feat(transport): fleet-wide bundle-unlock throttle window (register row 52)
The per-IP unlock throttle's counters were a process-local ConcurrentDictionary on each central node, so the effective fleet cap was N x MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour per client (failing over to the other node handed the client a fresh budget) and a node restart cleared the window outright. The window now lives in the central MS SQL BundleUnlockAttempt table — the HA store both central nodes already share, so no new infrastructure, no new port, no consensus protocol: - Commons: BundleUnlockAttempt entity + IBundleUnlockAttemptRepository. - ConfigurationDatabase: entity config (one index, IX_BundleUnlockAttempt_Client_Attempted, serving both the windowed count and the prune), repository (AsNoTracking count, ExecuteDeleteAsync prune), DbSet, DI registration, migration AddBundleUnlockAttemptTable + the hand-written idempotent production script under docs/plans/sql/. - Transport: IBundleUnlockAttemptWindow seam + SqlBundleUnlockAttemptWindow (singleton; resolves the scoped repository from its own scope per call, like the central purge singletons). BundleUnlockRateLimiter keeps the policy and gains TryRegisterAttemptAsync; BundleImporter.LoadAsync calls it. Behaviour preserved from row 44: locked bundles spend no hourly budget (the lockout check still runs first), throttle denials burn no per-bundle strike and are NOT recorded so they cannot roll the window forward, unattributable clients share the stricter <unattributed> bucket, and the budget counts attempts rather than failures. Config keys and their semantics are unchanged, so the rig's 500 override stays valid. Three deliberate trades, documented in both Transport docs: - FAILS OPEN. A store error logs a Warning naming the client and cap, and permits the attempt. This is a best-effort rate cap over an already authenticated, Administrator-gated surface — the availability of legitimate imports outranks the cap, and a DB blip must not make the import wizard unusable. Falling back to the process-local window was considered and rejected: it would still block a legitimate operator's 11th import. - Approximate. Count-then-insert is not atomic across nodes, so simultaneous attempts can overshoot by the number in flight — bounded, self-correcting within the window, and not worth provider-specific raw SQL. - Pruned opportunistically on the unlock path (CAS-claimed at most every 15 min per process, bounded to 1000 rows, retaining 2x the window, best-effort try/catch) rather than by a new background service — Transport owns no central scheduler. Same shape as DeploymentService's terminal-record sweep. Tests: Transport.IntegrationTests 116 passed (+10 — two limiter instances over one store enforcing a single combined window, restart durability, denials burning no budget, sliding release, bucket isolation, store-failure fail-open, caller-cancellation not swallowed, no-shared-window fallback, prune and its negative control); ConfigurationDatabase 395 passed (+5).
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ The Configuration Database component is the exclusive EF Core data-access layer
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The component lives in `src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ConfigurationDatabase/` and is central-only — site clusters never load it. Its responsibilities break down into four areas:
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- **DbContext + Fluent mappings** — `ScadaBridgeDbContext` maps ~30 Commons POCO entity types to SQL Server using `IEntityTypeConfiguration<T>` classes in `Configurations/`, registered wholesale via `modelBuilder.ApplyConfigurationsFromAssembly(...)`.
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- **Repository implementations** — eleven scoped repositories implement the interfaces declared in Commons, covering every domain area from template authoring to audit log ingest.
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- **Repository implementations** — scoped repositories implement the interfaces declared in Commons, covering every domain area from template authoring to audit log ingest.
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- **Config-change audit** — `AuditService` implements `IAuditService`, staging an `AuditLogEntry` into the change tracker so it commits atomically with the entity change; `AuditCorrelationContext` threads a `BundleImportId` through `AsyncLocal<T>` so bundle-import audit rows are correlated without cross-contaminating concurrent import sessions.
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- **Partition maintenance** — `AuditLogPartitionMaintenance` implements `IPartitionMaintenance`, rolling `pf_AuditLog_Month` forward by issuing `ALTER PARTITION FUNCTION … SPLIT RANGE` for each missing future monthly boundary.
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@@ -91,9 +91,11 @@ The predecessor `UX_AuditLog_EventId` — a single-column unique index on `[PRIM
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**`SiteCallEntityTypeConfiguration`** maps `SiteCall` to `dbo.SiteCalls` with a `TrackedOperationId` PK stored as `varchar(36)` (GUID in `"D"` format) so the column shape matches the wire format and the site SQLite store — one consistent format for operational debugging.
