feat(management): any-of role gates; restrict ListSecuredWrites to Operator/Verifier/Admin (arch-review UA1)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MtdgwpEeCUn6cUA5f1LMPj

docs/requirements/Component-ManagementService.md

@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ The two-person authorization workflow for writes through the MxAccess Gateway. B
 - **SubmitSecuredWriteCommand** (`Operator` role): validates the target connection exists and uses the **MxGateway** protocol (rejected otherwise), then inserts a `Pending` row capturing site / connection / tag / typed value / operator + comment. Nothing is written yet.
 - **ApproveSecuredWriteCommand** (`Verifier` role): enforces **no self-approval** (`VerifierUser ≠ OperatorUser`, checked **before** any state change) and a **compare-and-swap** race guard (`TryMarkApprovedAsync` — exactly one concurrent approver flips `Pending → Approved`; the loser is rejected). On winning, it validates the value type, decodes the value (guarded — a bad value fails the row deterministically rather than leaving it stuck `Approved`), and relays a `WriteTagRequest` to the site MxGateway via the Communication Layer, recording the outcome as `Executed` or `Failed`.
 - **RejectSecuredWriteCommand** (`Verifier` role): marks a `Pending` row `Rejected` with the verifier's reason.
-- **List / query secured writes**: pending queue + terminal history, global or per-site.
+- **ListSecuredWritesCommand** (any of `Operator` / `Verifier` / `Administrator`): pending queue + terminal history, global or per-site. Although read-only, the history table exposes process-sensitive tag values, so it is **not** open to any authenticated user — it is gated to the two Secured Write roles plus `Administrator` (any-of), aligning with the `RequireSecuredWriteAccess` Central UI policy (arch-review UA1).
 
 ### External Systems
 
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ Every incoming message carries the authenticated user's identity and roles. The
 - **Deployment** role required for: instance management (including instance alarm overrides and native alarm source overrides), deployments, debug view, debug snapshot, parked message queries, site event log queries. Site scoping is enforced for site-scoped Deployment users.
 - **Operator** role required for: submitting a secured write (`SubmitSecuredWriteCommand`).
 - **Verifier** role required for: approving / rejecting a secured write (`ApproveSecuredWriteCommand` / `RejectSecuredWriteCommand`). The no-self-approval rule (`Operator ≠ Verifier`) is enforced in the handler, independent of the role check.
+- **Any of Operator / Verifier / Administrator** required for: listing / querying secured writes (`ListSecuredWritesCommand`). Read-only, but the history exposes process-sensitive tag values, so it is gated any-of rather than open to every authenticated user (arch-review UA1). Enforced as an any-of gate (`GetRequiredRoles` returns the permitted set; the caller must hold at least one).
 - **Admin** role additionally required for: server-certificate trust/remove/list (`TrustServerCertCommand` / `RemoveServerCertCommand` / `ListServerCertsCommand`).
 - **Read-only access** (any authenticated role): health summary, health site, site event log queries, parked message queries.