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fix(auth+cli): fail-closed site-scope gate (row 98); case-insensitive audit filter values with a strict server-side check (row 99)

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Register row 98 — the site-scope authorization gate was FAIL-OPEN on an
unresolvable target. The resolve-then-check shape was written as
`if (target != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`, so a null resolve skipped the
check entirely and a site-scoped caller passed the gate for any id in the
system. Authorization now fails CLOSED: a target that cannot be PROVEN to sit
inside the caller's scope is treated as outside it.

The defect turned out to have THREE more instances than the register recorded.
Besides `EnforceSiteScopeForInstance` and `EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier`, the
same inline shape sat in `HandleGetInstance`, `HandleGetSite` and
`HandleGetDataConnection` — read handlers that resolve their own target and so
never call the helpers. Those were the sharper half of the bug: they answered
success-with-null for a nonexistent id and Unauthorized for an out-of-scope
one, making the pair an id-enumeration oracle over the whole fleet. All five
now route through one shared `DenyUnresolvedTargetIfScoped` arm.

Two properties are load-bearing and pinned by tests:
  - System-wide callers (Administrator, or a Deployer with no site grants) are
    untouched — they return at the guards above the lookup and keep the
    handler's ordinary "not found" / null answer.
  - The denial is indistinguishable from an out-of-scope denial: same
    ManagementUnauthorized shape, and a message that never states whether the
    target exists.

Register row 99 — CLI `audit query --status delivered` failed client-side while
the server would have accepted it: `AcceptOnlyFromAmong` matches ordinally
against the capitalised literals. Same treatment row 88 gave `deploy status` —
the client-side gate is removed, the valid set moves into the option help text,
and the server becomes the single authoritative check.

That required ADDING the server check, not just relying on one: the shared
audit filter parser was LAX, silently dropping an unrecognised value and
leaving the dimension unconstrained — so removing the CLI gate alone would have
turned a loud client-side failure into a plausible, complete-looking page that
did not answer the question asked. New `ParseEnumListStrict` (case-insensitive,
rejects ordinals — `Enum.TryParse` accepts "3", and a filter is a name-based
contract) backs the ManagementService /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export
endpoints, which now return 400 BAD_REQUEST naming the valid set.

Other AcceptOnlyFromAmong sites surveyed in the audit group: `--channel`,
`--kind`, `--status` on BOTH `query` and `export` (6 uses) plus `export
--format` (rejected `--format CSV` though the server lowercases it) — all seven
fixed here. Deliberately left alone: `template folder reorder --direction`
(pure client-side literal, no server-side parse to defer to) and the global
`--format json|table` (CLI-local output selection, never sent to a server).

The CentralUI AuditLogPage drill-in parser and the CentralUI export endpoint it
feeds deliberately KEEP the lax parse — they read a query string a human may
have bookmarked, where a stale fragment must still render the page. Both
contracts now live side by side in AuditQueryParamParsers and are documented as
non-reconcilable.

Docs: Component-ManagementService.md gains a "Site-scope gate: fail-closed on
an unresolvable target" section and a strict-filter note on the audit
endpoints; Component-Security.md records the fail-closed shape under Deployer
site scoping; the CLI README marks the audit filter values case-insensitive and
states the no-silent-drop / no-ordinals contract.

