fix(transport): enforce the documented per-IP bundle-unlock throttle (row 44)

BundleUnlockRateLimiter was registered (ServiceCollectionExtensions), injected
into BundleImporter, unit-tested, documented on
TransportOptions.MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour = 10 and pinned in
appsettings.Central.json — but _unlockRateLimiter was never invoked. A
brute-force passphrase attacker against a stolen bundle was bounded only by the
per-bundle 3-strike lockout, which a re-export side-steps (new ContentHash).

LoadAsync now registers every unlock attempt against the limiter. Ordering is
load-bearing: AFTER the per-bundle lockout check (hammering a locked bundle
spends no hourly budget) and BEFORE the decrypt (so a denial burns no per-bundle
strike — otherwise the throttle would be a way to lock a bundle someone is
legitimately importing). Over budget throws the new
BundleUnlockThrottledException, fail-closed with a clear message on both
surfaces; it lives in Commons because the management surface (Commons-only
references) must catch it to return a curated error rather than MapFault's
generic internal-error text.

Client key plumbing:
- Central UI: new scoped CircuitClientAddressProvider snapshots
  Connection.RemoteIpAddress at circuit establishment — the same constraint and
  the same pattern as CookieAuthenticationStateProvider, since HttpContext is
  null by the time a circuit submits a passphrase.
- CLI/management: additive ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp, stamped by
  ManagementEndpoints and threaded through DispatchCommand to the preview/import
  bundle handlers.
- No attributable address => a single SHARED "<unattributed>" bucket, not a
  bypass: unknown clients get a stricter budget, never none. Per-client
  isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same
  caveat the login throttle carries (Component-Security.md).

Docs: Component-Transport.md + docs/components/Transport.md record the two-level
ordering, the client-key sourcing, the shared-bucket fallback and a
troubleshooting entry for the new error.

Tests: 6 importer tests (cap enforced; denial != passphrase failure, no strike
burned; per-client isolation; shared unattributed bucket; unencrypted bundles
consume no budget; a locked bundle spends no hourly budget) — 4 of the 6 fail
with the limiter call disabled, i.e. against the dead-code state. Plus
ManagementActor tests pinning the ClientIp forwarding and the curated
throttle error.

src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CentralUI/Auth/CircuitClientAddressProvider.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.CentralUI.Auth;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// Supplies the remote IP of the client that established this Blazor circuit.
+/// <para>
+/// Same constraint — and the same solution — as
+/// <see cref="CookieAuthenticationStateProvider"/>: <see cref="IHttpContextAccessor.HttpContext"/>
+/// is valid only during the initial HTTP request that establishes the circuit and
+/// is null (or stale/foreign) for the life of the SignalR connection afterwards.
+/// Registered <c>Scoped</c>, this type is constructed inside that request's DI
+/// scope, so it snapshots <c>Connection.RemoteIpAddress</c> <b>once</b> in the
+/// constructor and serves that snapshot for the circuit's lifetime.
+/// </para>
+/// <para>
+/// The value is only as trustworthy as the proxy configuration: it is whatever
+/// Kestrel reports as the connection's remote address, which <c>ForwardedHeaders</c>
+/// (see <c>ForwardedHeadersSetup</c>, enabled for the shipped Traefik topologies)
+/// rewrites from <c>X-Forwarded-For</c> for CONFIGURED proxies only. Behind an
+/// untrusted proxy every circuit collapses onto the proxy's address — consumers
+/// must treat that as a shared bucket, not as per-client isolation.
+/// </para>
+/// </summary>
+public sealed class CircuitClientAddressProvider
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Snapshots the client address from the current HTTP context for use throughout
+    /// the circuit lifetime.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="httpContextAccessor">Accessor used to read the circuit-establishing request.</param>
+    public CircuitClientAddressProvider(IHttpContextAccessor httpContextAccessor)
+    {
+        ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(httpContextAccessor);
+        ClientAddress = httpContextAccessor.HttpContext?.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString();
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Test seam: constructs the provider with an explicit address instead of reading
+    /// an <see cref="IHttpContextAccessor"/>.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="clientAddress">The address to serve, or null for "unknown".</param>
+    public CircuitClientAddressProvider(string? clientAddress)
+    {
+        ClientAddress = clientAddress;
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The remote IP of the circuit-establishing request, or null when it could not be
+    /// determined (no HTTP context, or a transport that reports no remote address).
+    /// </summary>
+    public string? ClientAddress { get; }
+}