Resolve all 33 medium-severity architecture review findings

Second slice of the 2026-09-09 whole-system review remediation
(docs/plans/2026-09-09-arch-review.md §10), on top of the High slice 146a1323.

Runtime/devices: SR-2 alarm on-trigger integration scope; SR-3 correlated NativeAlarmActor
subscribe retry; SR-4 immutable audited DB target; SR-5 ordered InstanceActor stop/flush;
SR-12 rehydration fence; SR-13 S&F gate recheck per delivery; DC-4 no OPC UA security
downgrade; DC-5 alarm snapshot for every new subscriber; ORCH-1 sync-dispose joins the pump.

Management/UI: MG-2 site scope on audit tree + Flow Debugger Replay; MG-3 stale-probe memo
removed; MG-4 server-owned bulk-deploy deadline; UI-5 sandbox runs in a killable child
process (new CentralUI.SandboxWorker project); UI-14 bounded sandbox output/IPC.

Edge/audit: EI-1 relay audit ownership; EI-2 SkipBodyCapture suppresses error text; EI-3/EI-11
error-field redaction + caps; EI-4 single relay deadline, pre-execution-only retry; EI-5
authenticated relay provenance; EI-10 body cap before audit read.

Persistence/contracts: DL-1 global Instance.UniqueName unique index + conflict translation;
DL-2 DataConnection protocol config encrypted at rest (migration
20260909203046_EnforceGlobalInstanceNamesAndProtectProtocolConfiguration — coordinated
central upgrade, old binaries cannot read protected rows); DL-3 bounded Replay paging;
DL-6 cross-site Overwrite of a deployed instance rejected; XC-4 proto descriptor contract test.

Config/hygiene: XC-1 central listener isolation by local port; XC-2/XC-3 inert SMTP + cron
keys removed from rig settings; CM-2 env2 bootstrap guard enabled; DC-6 deploy site exit code;
DC-7 notifier retries only explicit standby rejection; XC-5 ClusterClient purged from docs.

Gates recorded in the report: build 0/0, 9 397 passed / 0 failed, rig redeployed on all
eight nodes with the migration applied. 46 Low findings remain open.

src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CentralUI/Services/AuditLogQueryService.cs

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Authorization;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CentralUI.Auth;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
 using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
 using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Interfaces.Repositories;
 using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types;
@@ -45,6 +48,7 @@ public sealed class AuditLogQueryService : IAuditLogQueryService
 
     // Production path: open a fresh scope per operation. Null in the test-seam ctor.
     private readonly IServiceScopeFactory? _scopeFactory;
+    private readonly AuthenticationStateProvider? _auth;
 
     // Test seam: a directly-injected repository whose lifetime the test owns.
     // Null in the production ctor.
@@ -68,9 +72,10 @@ public sealed class AuditLogQueryService : IAuditLogQueryService
     /// <param name="healthAggregator">Central health aggregator for KPI backlog data.</param>
     public AuditLogQueryService(
         IServiceScopeFactory scopeFactory,
-        ICentralHealthAggregator healthAggregator)
+        ICentralHealthAggregator healthAggregator, AuthenticationStateProvider? auth = null)
     {
         _scopeFactory = scopeFactory ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(scopeFactory));
+        _auth = auth;
         _healthAggregator = healthAggregator ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(healthAggregator));
     }
 
@@ -171,7 +176,12 @@ public sealed class AuditLogQueryService : IAuditLogQueryService
         // page's auto-load never shares the circuit-scoped context.
         await using var scope = _scopeFactory!.CreateAsyncScope();
         var repository = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<IAuditLogRepository>();
-        return await repository.GetExecutionTreeAsync(executionId, ct);
+        if (_auth is null) throw new InvalidOperationException("Audit tree caller authentication is not configured.");
+        var principal = (await _auth.GetAuthoritativeStateAsync()).User;
+        if (principal.Identity?.IsAuthenticated != true || !principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType).Any(c => AuthorizationPolicies.OperationalAuditRoles.Contains(c.Value))) throw new UnauthorizedAccessException();
+        var sites = principal.FindAll(JwtTokenService.SiteIdClaimType).Select(c => c.Value).ToArray();
+        var permitted = principal.HasClaim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, Roles.Administrator) || sites.Length == 0 ? null : sites;
+        return await repository.GetExecutionTreeAsync(executionId, ct, permitted);
     }
 
     /// <inheritdoc/>