Tests: 5 new ManagementActorTests fail before the row-98 fix (verified by
reverting ManagementActor.cs) and cover scoped+nonexistent -> denied,
system-wide+nonexistent -> unchanged (both Administrator and no-grant Deployer),
scoped+in-scope -> allowed, and the indistinguishability property. 21 CLI tests
fail before the row-99 fix. Four pre-existing tests that pinned the removed
client-side gate were rewritten to pin the new contract.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-17 06:05:29 -04:00
parent dcfcf822af
commit f33f25a10b
14 changed files with 818 additions and 101 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CLI.Tests/CommandTreeTests.cs
+81 -2
View File
@@ -231,8 +231,12 @@ public class CommandTreeTests
[Theory]
[InlineData("sideways")]
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong is case-SENSITIVE (same contract as the audit
// --channel / --kind / --status options), so the literals are lowercase only.
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong is case-SENSITIVE, so the literals are lowercase only.
// The audit --channel/--kind/--status options USED to share this contract; they
// dropped AcceptOnlyFromAmong in register row 99 precisely because the
// case-sensitivity rejected values the server accepts. --direction keeps it: it is
// a pure client-side literal that never reaches a server-side parse, so there is no
// authoritative check behind it to defer to.
[InlineData("Up")]
public void TemplateFolderReorder_RejectsAnythingElse(string direction)
{
@@ -255,6 +259,81 @@ public class CommandTreeTests
Assert.NotEmpty(parse.Errors);
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: the audit filter options must NOT be case-sensitively
// gated client-side.
//
// `audit query --status delivered` used to fail at the CLI parse layer while
// the server would have accepted it — AcceptOnlyFromAmong matches ordinally
// against the capitalised literals. The valid set now lives in the help text
// and the server's strict, case-insensitive check is authoritative (the same
// treatment row 88 gave `deploy status`). These tests fail before that change.
// ========================================================================
public static TheoryData<string, string, string> AuditFilterValues() => new()
{
// subcommand, option, value — lowercase, uppercase and mixed case of a real member.
{ "query", "--status", "delivered" },
{ "query", "--status", "DELIVERED" },
{ "query", "--channel", "apioutbound" },
{ "query", "--kind", "apicall" },
{ "export", "--status", "parked" },
{ "export", "--channel", "notification" },
{ "export", "--kind", "dbwrite" },
};
[Theory]
[MemberData(nameof(AuditFilterValues))]
public void AuditFilterOptions_AcceptValuesInAnyCase(string subcommand, string option, string value)
{
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var cmd = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == subcommand);
// `export` has three required options; supply them so the only thing under
// test is the filter value's own acceptance.
var args = subcommand == "export"
? new[] { "--since", "1h", "--until", "now", "--format", "csv", "--output", "out.csv", option, value }
: new[] { option, value };
var parse = cmd.Parse(args);
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("csv")]
[InlineData("CSV")]
[InlineData("jsonl")]
public void AuditExport_FormatOption_AcceptsValuesInAnyCase(string format)
{
// The server lowercases --format before matching and returns a 400 naming
// csv/jsonl/parquet for anything else, so the client-side literal gate was
// pure friction (register row 99).
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var export = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == "export");
var parse = export.Parse(new[]
{
"--since", "1h", "--until", "now", "--format", format, "--output", "out.csv",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void AuditQuery_UnrecognisedFilterValue_IsNotRejectedClientSide()
{
// Deliberate: the CLI no longer second-guesses the filter vocabulary. A bad
// value must reach the server, which answers 400 naming the valid set —
// one authoritative check instead of two that can drift apart.
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var query = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == "query");
var parse = query.Parse(new[] { "--status", "NotAStatus" });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void SiteArea_HasMoveVerb()
{
tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CLI.Tests/Commands/AuditExportCommandTests.cs
+30 -9
View File
@@ -40,15 +40,34 @@ public class AuditExportCommandTests
}
[Fact]
public void Export_InvalidFormat_Rejected()
public void Export_InvalidFormat_IsNotRejectedAtTheParseLayer()
{
// Register row 99: the client-side AcceptOnlyFromAmong gate is gone. It
// matched case-SENSITIVELY, so it rejected `--format CSV` even though the
// server lowercases the value before matching. The server returns a 400
// naming csv/jsonl/parquet and is the authoritative check.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var parse = root.Parse(new[]
{
"audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
"--format", "xml", "--output", "/tmp/out.xml",
});
Assert.NotEmpty(parse.Errors);
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("CSV")]
[InlineData("Csv")]
[InlineData("JSONL")]
public void Export_FormatInAnyCase_IsAccepted(string format)
{
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var parse = root.Parse(new[]
{
"audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
"--format", format, "--output", "/tmp/out.csv",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
// ---- Query string -----------------------------------------------------
@@ -148,16 +167,18 @@ public class AuditExportCommandTests
}
[Fact]
public void Export_MultiValueChannel_WithOneInvalidName_FailsFast()