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**`BundleUnlockAttemptEntityTypeConfiguration`** maps `BundleUnlockAttempt` to the table of the same name — the fleet-wide sliding window behind Transport's per-client bundle-unlock throttle (register row 52; the counters used to be per-node and per-process, so the effective cap was N × the configured limit). Operational history, not audit: non-partitioned, `[PRIMARY]` filegroup, no DB-role restriction. One named index, `IX_BundleUnlockAttempt_Client_Attempted`, serves both the windowed count and the application's opportunistic prune, which is bounded and best-effort — a store failure in this path is deliberately fail-open at the Transport layer, so nothing here may block an unlock. The table deliberately records no bundle identity; the durable record of a failed unlock is the `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row.
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### Repository implementations
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All eleven repositories follow the same shape: they take `ScadaBridgeDbContext` by constructor injection, work with Commons POCO types, and never commit — callers invoke `SaveChangesAsync()` to commit the unit of work.
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All repositories follow the same shape: they take `ScadaBridgeDbContext` by constructor injection, work with Commons POCO types, and never commit — callers invoke `SaveChangesAsync()` to commit the unit of work.
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**`AuditLogRepository`** is the most specialized. Its `InsertIfNotExistsAsync` bypasses the change tracker and issues raw interpolated SQL because the computed columns must not appear in the INSERT column list:
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@@ -152,7 +154,7 @@ services.AddConfigurationDatabase(
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configuration["ScadaBridge:Database:ConfigurationDb"]!);
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```
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This registers `ScadaBridgeDbContext` as scoped (with the runtime encryption overload), all eleven repository interfaces bound to their implementations, `IAuditCorrelationContext` → `AuditCorrelationContext`, `IAuditService` → `AuditService`, `IInstanceLocator` → `InstanceLocator`, `IPartitionMaintenance` → `AuditLogPartitionMaintenance`, and the Data Protection key ring persisted to the database.
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This registers `ScadaBridgeDbContext` as scoped (with the runtime encryption overload), every repository interface bound to its implementation, `IAuditCorrelationContext` → `AuditCorrelationContext`, `IAuditService` → `AuditService`, `IInstanceLocator` → `InstanceLocator`, `IPartitionMaintenance` → `AuditLogPartitionMaintenance`, and the Data Protection key ring persisted to the database.
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The obsolete zero-argument overload throws `InvalidOperationException` at startup (marked `error: true` on the `[Obsolete]` attribute) so a misconfigured host fails fast with a clear message rather than silently producing an empty DI registration.
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@@ -131,6 +131,14 @@ The two levels interact in a specific order, and it is load-bearing (register ro
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2. **Per-IP throttle next, before the decrypt.** Over budget throws `BundleUnlockThrottledException` (Commons, so the management surface can catch it and return a curated message). Because it precedes the decrypt, a denial burns **no** per-bundle strike — otherwise the throttle would be a way to lock out a bundle someone is legitimately importing. Every unlock attempt is registered, successful ones included: the documented budget counts attempts, not failures.
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3. Only then the AES-GCM decrypt, whose failure increments the per-bundle counter as before.
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**The per-IP window is fleet-wide (register row 52).** It used to be a process-local `ConcurrentDictionary` on each central node, which had two consequences worth naming: the effective fleet cap was N × `MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour` per client (a client that failed over to the other node got a fresh budget), and a node restart cleared the window outright. The window now lives in the central MS SQL `BundleUnlockAttempt` table — the HA store both central nodes already share, so this needs no new infrastructure, no new port and no consensus protocol. `BundleUnlockRateLimiter` keeps the policy; `SqlBundleUnlockAttemptWindow` is the store, resolving a scoped `IBundleUnlockAttemptRepository` from its own scope per call (it is a singleton, like the limiter). Three properties are load-bearing:
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- **It fails OPEN.** A store error logs a Warning naming the client and the cap, and *permits* the attempt. This is a best-effort rate cap layered over a surface that is already authenticated and Administrator-gated, so the availability of legitimate imports outranks the cap — a database blip must not make the import wizard unusable. Falling back to the old process-local window instead was considered and rejected: it would still block a legitimate operator's 11th import during an outage, which is precisely the outcome fail-open exists to prevent. The Warning is the operator's signal that the fleet cap is not currently being enforced.
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- **Accuracy is deliberately approximate.** The count-then-insert pair is not atomic across the two nodes, so genuinely simultaneous attempts can overshoot the cap by up to the number in flight. A conditional single-statement insert would close that at the cost of provider-specific raw SQL; the overshoot is bounded and self-corrects within the window.
