fix(central): review findings — no client-side audit truncation, insert-first upsert, QI-safe scripts, honest operator replies
Six adversarial-review findings in the central SQL/ingest layer. F1 (AuditLogRepository.InsertChunkAsync) — the set-based ingest declared each string parameter at its COLUMN width (Actor/Target 256, Action 64, Outcome 16, Category 32, SourceNode 64), so SqlClient truncated an over-long value at bind time and committed the mutilated row — silent, in an append-only store, with no PayloadTruncated flag — while the per-row and reconciliation paths sent the same value in full and let the server reject it with 2628. Bind at the value's own length instead; explicit SqlDbType is kept (it fixes the VALUES constructor's derived column types and datetime2 precision). Design: reject everywhere, truncate nowhere — matching today's per-row behaviour. F2 (SiteCallAuditRepository.UpsertAsync) — the single-statement upsert ran the monotonic UPDATE first and INSERTed only if nothing matched. Two writers racing the first packet of one TrackedOperationId (the cached dual-write and the reconciliation pull carry DIFFERENT lifecycle states) both matched nothing, and the loser then skipped its INSERT or swallowed a 2627 — dropping its Status/RetryCount/HttpStatus/TerminalAtUtc. Legs swapped to `IF NOT EXISTS … INSERT; UPDATE <monotonic>` — still one round trip, and the loser's UPDATE now lands on the winner's row. The duplicate-key catch re-runs the monotonic UPDATE for the same reason. Moved to raw SQL with explicitly-typed parameters so the intricate rank predicate exists in exactly one place (an untyped DateTime would bind as `datetime` and round the freshness tiebreaker). F3 (docs/plans/sql/*.sql) — filtered-index DDL failed with error 1934 under the documented `docker exec … sqlcmd` path, which defaults QUOTED_IDENTIFIER OFF; once IX_Notifications_Delivered exists, QI-OFF DML on Notifications fails too. All four scripts now open with `SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON; SET ANSI_NULLS ON; GO` (own batch, so it is in force when the next batch parses), and the migration convention in Component-ConfigurationDatabase.md documents `sqlcmd -I`. Verified live: the pre-fix script fails 1934 without -I, the fixed one applies. F4 (SiteCallAuditActor) — the off-mailbox reconciliation/purge passes reuse the injected repository, so tests drove one DbContext from the pass and a mailbox handler concurrently. Serialized at the CALL via a private SerializedRepository wrapper applied only by the test constructors, rather than running the pass on-mailbox: production keeps its PipeTo shape untouched, and the existing "a blocked drain does not stall ingest/query/KPI" regression tests stay meaningful (they would have been invalidated by suspending the mailbox). F5 (AuditLogIngestActor) — when the batch failed because the 20 s IngestBudget expired, the per-row fallback reused the same expired token: N instant failures, N counter bumps, zero accepted. The fallback now gets a fresh 5 s budget (inside the 30 s outer Ask), and a blown budget bumps the failure counter ONCE for the batch instead of once per row. F6 (NotificationOutboxRepository.UpdateAsync) — ExecuteUpdate's row count was discarded, so an operator Retry/Discard of a notification the retention purge had already deleted reported success (the pre-ExecuteUpdate code threw DbUpdateConcurrencyException). UpdateAsync now returns whether a row matched; the operator one-shots answer "notification not found" and emit no audit row for the action that did not happen, while the dispatcher logs a warning (its delivery already happened; nothing to retry). GetByIdAsync switched to AsNoTracking since the write is out-of-band. Tests: 5 new SQL-backed regressions (over-long Target rejected on both paths + boundary round-trip; concurrent first-write and already-created-by-another-writer upserts; vanished-row UpdateAsync), a token-identity pin on the ingest fallback, a repository-concurrency detector for the SiteCallAudit passes, and vanished-row operator-path tests. The F1/F2/F4 regressions were each confirmed failing against the pre-fix code. Suites: ConfigurationDatabase 369, AuditLog 378, SiteCallAudit 66, NotificationOutbox 152 — all green, solution builds with 0 warnings.
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@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ A notification is **stuck** if it is `Pending` or `Retrying` and older than a co
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- **Health Monitoring dashboard** — headline KPI tiles: queue depth, stuck count, parked count. These are central-computed and are not part of the site health report. The site S&F notification backlog remains a separate site health metric covering the site→central leg.
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- **Central UI "Notification Outbox" page** — KPI tiles plus a queryable notification list: filter by status, type, source site, list, and time range; a stuck-only toggle; keyword search on subject. Parked notifications offer **Retry** (→ `Pending`, reset `RetryCount` / `NextAttemptAt`) and **Discard** (→ `Discarded`) actions. Stuck rows are badged.
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Both operator actions are **read-then-write against a row the daily retention purge may delete in between**, so the write reports whether it matched a row and the actor answers `Success: false` / `"notification not found"` when it did not — never a success against a notification that no longer exists (and no audit row is emitted for the action that did not happen). The dispatcher's own delivery-state write takes the opposite stance on the same signal: the delivery has already happened, there is nothing left to retry, so a vanished row is logged as a warning and the audit rows stand as the durable record.
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## Configuration
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The component is configured via `NotificationOutboxOptions`, bound from an `appsettings.json` section on the central host (Options pattern):
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