public void Export_MultiValueChannel_WithOneUnrecognisedName_StillParses()
{
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong validates EACH value of the multi-value option.
// Register row 99: the vocabulary gate moved server-side; the multi-value
// shape itself is unchanged, so both values reach the server to adjudicate.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(
root, "audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
var parse = root.Parse(new[]
{
"audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
"--format", "csv", "--output", "/tmp/out.csv",
"--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
"--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
// ---- Streaming export to file -----------------------------------------
tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CLI.Tests/Commands/AuditQueryCommandTests.cs
+35 -27
View File
@@ -424,43 +424,51 @@ public class AuditQueryCommandTests
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_MultiValueChannel_WithOneInvalidName_FailsFast()
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: filter-vocabulary validation moved OFF the CLI.
//
// These four tests used to assert that AcceptOnlyFromAmong rejected an
// unrecognised --channel/--kind/--status at the parse layer. That gate matched
// case-SENSITIVELY, so it also rejected `--status delivered`, which the server
// has always accepted — the CLI was stricter than the system it drives. The
// gate is gone; the parse layer now accepts any string and the server answers
// 400 naming the valid set (AuditEndpointsTests pins that side).
//
// What is asserted here is the CLIENT half of that contract: the value is
// carried through to the request rather than rejected locally.
// ========================================================================
[Theory]
[InlineData("--channel", "OutboundApi")] // old (non-existent) name; the real enum is "ApiOutbound"
[InlineData("--kind", "CachedCall")]
[InlineData("--status", "Bogus")]
public void Query_UnrecognisedFilterValue_IsNotRejectedAtTheParseLayer(string option, string value)
{
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong validates EACH value of the multi-value option.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(
root, "audit", "query", "--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
var parse = root.Parse(new[] { "audit", "query", option, value });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_ChannelWithInvalidName_FailsFast_NonZeroExit()
public void Query_MultiValueChannel_WithOneUnrecognisedName_StillParses()
{
// "OutboundApi" is the old (non-existent) name; the real enum is "ApiOutbound".
// The multi-value shape is unchanged; only the vocabulary gate is gone, so
// BOTH values reach the server for it to adjudicate.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(root, "audit", "query", "--channel", "OutboundApi");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
Assert.Contains("OutboundApi", err);
var parse = root.Parse(new[] { "audit", "query", "--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi" });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_KindWithInvalidName_FailsFast_NonZeroExit()
[Theory]
[InlineData("--channel", "apioutbound")]
[InlineData("--kind", "apicall")]
[InlineData("--status", "delivered")]
[InlineData("--status", "DELIVERED")]
public void Query_FilterValueInAnyCase_IsAccepted(string option, string value)
{
// The defect row 99 names: these all failed client-side before the fix.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(root, "audit", "query", "--kind", "CachedCall");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_StatusWithInvalidName_FailsFast_NonZeroExit()
{
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(root, "audit", "query", "--status", "Bogus");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
var parse = root.Parse(new[] { "audit", "query", option, value });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
}
tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Tests/Types/AuditQueryParamParsersTests.cs
+97 -5
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,17 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Enums;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Tests.Types;
/// <summary>
/// Audit Log #23 (M8): tests for the shared lax multi-value query-param parsers
/// used by the ManagementService + CentralUI audit endpoints and the
/// <c>AuditLogPage</c> drill-in parser. The contract under test: parse each
/// repeated value independently, silently drop unparseable/blank elements, and
/// collapse an empty result to <c>null</c>.
/// Audit Log #23 (M8): tests for the shared multi-value query-param parsers used by
/// the ManagementService + CentralUI audit endpoints and the <c>AuditLogPage</c>
/// drill-in parser. Two contracts are under test:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><b>Lax</b> (<c>ParseEnumList</c>/<c>ParseStringList</c>, used by the
/// CentralUI surfaces): parse each repeated value independently, silently drop
/// unparseable/blank elements, collapse an empty result to <c>null</c>.</item>
/// <item><b>Strict</b> (<c>ParseEnumListStrict</c>, register row 99, used by the
/// ManagementService endpoints the CLI calls): an unrecognised value is an error
/// naming the valid set; blanks are still dropped.</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public class AuditQueryParamParsersTests
{
@@ -53,6 +59,92 @@ public class AuditQueryParamParsersTests
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumList<AuditStatus>(new[] { "Bogus", "" }));
}
// ========================================================================
// Strict variant (register row 99) — the contract the ManagementService
// /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export endpoints use, so the CLI can drop its