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- **Rows are pruned opportunistically, not by a background service.** Transport owns no central scheduler, so the prune rides the unlock path: claimed by CAS at most once per 15 minutes per process, bounded to 1000 rows per pass, retaining `2 ×` the window so a prune racing a count can never delete a row the count still needs, and wrapped in a try/catch that logs and swallows — retention maintenance must never fail the operator's actual unlock. This is the same shape `DeploymentService` uses for terminal deployment records.
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Behaviour the operator sees is otherwise unchanged: same config key, same semantics ("attempts, not failures"), same ordering relative to the per-bundle lockout, same `<unattributed>` bucket.
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The client key is the caller's remote IP: the Central UI wizard reads it from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (a scoped service that snapshots `Connection.RemoteIpAddress` at circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is gone by the time a circuit submits a passphrase — the same pattern as `CookieAuthenticationStateProvider`), and the management endpoint stamps it on `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI `transport preview` / `transport import` paths. A caller with no attributable address is counted against a single **shared** bucket rather than skipping the throttle — "unknown client" degrades to a stricter budget, never to none. As with the login throttle (`Component-Security.md`), per-client isolation is only real when ForwardedHeaders is configured for the fronting proxy; behind an untrusted proxy every caller collapses into the proxy's bucket.
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```csharp
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@@ -264,7 +272,7 @@ After 3 wrong passphrase attempts against the same bundle (keyed by `ContentHash
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### Unlock throttled ("Too many bundle unlock attempts")
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`BundleUnlockThrottledException` — this **client** (not this bundle) has used its `MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour` budget within the trailing hour. Re-uploading does not help; the budget is keyed by IP and rolls forward on a sliding window, and the counters are process-local (a central node restart clears them, deliberately, so an outage doesn't strand legitimate operators). The denial burns no per-bundle strike, so the bundle itself is still importable once the window frees up. Raise `ScadaBridge:Transport:MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour` if a legitimate workflow (many encrypted bundles in one sitting) trips it routinely.
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`BundleUnlockThrottledException` — this **client** (not this bundle) has used its `MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour` budget within the trailing hour. Re-uploading does not help; the budget is keyed by IP, rolls forward on a sliding window, and is **fleet-wide and restart-durable** (register row 52 — see below), so failing over to the other central node does not help either. The denial burns no per-bundle strike, so the bundle itself is still importable once the window frees up. Raise `ScadaBridge:Transport:MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour` if a legitimate workflow (many encrypted bundles in one sitting) trips it routinely.
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### BundleImportAlarmScriptUnresolved / BundleImportCompositionUnresolved warnings
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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-- Register row 52: the fleet-wide bundle-unlock throttle window.
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--
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-- Creates the central [BundleUnlockAttempt] table that both central nodes share, so
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-- ScadaBridge:Transport:MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour is a fleet cap rather than a
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-- per-node, per-process one. Operational history, not audit: non-partitioned, standard
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-- [PRIMARY] filegroup, no DB-role restriction, and rows are pruned opportunistically by
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-- the application once they age past twice the trailing window.
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--
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-- Run with QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON. Several tables in this database carry filtered indexes
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-- and persisted computed columns, and SQL Server refuses DDL/DML against them with error
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-- 1934 when the session has QUOTED_IDENTIFIER OFF -- which is exactly what `sqlcmd` gives
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-- you by default (pass -I, or keep this header). The SETs sit in their own batch so they
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-- are in force when the statements after the GO parse.
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SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON;
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SET ANSI_NULLS ON;
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GO
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BEGIN TRANSACTION;
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT * FROM [__EFMigrationsHistory]
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WHERE [MigrationId] = N'20260815154803_AddBundleUnlockAttemptTable'
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)
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BEGIN
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EXEC(N'CREATE TABLE [BundleUnlockAttempt] (
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[Id] bigint NOT NULL IDENTITY,
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[ClientKey] varchar(64) NOT NULL,
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[AttemptedAtUtc] datetime2 NOT NULL,
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CONSTRAINT [PK_BundleUnlockAttempt] PRIMARY KEY ([Id])
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)');
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EXEC(N'CREATE INDEX [IX_BundleUnlockAttempt_Client_Attempted]
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ON [BundleUnlockAttempt] ([ClientKey], [AttemptedAtUtc])');
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END;
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT * FROM [__EFMigrationsHistory]
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WHERE [MigrationId] = N'20260815154803_AddBundleUnlockAttemptTable'
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)
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BEGIN
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INSERT INTO [__EFMigrationsHistory] ([MigrationId], [ProductVersion])
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VALUES (N'20260815154803_AddBundleUnlockAttemptTable', N'10.0.7');
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END;
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COMMIT;
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GO
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@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ The configuration database stores all central system data, organized by domain a
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- **Deployment Records**: Deployment history per instance (timestamp, user, status, deployed configuration snapshot).
