fix(auth+cli): fail-closed site-scope gate (row 98); case-insensitive audit filter values with a strict server-side check (row 99)

Register row 98 — the site-scope authorization gate was FAIL-OPEN on an
unresolvable target. The resolve-then-check shape was written as
`if (target != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`, so a null resolve skipped the
check entirely and a site-scoped caller passed the gate for any id in the
system. Authorization now fails CLOSED: a target that cannot be PROVEN to sit
inside the caller's scope is treated as outside it.

The defect turned out to have THREE more instances than the register recorded.
Besides `EnforceSiteScopeForInstance` and `EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier`, the
same inline shape sat in `HandleGetInstance`, `HandleGetSite` and
`HandleGetDataConnection` — read handlers that resolve their own target and so
never call the helpers. Those were the sharper half of the bug: they answered
success-with-null for a nonexistent id and Unauthorized for an out-of-scope
one, making the pair an id-enumeration oracle over the whole fleet. All five
now route through one shared `DenyUnresolvedTargetIfScoped` arm.

Two properties are load-bearing and pinned by tests:
  - System-wide callers (Administrator, or a Deployer with no site grants) are
    untouched — they return at the guards above the lookup and keep the
    handler's ordinary "not found" / null answer.
  - The denial is indistinguishable from an out-of-scope denial: same
    ManagementUnauthorized shape, and a message that never states whether the
    target exists.

Register row 99 — CLI `audit query --status delivered` failed client-side while
the server would have accepted it: `AcceptOnlyFromAmong` matches ordinally
against the capitalised literals. Same treatment row 88 gave `deploy status` —
the client-side gate is removed, the valid set moves into the option help text,
and the server becomes the single authoritative check.

That required ADDING the server check, not just relying on one: the shared
audit filter parser was LAX, silently dropping an unrecognised value and
leaving the dimension unconstrained — so removing the CLI gate alone would have
turned a loud client-side failure into a plausible, complete-looking page that
did not answer the question asked. New `ParseEnumListStrict` (case-insensitive,
rejects ordinals — `Enum.TryParse` accepts "3", and a filter is a name-based
contract) backs the ManagementService /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export
endpoints, which now return 400 BAD_REQUEST naming the valid set.

Other AcceptOnlyFromAmong sites surveyed in the audit group: `--channel`,
`--kind`, `--status` on BOTH `query` and `export` (6 uses) plus `export
--format` (rejected `--format CSV` though the server lowercases it) — all seven
fixed here. Deliberately left alone: `template folder reorder --direction`
(pure client-side literal, no server-side parse to defer to) and the global
`--format json|table` (CLI-local output selection, never sent to a server).

The CentralUI AuditLogPage drill-in parser and the CentralUI export endpoint it
feeds deliberately KEEP the lax parse — they read a query string a human may
have bookmarked, where a stale fragment must still render the page. Both
contracts now live side by side in AuditQueryParamParsers and are documented as
non-reconcilable.

Docs: Component-ManagementService.md gains a "Site-scope gate: fail-closed on
an unresolvable target" section and a strict-filter note on the audit
endpoints; Component-Security.md records the fail-closed shape under Deployer
site scoping; the CLI README marks the audit filter values case-insensitive and
states the no-silent-drop / no-ordinals contract.

Tests: 5 new ManagementActorTests fail before the row-98 fix (verified by
reverting ManagementActor.cs) and cover scoped+nonexistent -> denied,
system-wide+nonexistent -> unchanged (both Administrator and no-grant Deployer),
scoped+in-scope -> allowed, and the indistinguishability property. 21 CLI tests
fail before the row-99 fix. Four pre-existing tests that pinned the removed
client-side gate were rewritten to pin the new contract.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-17 06:05:29 -04:00
parent dcfcf822af
commit f33f25a10b
14 changed files with 818 additions and 101 deletions
@@ -231,8 +231,12 @@ public class CommandTreeTests
[Theory]
[InlineData("sideways")]
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong is case-SENSITIVE (same contract as the audit
// --channel / --kind / --status options), so the literals are lowercase only.
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong is case-SENSITIVE, so the literals are lowercase only.
// The audit --channel/--kind/--status options USED to share this contract; they
// dropped AcceptOnlyFromAmong in register row 99 precisely because the
// case-sensitivity rejected values the server accepts. --direction keeps it: it is
// a pure client-side literal that never reaches a server-side parse, so there is no
// authoritative check behind it to defer to.
[InlineData("Up")]
public void TemplateFolderReorder_RejectsAnythingElse(string direction)
{
@@ -255,6 +259,81 @@ public class CommandTreeTests
Assert.NotEmpty(parse.Errors);
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: the audit filter options must NOT be case-sensitively
// gated client-side.
//
// `audit query --status delivered` used to fail at the CLI parse layer while
// the server would have accepted it — AcceptOnlyFromAmong matches ordinally
// against the capitalised literals. The valid set now lives in the help text
// and the server's strict, case-insensitive check is authoritative (the same
// treatment row 88 gave `deploy status`). These tests fail before that change.
// ========================================================================
public static TheoryData<string, string, string> AuditFilterValues() => new()
{
// subcommand, option, value — lowercase, uppercase and mixed case of a real member.
{ "query", "--status", "delivered" },
{ "query", "--status", "DELIVERED" },
{ "query", "--channel", "apioutbound" },
{ "query", "--kind", "apicall" },
{ "export", "--status", "parked" },
{ "export", "--channel", "notification" },
{ "export", "--kind", "dbwrite" },
};
[Theory]
[MemberData(nameof(AuditFilterValues))]
public void AuditFilterOptions_AcceptValuesInAnyCase(string subcommand, string option, string value)
{
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var cmd = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == subcommand);
// `export` has three required options; supply them so the only thing under
// test is the filter value's own acceptance.
var args = subcommand == "export"
? new[] { "--since", "1h", "--until", "now", "--format", "csv", "--output", "out.csv", option, value }
: new[] { option, value };
var parse = cmd.Parse(args);
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("csv")]
[InlineData("CSV")]
[InlineData("jsonl")]
public void AuditExport_FormatOption_AcceptsValuesInAnyCase(string format)
{
// The server lowercases --format before matching and returns a 400 naming
// csv/jsonl/parquet for anything else, so the client-side literal gate was
// pure friction (register row 99).
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var export = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == "export");
var parse = export.Parse(new[]
{
"--since", "1h", "--until", "now", "--format", format, "--output", "out.csv",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void AuditQuery_UnrecognisedFilterValue_IsNotRejectedClientSide()
{
// Deliberate: the CLI no longer second-guesses the filter vocabulary. A bad
// value must reach the server, which answers 400 naming the valid set —
// one authoritative check instead of two that can drift apart.
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var query = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == "query");
var parse = query.Parse(new[] { "--status", "NotAStatus" });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void SiteArea_HasMoveVerb()
{