fix(transport): curate BundleLockedException on the management surface (register row 51)
ManagementService references Commons but not Transport, so MapFault could not see BundleLockedException and the per-bundle 3-strike lockout reached the CLI as "An internal error occurred (CorrelationId=...)" — the operator got a correlation id instead of the reason, and no hint that further attempts on that bundle would be refused. Applies the pattern register row 44 established for BundleUnlockThrottledException: - Relocate BundleLockedException from Transport/Import/ to Commons/Types/Transport/, beside BundleUnlockThrottledException. Both consumers (BundleImporter, CentralUI TransportImport) already carried the Commons.Types.Transport using, so no call-site edits were needed. - Add curated catch arms in ManagementActor.HandlePreviewBundle and HandleImportBundle that rethrow as ManagementCommandException, so the message survives MapFault's disclosure filter. - Mirror the row-44 throttle fault-mapping test for both handlers. - Document the relocation in docs/components/Transport.md and docs/requirements/Component-Transport.md. Tests: ManagementService 499 passed (+2 new), Transport 167 passed.
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@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ Imports are all-or-nothing per bundle. A bundle either applies fully or not at a
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- **AES-256-GCM** for content encryption with **PBKDF2-SHA256 / 600 000 iterations** (OWASP 2023+ guidance), per-bundle random salt, random IV per encryption. The GCM auth tag is verified before decryption — a wrong passphrase fails cleanly.
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- **Passphrase never persisted.** It lives only inside the export/import service call path and is discarded after use. No environment variable, no log line.
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- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-bundle 3-strike lockout (keyed by `ContentHash`, server-side); per-IP-per-hour cap (`MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour`, default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. The two are evaluated in order — bundle lockout, then per-IP throttle, then decrypt — so hammering an already-locked bundle spends no hourly budget, and a throttle denial (`BundleUnlockThrottledException`, fail-closed with a curated message on both the UI and CLI surfaces) burns **no** per-bundle strike, since it never reaches the decryptor. Successful unlocks count against the hourly budget too: it caps attempts, not failures. The client key is the caller's remote IP — from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (snapshotted at Blazor circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is unavailable mid-circuit) for the Central UI, and from `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI; a caller with no attributable address shares a single stricter bucket rather than bypassing the throttle. Per-client isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same caveat the login throttle carries in `Component-Security.md`. (Register row 44: the limiter existed, was configured and unit-tested, but was never invoked until this was wired.)
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- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-bundle 3-strike lockout (keyed by `ContentHash`, server-side); per-IP-per-hour cap (`MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour`, default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. The two are evaluated in order — bundle lockout, then per-IP throttle, then decrypt — so hammering an already-locked bundle spends no hourly budget, and a throttle denial (`BundleUnlockThrottledException`, fail-closed with a curated message on both the UI and CLI surfaces) burns **no** per-bundle strike, since it never reaches the decryptor. Both typed exceptions live in `Commons/Types/Transport/` — `ManagementService` references Commons but not Transport, so a type declared beside the importer cannot be curated by `MapFault` and reaches the CLI as a generic internal-error message (register rows 44 and 51). Successful unlocks count against the hourly budget too: it caps attempts, not failures. The client key is the caller's remote IP — from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (snapshotted at Blazor circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is unavailable mid-circuit) for the Central UI, and from `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI; a caller with no attributable address shares a single stricter bucket rather than bypassing the throttle. Per-client isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same caveat the login throttle carries in `Component-Security.md`. (Register row 44: the limiter existed, was configured and unit-tested, but was never invoked until this was wired.)
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- **Bundle size cap** on upload (default 100 MB, configurable) to bound memory.
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- **In-transit:** existing HTTPS to the Central UI; no new channel.
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- **Audit trail is the chain of custody.** Every export, every import (including aborted ones at validation), and every unlock failure is audit-logged with source env, content hash, encrypted yes/no, and artifact summary.
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