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- **System-Wide Artifact Deployment Records**: Deployment history for shared artifacts (timestamp, user, artifact type, status).
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### Transport
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- **Bundle Unlock Attempts**: One row per permitted bundle-unlock passphrase attempt (`ClientKey`, `AttemptedAtUtc`), forming the fleet-wide sliding window behind Transport's `MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour` throttle — see `Component-Transport.md` (register row 52). Operational history, not audit: non-partitioned, no DB-role restriction, and rows are pruned opportunistically by the application once they age past twice the window. **Denied** attempts are deliberately not recorded (a denial burns no budget), and no bundle identity is stored — the durable record of a failed unlock is the `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. Central-only: written only by the Transport component, which the host registers for central roles.
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### Audit Logging
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- **Audit Log Entries**: Append-only audit trail (timestamp, user, action, entity type, entity ID, entity name, state as JSON). Stores only the after-state — change history is reconstructed by comparing consecutive entries. Entries are never modified or deleted. No retention policy — retained indefinitely. Indexed on timestamp, user, entity type, entity ID, and action for efficient filtering.
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@@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ Imports are all-or-nothing per bundle. A bundle either applies fully or not at a
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- **AES-256-GCM** for content encryption with **PBKDF2-SHA256 / 600 000 iterations** (OWASP 2023+ guidance), per-bundle random salt, random IV per encryption. The GCM auth tag is verified before decryption — a wrong passphrase fails cleanly.
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- **Passphrase never persisted.** It lives only inside the export/import service call path and is discarded after use. No environment variable, no log line.
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- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-bundle 3-strike lockout (keyed by `ContentHash`, server-side); per-IP-per-hour cap (`MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour`, default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. The two are evaluated in order — bundle lockout, then per-IP throttle, then decrypt — so hammering an already-locked bundle spends no hourly budget, and a throttle denial (`BundleUnlockThrottledException`, fail-closed with a curated message on both the UI and CLI surfaces) burns **no** per-bundle strike, since it never reaches the decryptor. Both typed exceptions live in `Commons/Types/Transport/` — `ManagementService` references Commons but not Transport, so a type declared beside the importer cannot be curated by `MapFault` and reaches the CLI as a generic internal-error message (register rows 44 and 51). Successful unlocks count against the hourly budget too: it caps attempts, not failures. The client key is the caller's remote IP — from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (snapshotted at Blazor circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is unavailable mid-circuit) for the Central UI, and from `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI; a caller with no attributable address shares a single stricter bucket rather than bypassing the throttle. Per-client isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same caveat the login throttle carries in `Component-Security.md`. (Register row 44: the limiter existed, was configured and unit-tested, but was never invoked until this was wired.)
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**The per-IP window is fleet-wide and restart-durable (register row 52).** It is persisted in the central MS SQL `BundleUnlockAttempt` table — the HA store both central nodes already share — rather than in each node's process memory, so the documented cap is a fleet cap and not N × the cap, and a node restart no longer clears it. `BundleUnlockRateLimiter` still owns the policy; `SqlBundleUnlockAttemptWindow` is the store behind the `IBundleUnlockAttemptWindow` seam, and `IBundleUnlockAttemptRepository` (Commons interface, ConfigurationDatabase implementation) is the persistence. Three deliberate trades: **the throttle fails OPEN** — a store error logs a Warning and permits the attempt, because this is a best-effort rate cap over an already-authenticated Administrator-gated surface and the availability of legitimate imports outranks the cap; **accuracy is approximate** — count-then-insert is not atomic across nodes, so simultaneous attempts can overshoot by the number in flight, which is bounded and self-corrects within the window; and **rows are pruned opportunistically on the unlock path** (CAS-claimed at most every 15 minutes per process, bounded to 1000 rows, retaining twice the window, best-effort) rather than by a new background service, since Transport owns no central scheduler.
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- **Bundle size cap** on upload (default 100 MB, configurable) to bound memory.
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- **In-transit:** existing HTTPS to the Central UI; no new channel.
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- **Audit trail is the chain of custody.** Every export, every import (including aborted ones at validation), and every unlock failure is audit-logged with source env, content hash, encrypted yes/no, and artifact summary.
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