Resolve all 33 medium-severity architecture review findings
Second slice of the 2026-09-09 whole-system review remediation
(docs/plans/2026-09-09-arch-review.md §10), on top of the High slice 146a1323.
Runtime/devices: SR-2 alarm on-trigger integration scope; SR-3 correlated NativeAlarmActor
subscribe retry; SR-4 immutable audited DB target; SR-5 ordered InstanceActor stop/flush;
SR-12 rehydration fence; SR-13 S&F gate recheck per delivery; DC-4 no OPC UA security
downgrade; DC-5 alarm snapshot for every new subscriber; ORCH-1 sync-dispose joins the pump.
Management/UI: MG-2 site scope on audit tree + Flow Debugger Replay; MG-3 stale-probe memo
removed; MG-4 server-owned bulk-deploy deadline; UI-5 sandbox runs in a killable child
process (new CentralUI.SandboxWorker project); UI-14 bounded sandbox output/IPC.
Edge/audit: EI-1 relay audit ownership; EI-2 SkipBodyCapture suppresses error text; EI-3/EI-11
error-field redaction + caps; EI-4 single relay deadline, pre-execution-only retry; EI-5
authenticated relay provenance; EI-10 body cap before audit read.
Persistence/contracts: DL-1 global Instance.UniqueName unique index + conflict translation;
DL-2 DataConnection protocol config encrypted at rest (migration
20260909203046_EnforceGlobalInstanceNamesAndProtectProtocolConfiguration — coordinated
central upgrade, old binaries cannot read protected rows); DL-3 bounded Replay paging;
DL-6 cross-site Overwrite of a deployed instance rejected; XC-4 proto descriptor contract test.
Config/hygiene: XC-1 central listener isolation by local port; XC-2/XC-3 inert SMTP + cron
keys removed from rig settings; CM-2 env2 bootstrap guard enabled; DC-6 deploy site exit code;
DC-7 notifier retries only explicit standby rejection; XC-5 ClusterClient purged from docs.
Gates recorded in the report: build 0/0, 9 397 passed / 0 failed, rig redeployed on all
eight nodes with the migration applied. 46 Low findings remain open.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -54,12 +54,11 @@ WWNotifier.exe -m Z28061 -d "C:\recipes\job.nc" -w WO12345 -p PN-7788 -s 0100 -u
|
||||
|
||||
## Delivery semantics
|
||||
|
||||
The `BaseUrls` failover loop is at-least-once, not exactly-once: a connection reset *after* the
|
||||
target already processed the POST, or a slow response that exceeds `TimeoutSeconds`, both look like
|
||||
an unreachable node to this client and cause a re-POST to the next URL — even though the first
|
||||
attempt may already have succeeded. The deployed `DelmiaRecipeDownload` inbound method must be
|
||||
idempotent on `(MachineCode, DownloadPath, WorkOrderNumber)` so a duplicate delivery is harmless;
|
||||
see the design doc's "Delivery semantics: at-least-once" section for details.
|
||||
The notifier retries only when a request is known not to have executed: connection refusal,
|
||||
name-resolution failure, or the server's explicit standby rejection. A connection reset after
|
||||
sending or a response timeout returns `OUTCOME_UNKNOWN` without replay. Operators must verify
|
||||
an uncertain result before manually retrying. Idempotent method implementations remain useful
|
||||
because callers can deliberately retry, but the notifier does not blindly repeat ambiguous sends.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration — `appsettings.json`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,10 +76,9 @@ Placed next to the exe (copied to the output on build/publish):
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **`BaseUrls`** — comma-separated failover list of **base URLs only**; the app appends
|
||||
`/api/DelmiaRecipeDownload`. URLs are tried in order with **connect-failure-only failover**: a node
|
||||
that responds at all (even `4xx`/`5xx`) is authoritative and its answer is final; only a node that
|
||||
fails to connect (refused/reset, DNS, TLS, timeout) rolls over to the next. If every URL fails to
|
||||
connect → `NO` + last connection error.
|
||||
`/api/DelmiaRecipeDownload`. URLs are tried in order after proven DNS/connection refusal or
|
||||
explicit standby rejection. Other HTTP responses are final; ambiguous transport errors return
|
||||
`NO` + `OUTCOME_UNKNOWN` without trying another URL.
|
||||
- **`TimeoutSeconds`** — per-attempt HTTP timeout (default `30`).
|
||||
- **`LogPath`** — optional diagnostic log file, relative to the exe. Omit to log to stderr only.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +148,13 @@ bash docker/verify-delmia-notifier.sh # runs the managed build from a scratc
|
||||
| A | active node first in `BaseUrls` | `YES` |
|
||||
| B | standby first (standby relays to the active) | `YES` |
|
||||
| C | bad key | `NO` + `HTTP 401` (an answer is final — no failover) |
|
||||
| D | active `docker kill`ed, attempt inside the takeover window | `NO` + `HTTP 503` — expected: connect-failure-only failover, the survivor is not yet active |
|
||||
| D | active `docker kill`ed, attempt inside the takeover window | historical baseline: `NO` + `HTTP 503`; the updated client retries explicit standby refusals and still fails if no node is active |
|
||||
| E | survivor `/health/active` = 200 (~27 s) | `YES` (first URL refused → second URL) |
|
||||
| F | victim restarted and rejoined as standby | `YES` (victim relays) |
|
||||
| G | `DownloadPath` ending in `.bad` | `NO` + `Simulated reject: bad path or missing work order` |
|
||||
|
||||
### Safe failover
|
||||
|
||||
The notifier advances to the next configured URL after a proven connection refusal/name-resolution failure, or HTTP 503 carrying the server's exact `X-ScadaBridge-Standby: 1` pre-execution marker. A generic 503 or business rejection is final. Both centrals may therefore be listed even when their internal standby-forwarding peer lists are absent.
|
||||
|
||||
A timeout or other response loss is reported as `OUTCOME_UNKNOWN` with a failed result and no automatic replay: the first node may already have applied the download. Verify the operation before manually retrying. Configure trusted central endpoints; the standby marker is a server protocol contract, not permission to retry arbitrary HTTP errors.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user