// case-SENSITIVE AcceptOnlyFromAmong guard and still fail loudly on garbage.
// ========================================================================
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_NullInput_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(null, "status"));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_EmptyInput_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(Array.Empty<string?>(), "status"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("delivered")]
[InlineData("DELIVERED")]
[InlineData("Delivered")]
[InlineData(" delivered ")]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_IsCaseInsensitiveAndTrims(string raw)
{
var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(new[] { raw }, "status");
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered }, result);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_AllValuesValid_ParsesEverything()
{
var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditChannel>(
new[] { "ApiOutbound", "dboutbound" }, "channel");
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound, AuditChannel.DbOutbound }, result);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_UnrecognisedValue_ThrowsNamingTheValidSet()
{
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(
() => AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
new[] { "Delivered", "NotAStatus" }, "status"));
// The offending value AND the whole valid vocabulary must be in the message —
// naming the valid set is the entire point of the check.
Assert.Contains("NotAStatus", ex.Message);
Assert.Contains("status", ex.Message);
foreach (var name in Enum.GetNames<AuditStatus>())
{
Assert.Contains(name, ex.Message);
}
}
[Theory]
// "7" is out of range; "3" lands on a REAL member. Enum.TryParse accepts BOTH —
// a filter is a name-based contract, never an ordinal one, so both are rejected.
[InlineData("7")]
[InlineData("3")]
[InlineData("0")]
[InlineData("-1")]
[InlineData("+2")]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_NumericString_IsRejected(string raw)
{
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(
() => AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(new[] { raw }, "status"));
Assert.Contains(raw, ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_BlankElements_AreStillDroppedSilently()
{
// A repeated query param can legitimately carry an empty slot; only a
// NON-blank unrecognised value is an error.
var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
new[] { "Delivered", "", " ", null }, "status");
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered }, result);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_AllBlank_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
new[] { "", " ", null }, "status"));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseStringList_NullInput_ReturnsNull()
{
tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ManagementService.Tests/AuditEndpointsTests.cs
+63 -6
View File
@@ -416,23 +416,80 @@ public class AuditEndpointsTests
Assert.Null(filter.SourceSiteIds);
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: the enum filter dimensions parse STRICTLY here.
//
// These used to assert the LAX contract — an unrecognised enum name was
// dropped and the query ran unfiltered on that dimension, so `--status
// Nonsense` returned a plausible, complete-looking page that did not answer
// the question asked. That is exactly the failure row 88 fixed for `deploy
// status`, and it became reachable from the CLI once the (case-SENSITIVE,
// and therefore over-strict) client-side AcceptOnlyFromAmong guard was
// removed. The Guid/date dimensions stay lax — see ParseFilter's remarks.
// ========================================================================
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_UnparseableValuesInRepeatedSet_AreDroppedSilently()
public void ParseFilter_UnrecognisedEnumValue_Throws()
{
// Lax-parse contract: an unrecognised enum name is dropped, the rest of
// the repeated set survives — no 400, no whole-set drop.
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["channel"] = new[] { "ApiOutbound", "Bogus", "Notification" },
});
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(() => AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query));
Assert.Contains("Bogus", ex.Message);
Assert.Contains("channel", ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_UnrecognisedStatus_ThrowsNamingTheValidSet()
{
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["status"] = new[] { "Nonsense" },
});
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(() => AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query));
foreach (var name in Enum.GetNames<AuditStatus>())
{
Assert.Contains(name, ex.Message);
}
}
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_LowercaseEnumValues_AreAccepted()
{
// The CLI sends whatever the operator typed now that its own case-sensitive
// guard is gone; `--status delivered` must resolve here.
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["channel"] = new[] { "apioutbound" },
["kind"] = new[] { "apicall" },
["status"] = new[] { "delivered", "PARKED" },
});
var filter = AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound, AuditChannel.Notification }, filter.Channels);
// Every value unparseable → the dimension stays unconstrained (null).
Assert.Null(filter.Statuses);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound }, filter.Channels);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditKind.ApiCall }, filter.Kinds);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered, AuditStatus.Parked }, filter.Statuses);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_NumericEnumValue_IsRejected()
{
// Enum.TryParse would accept "3" as an ordinal; a filter is a name-based
// contract, so it must not.
