feat(dcl): move the OPC UA client to OPC Foundation SDK 2.0.1 (#125)
OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client and the test-only .Server move 1.5.378.182 -> 2.0.1, the version OtOpcUa master runs (lmxopcua#782; #799 and #801 closed). Transitive Core/Core.Types/Types/Configuration/ Security.Certificates resolve to 2.0.1. API breaks fixed in the DCL adapter: - Built-in types are immutable structs (Variant, DataValue, NodeId, LocalizedText, StatusCode, ArrayOf<T>). New OpcUaValueBoundary restores the SDK 1.5 CLR shapes for every read, subscription and alarm-event value (byte[], UTC DateTime with no-timestamp = MinValue, Guid, detached arrays) and builds write variants with SDK 1.5's new Variant(object) semantics (byte[] = ByteString scalar). - StatusCodes members are no longer constants: switches/patterns over them (verify-outcome mapping, connection-level classification, BadResourceUnavailable) match by value. - CertificateIdentifier no longer caches a certificate and the CertificateValidator/CertificateValidation event is gone: the configuration's CertificateManager owns trust lists and the loaded application certificate and is disposed with the session; auto-accept and the verify probe's capture-and-reject use AcceptError. - new UserIdentity(X509Certificate2) is gone: X509 user identities use X509IdentityTokenHandler with an on-demand PFX provider (still fails fast on a missing file/key). - DefaultSessionFactory takes the telemetry context; collections are ArrayOf<T>; EventFilter select clauses and ContentFilter operands are built immutably. UserName identity (lmxopcua#880): SDK 2's default handler sends a password over 64 bytes - every 65-character OtOpcUa API key - as an RsaEncryptedSecret that SDK 1.5 servers reject with BadIdentityTokenInvalid and SDK 2 servers accept only within a 5-minute clock window (#873). The DCL now always uses LegacyRsaUserNameIdentityTokenHandler (ported from OtOpcUa be28aa44), i.e. exactly what it sent on SDK 1.5, so it logs in to both server generations during a mixed rollout. Tests: the in-process secured test server is ported to SDK 2 and can admit an API key; new tests cover the handler (mutation-checked: 5 of 7 fail with the SDK default handler), the value boundary, and a 65-char key end to end over None/Sign/SignAndEncrypt with a wrong key reaching the key check (BadIdentityTokenRejected). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
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@@ -70,7 +70,10 @@ All protocols produce the same value tuple consumed by Instance Actors. Before t
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## Supported Protocols
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### OPC UA
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- Uses the **OPC Foundation .NET Standard Library** (`OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client`).
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- Uses the **OPC Foundation .NET Standard Library** (`OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client`), **SDK 2.0.1** since ScadaBridge#125 (2026-11-12; the same version OtOpcUa runs). The port keeps the SDK 1.5 behaviour at the adapter boundary:
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- **Values.** SDK 2's `Variant`/`DataValue` are immutable structs and its boxing returns SDK wrapper types; `OpcUaValueBoundary` converts every read, subscription and alarm-event value back to the SDK 1.5 CLR shapes (`byte[]` for ByteString, UTC `DateTime` with "no timestamp" as `DateTime.MinValue`, `Guid`, detached arrays), and builds write variants with SDK 1.5's `new Variant(object)` semantics (a `byte[]` is a ByteString scalar).
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- **UserName identity.** Always sent in the legacy RSA password format (`LegacyRsaUserNameIdentityTokenHandler`, ported from OtOpcUa lmxopcua#880). SDK 2's own handler sends a password over 64 bytes — every 65-character OtOpcUa API key — as an `RsaEncryptedSecret`, which an SDK 1.5 server rejects with `BadIdentityTokenInvalid` and an SDK 2 server accepts only within a 5-minute clock window (lmxopcua#873). With the legacy format the DCL logs in to both server generations, as it did on SDK 1.5. X509 user identities resolve the PFX's private key on demand (`OpcUaUserIdentities`); a missing file or key still fails before any session is created.
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- **Certificates.** The configuration's SDK-created `CertificateManager` owns the trust lists and the loaded application certificate, and is disposed with the session. `AutoAcceptUntrustedCerts` and the verify probe's capture-and-reject use the manager's `AcceptError` hook (the 1.5 `CertificateValidation` event is gone). SDK 2 makes two errors non-suppressible even with auto-accept on: an incomplete chain (install the issuing CA in the trusted or issuer store) and a certificate with an empty subject or issuer.
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- Session-based connection with endpoint discovery, certificate handling, and configurable security modes. Endpoint discovery is **asynchronous** and bounded by the connection's `OperationTimeoutMs` (the discovery client is built from the connection's own `EndpointConfiguration`) and by the caller's cancellation; a cancelled discovery is never mistaken for "discovery unavailable". The `DataConnectionActor` starts every adapter `ConnectAsync` on the thread pool, so no adapter connect work — whatever runs before its first yielding await — can occupy the actor's dispatcher thread (review 2026-10-21; previously a synchronous discovery against a black-holed endpoint held the thread for the SDK's 120 s default on every reconnect tick).
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- Subscriptions via OPC UA Monitored Items with data change notifications (1000ms sampling, queue size 10, discard-oldest).
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- Read/Write via OPC UA Read/Write services with StatusCode-based quality mapping.
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