fix(auth+cli): fail-closed site-scope gate (row 98); case-insensitive audit filter values with a strict server-side check (row 99)

Register row 98 — the site-scope authorization gate was FAIL-OPEN on an
unresolvable target. The resolve-then-check shape was written as
`if (target != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`, so a null resolve skipped the
check entirely and a site-scoped caller passed the gate for any id in the
system. Authorization now fails CLOSED: a target that cannot be PROVEN to sit
inside the caller's scope is treated as outside it.

The defect turned out to have THREE more instances than the register recorded.
Besides `EnforceSiteScopeForInstance` and `EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier`, the
same inline shape sat in `HandleGetInstance`, `HandleGetSite` and
`HandleGetDataConnection` — read handlers that resolve their own target and so
never call the helpers. Those were the sharper half of the bug: they answered
success-with-null for a nonexistent id and Unauthorized for an out-of-scope
one, making the pair an id-enumeration oracle over the whole fleet. All five
now route through one shared `DenyUnresolvedTargetIfScoped` arm.

Two properties are load-bearing and pinned by tests:
  - System-wide callers (Administrator, or a Deployer with no site grants) are
    untouched — they return at the guards above the lookup and keep the
    handler's ordinary "not found" / null answer.
  - The denial is indistinguishable from an out-of-scope denial: same
    ManagementUnauthorized shape, and a message that never states whether the
    target exists.

Register row 99 — CLI `audit query --status delivered` failed client-side while
the server would have accepted it: `AcceptOnlyFromAmong` matches ordinally
against the capitalised literals. Same treatment row 88 gave `deploy status` —
the client-side gate is removed, the valid set moves into the option help text,
and the server becomes the single authoritative check.

That required ADDING the server check, not just relying on one: the shared
audit filter parser was LAX, silently dropping an unrecognised value and
leaving the dimension unconstrained — so removing the CLI gate alone would have
turned a loud client-side failure into a plausible, complete-looking page that
did not answer the question asked. New `ParseEnumListStrict` (case-insensitive,
rejects ordinals — `Enum.TryParse` accepts "3", and a filter is a name-based
contract) backs the ManagementService /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export
endpoints, which now return 400 BAD_REQUEST naming the valid set.

Other AcceptOnlyFromAmong sites surveyed in the audit group: `--channel`,
`--kind`, `--status` on BOTH `query` and `export` (6 uses) plus `export
--format` (rejected `--format CSV` though the server lowercases it) — all seven
fixed here. Deliberately left alone: `template folder reorder --direction`
(pure client-side literal, no server-side parse to defer to) and the global
`--format json|table` (CLI-local output selection, never sent to a server).

The CentralUI AuditLogPage drill-in parser and the CentralUI export endpoint it
feeds deliberately KEEP the lax parse — they read a query string a human may
have bookmarked, where a stale fragment must still render the page. Both
contracts now live side by side in AuditQueryParamParsers and are documented as
non-reconcilable.

Docs: Component-ManagementService.md gains a "Site-scope gate: fail-closed on
an unresolvable target" section and a strict-filter note on the audit
endpoints; Component-Security.md records the fail-closed shape under Deployer
site scoping; the CLI README marks the audit filter values case-insensitive and
states the no-silent-drop / no-ordinals contract.

Tests: 5 new ManagementActorTests fail before the row-98 fix (verified by
reverting ManagementActor.cs) and cover scoped+nonexistent -> denied,
system-wide+nonexistent -> unchanged (both Administrator and no-grant Deployer),
scoped+in-scope -> allowed, and the indistinguishability property. 21 CLI tests
fail before the row-99 fix. Four pre-existing tests that pinned the removed
client-side gate were rewritten to pin the new contract.