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["status"] = new[] { "3" },
});
Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(() => AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query));
}
[Fact]
tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ManagementService.Tests/ManagementActorTests.cs
+187
View File
@@ -985,6 +985,193 @@ public class ManagementActorTests : TestKit, IDisposable
ExpectMsg<ManagementSuccess>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 98: the scope gate fails CLOSED on an unresolvable target.
//
// EnforceSiteScopeForInstance / EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier used to skip
// EnforceSiteScope entirely when the id did not resolve, so a site-scoped
// caller PASSED the gate and fell through into the handler body. A gate that
// cannot prove the target is inside the caller's scope must treat it as
// outside. System-wide callers return at the guards above the lookup and are
// untouched — they still get the handler's ordinary "not found".
// ========================================================================
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// _templateRepo is unstubbed for id 999 → GetInstanceByIdAsync returns null.
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
// The denial must not double as an existence oracle: the message says the
// instance is not in scope, never whether it exists.
Assert.DoesNotContain("not found", response.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("exist", response.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_IsIndistinguishableFromOutOfScope()
{
// The security property: a scoped caller cannot tell "instance 7 lives at a
// site you may not see" apart from "instance 999 does not exist" — both are
// the same ManagementUnauthorized shape.
_templateRepo.GetInstanceByIdAsync(7, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(new Instance("Pump7") { Id = 7, SiteId = 2 });
var actor = CreateActor();
actor.Tell(ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(7), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer"));
var outOfScope = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
actor.Tell(ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer"));
var nonexistent = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(outOfScope.GetType(), nonexistent.GetType());
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForAdminUser_IsUnchanged()
{
// An Administrator is system-wide, so the gate returns before the lookup:
// the handler runs and answers for itself. NOT a ManagementUnauthorized.
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Administrator");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForSystemWideDeployer_IsUnchanged()
{
// The other system-wide arm: a Deployer with NO site grants. Same rule,
// same untouched behaviour.
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), Array.Empty<string>(), "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_InScopeIdForSiteScopedUser_IsStillAllowed()
{
// The fail-closed change must not deny a legitimate in-scope target.
_templateRepo.GetInstanceByIdAsync(7, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(new Instance("Pump7") { Id = 7, SiteId = 1 });
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(7), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
ExpectMsg<ManagementSuccess>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
}
[Fact]
public void GetSite_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// HandleGetSite resolves the site itself and carried its own copy of the
// fail-OPEN shape (`if (site != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`), so a scoped
// caller used to get success/null for any id — an enumeration oracle.
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetSiteByIdAsync(999, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.Site?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetSiteCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
}
[Fact]
public void GetSite_NonexistentIdForAdminUser_IsUnchanged()
{
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetSiteByIdAsync(999, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.Site?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetSiteCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Administrator");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetDataConnection_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// Third copy of the same inline fail-OPEN shape.
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetDataConnectionByIdAsync(999, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.DataConnection?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetDataConnectionCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
}
[Fact]
public void QueryEventLogs_NonexistentSiteIdentifierForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier shares the shape: an identifier that
// resolves to no Site row is a denial for a scoped caller.
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetSiteByIdentifierAsync("GHOST", Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.Site?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(
new QueryEventLogsCommand("GHOST"),
new[] { "1" },
"Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
}
[Fact]
public void QueryEventLogs_InScopeSiteIdentifierForSiteScopedUser_IsStillAllowed()
{
AddSiteRepoWithSite(1, "SITE1");
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(
new QueryEventLogsCommand("SITE1"),
new[] { "1" },
"Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
// The scope gate passes; whatever the (unwired) CommunicationService does
// next is not this test's business — only that it is NOT a scope denial.
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetSite_OutOfScopeForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{