Resolve all 33 medium-severity architecture review findings

Second slice of the 2026-09-09 whole-system review remediation
(docs/plans/2026-09-09-arch-review.md §10), on top of the High slice 146a1323.

Runtime/devices: SR-2 alarm on-trigger integration scope; SR-3 correlated NativeAlarmActor
subscribe retry; SR-4 immutable audited DB target; SR-5 ordered InstanceActor stop/flush;
SR-12 rehydration fence; SR-13 S&F gate recheck per delivery; DC-4 no OPC UA security
downgrade; DC-5 alarm snapshot for every new subscriber; ORCH-1 sync-dispose joins the pump.

Management/UI: MG-2 site scope on audit tree + Flow Debugger Replay; MG-3 stale-probe memo
removed; MG-4 server-owned bulk-deploy deadline; UI-5 sandbox runs in a killable child
process (new CentralUI.SandboxWorker project); UI-14 bounded sandbox output/IPC.

Edge/audit: EI-1 relay audit ownership; EI-2 SkipBodyCapture suppresses error text; EI-3/EI-11
error-field redaction + caps; EI-4 single relay deadline, pre-execution-only retry; EI-5
authenticated relay provenance; EI-10 body cap before audit read.

Persistence/contracts: DL-1 global Instance.UniqueName unique index + conflict translation;
DL-2 DataConnection protocol config encrypted at rest (migration
20260909203046_EnforceGlobalInstanceNamesAndProtectProtocolConfiguration — coordinated
central upgrade, old binaries cannot read protected rows); DL-3 bounded Replay paging;
DL-6 cross-site Overwrite of a deployed instance rejected; XC-4 proto descriptor contract test.

Config/hygiene: XC-1 central listener isolation by local port; XC-2/XC-3 inert SMTP + cron
keys removed from rig settings; CM-2 env2 bootstrap guard enabled; DC-6 deploy site exit code;
DC-7 notifier retries only explicit standby rejection; XC-5 ClusterClient purged from docs.

Gates recorded in the report: build 0/0, 9 397 passed / 0 failed, rig redeployed on all
eight nodes with the migration applied. 46 Low findings remain open.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-09-09 22:05:30 -04:00
parent 146a13238f
commit 9a87d7a328
136 changed files with 5441 additions and 648 deletions
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
private readonly IOptionsMonitor<AuditLogOptions> _options;
private readonly IAuditActorAccessor? _actorAccessor;
private readonly IAuditInboundCeilingHitsCounter _ceilingHitsCounter;
private readonly IOptionsMonitor<InboundApiOptions>? _inboundOptions;
/// <summary>
/// Initializes the middleware with its required dependencies.
@@ -134,13 +135,15 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
ILogger<AuditWriteMiddleware> logger,
IOptionsMonitor<AuditLogOptions> options,
IAuditActorAccessor? actorAccessor = null,
IAuditInboundCeilingHitsCounter? ceilingHitsCounter = null)
IAuditInboundCeilingHitsCounter? ceilingHitsCounter = null,
IOptionsMonitor<InboundApiOptions>? inboundOptions = null)
{
_next = next ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(next));
_auditWriter = auditWriter ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(auditWriter));
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_options = options ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(options));
_actorAccessor = actorAccessor;
_inboundOptions = inboundOptions;
_ceilingHitsCounter = ceilingHitsCounter ?? new NoOpAuditInboundCeilingHitsCounter();
}
@@ -151,6 +154,15 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
public async Task InvokeAsync(HttpContext ctx)
{
// Install the route cap before EnableBuffering or any audit read makes Kestrel readonly.
var maxBytes = _inboundOptions?.CurrentValue.MaxRequestBodyBytes ?? new InboundApiOptions().MaxRequestBodyBytes;
var size = ctx.Features.Get<Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features.IHttpMaxRequestBodySizeFeature>();
if (size is { IsReadOnly: false }) size.MaxRequestBodySize = maxBytes;
if (ctx.Request.ContentLength is { } declared && declared > maxBytes)
{
ctx.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status413PayloadTooLarge;
return;
}
var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
// Per-request hot read of the options snapshot so a live config change
@@ -169,6 +181,15 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
// ExecutionId (the row stays top-level — its ParentExecutionId is
// never set).
ctx.Items[InboundExecutionIdItemKey] = Guid.NewGuid();
try
{
if (_inboundOptions is not null) await RelayProvenance.VerifyAsync(ctx, _inboundOptions.CurrentValue);
}
catch (BadHttpRequestException ex) when (ex.StatusCode == StatusCodes.Status413PayloadTooLarge)
{
ctx.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status413PayloadTooLarge;
return;
}
// Buffer the request body up front so we can both audit it and let the
// downstream handler still parse it. EnableBuffering swaps the request
@@ -201,8 +222,15 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
if (!skipBody && RequestHasBody(ctx.Request))
{
ctx.Request.EnableBuffering();
(requestBody, requestTruncated) =
await ReadBufferedRequestBodyAsync(ctx.Request, cap).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
(requestBody, requestTruncated) = await ReadBufferedRequestBodyAsync(ctx.Request, cap).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (BadHttpRequestException ex) when (ex.StatusCode == StatusCodes.Status413PayloadTooLarge)
{
ctx.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status413PayloadTooLarge;
return;
}
}
// Response body — wrap Response.Body in a forwarding stream that mirrors
@@ -322,6 +350,7 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
{
// Redact headers whose name appears in the HeaderRedactList —
// the same "<redacted>" marker used by ScadaBridgeAuditRedactor.
if (string.Equals(header.Key, RelayProvenance.Header, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) continue;
var value = redactSet.Contains(header.Key)
? "<redacted>"
: header.Value.ToString();
@@ -332,8 +361,9 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
// pipeline is the authoritative failure, so it wins; otherwise the endpoint may
// have stashed the method script's exception (which the executor keeps out of the
// HTTP body). Absent both, the row carries no detail.
var errorDetail = thrown?.ToString();
if (errorDetail is null
var suppressErrors = methodName is not null && opts.PerTargetOverrides.TryGetValue(methodName, out var privacy) && privacy.SkipBodyCapture;
var errorDetail = suppressErrors ? null : thrown?.ToString();
if (!suppressErrors && errorDetail is null
&& ctx.Items.TryGetValue(ErrorDetailItemKey, out var stashedErrorDetail))
{
errorDetail = stashedErrorDetail as string;
@@ -341,7 +371,7 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
var extra = JsonSerializer.Serialize(new
{
remoteIp = ctx.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString(),
remoteIp = RelayProvenance.CallerIp(ctx),
userAgent = ctx.Request.Headers.UserAgent.ToString(),
requestHeaders = headerDict,
});
@@ -367,7 +397,7 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
correlationId: null,
httpStatus: statusCode,
durationMs: (int)Math.Min(durationMs, int.MaxValue),
errorMessage: thrown?.Message,
errorMessage: suppressErrors ? null : thrown?.Message,
errorDetail: errorDetail,
requestSummary: requestBody,
responseSummary: responseBody,
@@ -512,6 +542,10 @@ public sealed class AuditWriteMiddleware
var content = DecodeUtf8Bounded(buffer, bytesForString, cutAtValidBytes: truncated);
return (string.IsNullOrEmpty(content) ? null : content, truncated);
}
catch (BadHttpRequestException ex) when (ex.StatusCode == StatusCodes.Status413PayloadTooLarge)
{
throw; // The route limit is authoritative, even when audit capture reads first.
}
catch
{
// A failed body read must not abort the request — fall through