src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CLI/README.md

@@ -1688,9 +1688,9 @@ scadabridge --url <url> audit query [options]
 |--------|----------|---------|-------------|
 | `--since` | no | — | Start time: relative (`1h`, `24h`, `7d`) or ISO-8601 |
 | `--until` | no | — | End time: relative (`1h`, `24h`, `7d`) or ISO-8601 |
-| `--channel` | no | — | Filter by channel (`ApiOutbound`, `DbOutbound`, `Notification`, `ApiInbound`); repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
-| `--kind` | no | — | Filter by event kind (`ApiCall`, `ApiCallCached`, `DbWrite`, `DbWriteCached`, `NotifySend`, `NotifyDeliver`, `InboundRequest`, `InboundAuthFailure`, `CachedSubmit`, `CachedResolve`); repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
-| `--status` | no | — | Filter by status (`Submitted`, `Forwarded`, `Attempted`, `Delivered`, `Failed`, `Parked`, `Discarded`, `Skipped`); repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
+| `--channel` | no | — | Filter by channel (`ApiOutbound`, `DbOutbound`, `Notification`, `ApiInbound`; case-insensitive); repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
+| `--kind` | no | — | Filter by event kind (`ApiCall`, `ApiCallCached`, `DbWrite`, `DbWriteCached`, `NotifySend`, `NotifyDeliver`, `InboundRequest`, `InboundAuthFailure`, `CachedSubmit`, `CachedResolve`; case-insensitive); repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
+| `--status` | no | — | Filter by status (`Submitted`, `Forwarded`, `Attempted`, `Delivered`, `Failed`, `Parked`, `Discarded`, `Skipped`; case-insensitive); repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
 | `--site` | no | — | Filter by source site ID; repeatable — multiple values are OR-combined |
 | `--target` | no | — | Filter by target (external system, DB connection, notification list) |
 | `--actor` | no | — | Filter by actor |
@@ -1707,6 +1707,15 @@ either as repeated flags (`--channel ApiOutbound --channel DbOutbound`) or
 space-separated after one flag (`--channel ApiOutbound DbOutbound`). Values
 within one filter are OR-combined; the different filters are AND-combined.
 
+**Filter values are case-insensitive** — `--status delivered`, `--status Delivered`
+and `--status DELIVERED` are the same query. The CLI does not validate the
+vocabulary itself; the server does, and an unrecognised value is an **error naming
+the valid set**, not a silently-dropped filter. That matters: dropping the filter
+would return a plausible, complete-looking page that does not answer the question
+asked (the same failure mode as `deploy status`). Ordinals are rejected — a filter
+is a name-based contract, so `--status 3` is an error even though `3` is a real
+enum value.
+
 With `--format table`, events render as an aligned text table with columns
 `OccurredAtUtc`, `Channel`, `Kind`, `Status`, `Target`, `Actor`, `DurationMs`,
 `HttpStatus`; long `Target`/`Actor` values are truncated with an ellipsis. With
@@ -1726,11 +1735,11 @@ scadabridge --url <url> audit export --since <time> --until <time> --format <fmt
 |--------|----------|---------|-------------|
 | `--since` | yes | — | Start time: relative (`1h`, `24h`, `7d`) or ISO-8601 |
 | `--until` | yes | — | End time: relative (`1h`, `24h`, `7d`) or ISO-8601 |
-| `--format` | yes | — | Export format: `csv`, `jsonl`, or `parquet` |
+| `--format` | yes | — | Export format: `csv`, `jsonl`, or `parquet` (case-insensitive) |
 | `--output` | yes | — | Destination file path |
-| `--channel` | no | — | Filter by channel |
-| `--kind` | no | — | Filter by event kind |
-| `--status` | no | — | Filter by status |
+| `--channel` | no | — | Filter by channel (case-insensitive; same valid set as `audit query`) |
+| `--kind` | no | — | Filter by event kind (case-insensitive; same valid set as `audit query`) |
+| `--status` | no | — | Filter by status (case-insensitive; same valid set as `audit query`) |
 | `--site` | no | — | Filter by source site ID |
 | `--target` | no | — | Filter by target |
 | `--actor` | no | — | Filter by actor |