docs(security): no role, no login now covers the management/CLI surfaces (#145)
Component-Security "No role, no login": replace the "HTTP Basic is not covered yet" note with the Basic and Bearer behaviour, the throttle and log details; bearer section notes a role-less token is refused. Component-CLI: a zero-role user sees the bad-password 401. Component-ManagementService: 401 covers it. CLAUDE.md Security & Auth bullet updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AFKC45MBz1wPZnVbX8
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@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ spec for each is `docs/requirements/Component-<Name>.md`, and `README.md` carrie
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- Authentication: direct LDAP bind (username/password), no Kerberos/NTLM. LDAPS/StartTLS required.
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- Two session models: the **UI** uses an HttpOnly/Secure cookie carrying a data-protected claims ticket (no embedded JWT; shared Data Protection keys; 30-minute idle timeout, DB-only role re-map every 15 min); the **CLI/API** exchanges credentials once per invocation at `POST /auth/token` for a 15-minute HS256 **bearer** JWT (`JwtSigningKey`, >= 32 bytes, shared by both centrals; `management_bearer: true` capability flag; Basic stays as fallback). Bearer roles are authoritative until expiry (revocation lag <= `JwtExpiryMinutes`; rotating the key kills every token). Cookies are the correct transport for Blazor Server (SignalR circuits). Spec: `Component-Security.md`.
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- LDAP failure: new logins fail; active sessions continue with current roles.
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- **No role, no login (ScadaBridge#144, 2026-11-17).** `/auth/login` and `/auth/token` refuse a bind whose groups map to zero roles (or whose role mapping throws) with the exact bad-password response + a throttle failure; the reason is logged server-side only. A cookie session whose refresh maps to zero roles is ended (`CookieSessionValidator` → Reject). HTTP Basic on the management surfaces is not covered yet (follow-up). Spec: `Component-Security.md` *No role, no login*.
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- **No role, no login (ScadaBridge#144/#145, 2026-11-17).** `/auth/login` and `/auth/token` refuse a bind whose groups map to zero roles (or whose role mapping throws) with the exact bad-password response + a throttle failure; the reason is logged server-side only. A cookie session whose refresh maps to zero roles is ended (`CookieSessionValidator` → Reject). The management/CLI surfaces (`/management`, `/api/audit/*`, `/hubs/debug-stream`) refuse the same way in `ManagementAuthenticator` (ScadaBridge#145): a zero-role or mapper-fault Basic bind gets the bad-password 401 + a throttle failure, and a bearer token with no role claim gets the invalid-token 401. Spec: `Component-Security.md` *No role, no login*.
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- Load balancer in front of central UI; cookie-embedded JWT + shared Data Protection keys for failover transparency.
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- Two-person MxGateway secured writes (M7): two new global roles — `Operator` (initiates) + `Verifier` (approves) — added alongside the canonical `Administrator`/`Designer`/`Deployer`/`Viewer`, with `RequireOperator`/`RequireVerifier` policies. An Operator submits a secured write from the Central UI Secured Writes page (`/operations/secured-writes`); it stays a `Pending` `PendingSecuredWrite` row until a *distinct* Verifier approves it (no-self-approval enforced server-side in the ManagementActor, plus a compare-and-swap race guard). Approval relays a `WriteTagRequest` to the site MxGateway; MxGateway-protocol connections only; each lifecycle event (submit/approve/reject/execute) emits a best-effort `AuditChannel.SecuredWrite` / `AuditKind.SecuredWrite*` central-direct-write row sharing the row id as `CorrelationId`. (SecuredWrite audit rows stamp `SourceNode` via `ICentralAuditWriter`/`INodeIdentityProvider`.) Pending secured writes expire server-side after a configurable TTL (`ManagementServiceOptions.SecuredWritePendingTtl`, default 24 h): an overdue `Pending` row is CAS'd to `Expired` (never relayed) — enforced at approve/reject and swept opportunistically on list (arch-review S2, `AuditKind.SecuredWriteExpire`).
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- **Inbound API key store — per node by default, shared on central pairs (2026-09-02, register row 108).** The shared `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys` library stores inbound keys in **SQLite per node** unless `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:Provider=SqlServer`, which points both central nodes at the same `zbauth` schema in the configuration database (library `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys.SqlServer` 0.3.0) — under `SqlServer`, create/revoke/rotate/scope changes are cluster-wide immediately; a node's existing SQLite file is imported once at boot (insert-where-absent, safe on both nodes of a pair) and renamed `*.imported`. Central pairs **MUST** run `Provider=SqlServer` — a clustered Central left on `Sqlite` boots fine but `StartupValidator` logs a Warning, because a failover otherwise 401s every inbound client until keys are re-issued on the survivor. Both docker rigs (`docker/`, `docker-env2/`) run `SqlServer`; QA (`vq03`/`vq04`) runs `SqlServer` for both inbound keys and secrets since 2026-10-22 (deployment record `2026-10-22-wonder-app-vq03-vq04-3808b49f.md`); DEV (`vd03`, single node — not production) is not switched. The boot import's `*.imported` rename needs the importer's pooled SQLite handle released first — Windows refuses to rename an open file (fixed `6ed6800b`; pre-fix Windows builds need the manual rename in the runbook). Design: `docs/plans/2026-09-02-inbound-api-key-shared-store-design.md`; runbook: `docs/operations/inbound-api-key-reissue.md` → *Central pairs*.
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