fix(transport): curate BundleLockedException on the management surface (register row 51)

ManagementService references Commons but not Transport, so MapFault could not
see BundleLockedException and the per-bundle 3-strike lockout reached the CLI
as "An internal error occurred (CorrelationId=...)" — the operator got a
correlation id instead of the reason, and no hint that further attempts on
that bundle would be refused.

Applies the pattern register row 44 established for BundleUnlockThrottledException:

- Relocate BundleLockedException from Transport/Import/ to
  Commons/Types/Transport/, beside BundleUnlockThrottledException. Both
  consumers (BundleImporter, CentralUI TransportImport) already carried the
  Commons.Types.Transport using, so no call-site edits were needed.
- Add curated catch arms in ManagementActor.HandlePreviewBundle and
  HandleImportBundle that rethrow as ManagementCommandException, so the
  message survives MapFault's disclosure filter.
- Mirror the row-44 throttle fault-mapping test for both handlers.
- Document the relocation in docs/components/Transport.md and
  docs/requirements/Component-Transport.md.

Tests: ManagementService 499 passed (+2 new), Transport 167 passed.

docs/components/Transport.md

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Passphrase lockout operates at two levels: per-bundle (3-strike counter in `Bund
 
 The two levels interact in a specific order, and it is load-bearing (register row 44 — the limiter had been registered, injected and unit-tested but never called, so only the per-bundle lockout was real):
 
-1. **Per-bundle lockout first.** An already-locked bundle throws `BundleLockedException` without registering a rate-limiter attempt, so hammering a locked bundle cannot spend the client's hourly budget.
+1. **Per-bundle lockout first.** An already-locked bundle throws `BundleLockedException` (Commons — register row 51 moved it out of `Transport.Import` for the same reason the throttle exception lives there: `ManagementService` does not reference `Transport`, so a lockout used to reach the CLI as `MapFault`'s generic "An internal error occurred" plus a correlation id) without registering a rate-limiter attempt, so hammering a locked bundle cannot spend the client's hourly budget.
 2. **Per-IP throttle next, before the decrypt.** Over budget throws `BundleUnlockThrottledException` (Commons, so the management surface can catch it and return a curated message). Because it precedes the decrypt, a denial burns **no** per-bundle strike — otherwise the throttle would be a way to lock out a bundle someone is legitimately importing. Every unlock attempt is registered, successful ones included: the documented budget counts attempts, not failures.
 3. Only then the AES-GCM decrypt, whose failure increments the per-bundle counter as before.
 
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ A template's scripts reference a `SharedScript` or `ExternalSystem` that exists
 
 ### Passphrase lockout
 
-After 3 wrong passphrase attempts against the same bundle (keyed by `ContentHash`), `BundleImporter.LoadAsync` throws `BundleLockedException`. The session is unusable. Re-upload the bundle file to get a new session with a fresh counter. A `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row is written on each failed attempt.
+After 3 wrong passphrase attempts against the same bundle (keyed by `ContentHash`), `BundleImporter.LoadAsync` throws `BundleLockedException`. The session is unusable. Re-upload the bundle file to get a new session with a fresh counter. A `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row is written on each failed attempt. Both the Central UI and the CLI surface the lockout reason verbatim — the exception lives in `Commons/Types/Transport/` so `ManagementActor` can curate it into a `ManagementCommandException` (register row 51).
 
 ### Unlock throttled ("Too many bundle unlock attempts")
 

docs/requirements/Component-Transport.md

@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ Imports are all-or-nothing per bundle. A bundle either applies fully or not at a
 
 - **AES-256-GCM** for content encryption with **PBKDF2-SHA256 / 600 000 iterations** (OWASP 2023+ guidance), per-bundle random salt, random IV per encryption. The GCM auth tag is verified before decryption — a wrong passphrase fails cleanly.
 - **Passphrase never persisted.** It lives only inside the export/import service call path and is discarded after use. No environment variable, no log line.
-- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-bundle 3-strike lockout (keyed by `ContentHash`, server-side); per-IP-per-hour cap (`MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour`, default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. The two are evaluated in order — bundle lockout, then per-IP throttle, then decrypt — so hammering an already-locked bundle spends no hourly budget, and a throttle denial (`BundleUnlockThrottledException`, fail-closed with a curated message on both the UI and CLI surfaces) burns **no** per-bundle strike, since it never reaches the decryptor. Successful unlocks count against the hourly budget too: it caps attempts, not failures. The client key is the caller's remote IP — from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (snapshotted at Blazor circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is unavailable mid-circuit) for the Central UI, and from `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI; a caller with no attributable address shares a single stricter bucket rather than bypassing the throttle. Per-client isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same caveat the login throttle carries in `Component-Security.md`. (Register row 44: the limiter existed, was configured and unit-tested, but was never invoked until this was wired.)
+- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-bundle 3-strike lockout (keyed by `ContentHash`, server-side); per-IP-per-hour cap (`MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour`, default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. The two are evaluated in order — bundle lockout, then per-IP throttle, then decrypt — so hammering an already-locked bundle spends no hourly budget, and a throttle denial (`BundleUnlockThrottledException`, fail-closed with a curated message on both the UI and CLI surfaces) burns **no** per-bundle strike, since it never reaches the decryptor. Both typed exceptions live in `Commons/Types/Transport/` — `ManagementService` references Commons but not Transport, so a type declared beside the importer cannot be curated by `MapFault` and reaches the CLI as a generic internal-error message (register rows 44 and 51). Successful unlocks count against the hourly budget too: it caps attempts, not failures. The client key is the caller's remote IP — from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (snapshotted at Blazor circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is unavailable mid-circuit) for the Central UI, and from `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI; a caller with no attributable address shares a single stricter bucket rather than bypassing the throttle. Per-client isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same caveat the login throttle carries in `Component-Security.md`. (Register row 44: the limiter existed, was configured and unit-tested, but was never invoked until this was wired.)
 - **Bundle size cap** on upload (default 100 MB, configurable) to bound memory.
 - **In-transit:** existing HTTPS to the Central UI; no new channel.
 - **Audit trail is the chain of custody.** Every export, every import (including aborted ones at validation), and every unlock failure is audit-logged with source env, content hash, encrypted yes/no, and artifact summary.