 namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Tests.Types;
 
 /// <summary>
-/// Audit Log #23 (M8): tests for the shared lax multi-value query-param parsers
-/// used by the ManagementService + CentralUI audit endpoints and the
-/// <c>AuditLogPage</c> drill-in parser. The contract under test: parse each
-/// repeated value independently, silently drop unparseable/blank elements, and
-/// collapse an empty result to <c>null</c>.
+/// Audit Log #23 (M8): tests for the shared multi-value query-param parsers used by
+/// the ManagementService + CentralUI audit endpoints and the <c>AuditLogPage</c>
+/// drill-in parser. Two contracts are under test:
+/// <list type="bullet">
+///   <item><b>Lax</b> (<c>ParseEnumList</c>/<c>ParseStringList</c>, used by the
+///   CentralUI surfaces): parse each repeated value independently, silently drop
+///   unparseable/blank elements, collapse an empty result to <c>null</c>.</item>
+///   <item><b>Strict</b> (<c>ParseEnumListStrict</c>, register row 99, used by the
+///   ManagementService endpoints the CLI calls): an unrecognised value is an error
+///   naming the valid set; blanks are still dropped.</item>
+/// </list>
 /// </summary>
 public class AuditQueryParamParsersTests
 {
@@ -53,6 +59,92 @@ public class AuditQueryParamParsersTests
         Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumList<AuditStatus>(new[] { "Bogus", "" }));
     }
 
+    // ========================================================================
+    // Strict variant (register row 99) — the contract the ManagementService
+    // /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export endpoints use, so the CLI can drop its
+    // case-SENSITIVE AcceptOnlyFromAmong guard and still fail loudly on garbage.
+    // ========================================================================
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_NullInput_ReturnsNull()
+    {
+        Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(null, "status"));
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_EmptyInput_ReturnsNull()
+    {
+        Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(Array.Empty<string?>(), "status"));
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData("delivered")]
+    [InlineData("DELIVERED")]
+    [InlineData("Delivered")]
+    [InlineData("  delivered  ")]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_IsCaseInsensitiveAndTrims(string raw)
+    {
+        var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(new[] { raw }, "status");
+        Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered }, result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_AllValuesValid_ParsesEverything()
+    {
+        var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditChannel>(
+            new[] { "ApiOutbound", "dboutbound" }, "channel");
+        Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound, AuditChannel.DbOutbound }, result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_UnrecognisedValue_ThrowsNamingTheValidSet()
+    {
+        var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(
+            () => AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
+                new[] { "Delivered", "NotAStatus" }, "status"));
+
+        // The offending value AND the whole valid vocabulary must be in the message —
+        // naming the valid set is the entire point of the check.
+        Assert.Contains("NotAStatus", ex.Message);
+        Assert.Contains("status", ex.Message);
+        foreach (var name in Enum.GetNames<AuditStatus>())
+        {
+            Assert.Contains(name, ex.Message);
+        }
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    // "7" is out of range; "3" lands on a REAL member. Enum.TryParse accepts BOTH —
+    // a filter is a name-based contract, never an ordinal one, so both are rejected.
+    [InlineData("7")]
+    [InlineData("3")]
+    [InlineData("0")]
+    [InlineData("-1")]
+    [InlineData("+2")]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_NumericString_IsRejected(string raw)
+    {
+        var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(
+            () => AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(new[] { raw }, "status"));
+        Assert.Contains(raw, ex.Message);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_BlankElements_AreStillDroppedSilently()
+    {
+        // A repeated query param can legitimately carry an empty slot; only a
+        // NON-blank unrecognised value is an error.
+        var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
+            new[] { "Delivered", "", "   ", null }, "status");
+        Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered }, result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnumListStrict_AllBlank_ReturnsNull()
+    {
+        Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
+            new[] { "", "  ", null }, "status"));
+    }
+
     [Fact]
     public void ParseStringList_NullInput_ReturnsNull()
     {