fix(transport): enforce the documented per-IP bundle-unlock throttle (row 44)

BundleUnlockRateLimiter was registered (ServiceCollectionExtensions), injected
into BundleImporter, unit-tested, documented on
TransportOptions.MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour = 10 and pinned in
appsettings.Central.json — but _unlockRateLimiter was never invoked. A
brute-force passphrase attacker against a stolen bundle was bounded only by the
per-bundle 3-strike lockout, which a re-export side-steps (new ContentHash).

LoadAsync now registers every unlock attempt against the limiter. Ordering is
load-bearing: AFTER the per-bundle lockout check (hammering a locked bundle
spends no hourly budget) and BEFORE the decrypt (so a denial burns no per-bundle
strike — otherwise the throttle would be a way to lock a bundle someone is
legitimately importing). Over budget throws the new
BundleUnlockThrottledException, fail-closed with a clear message on both
surfaces; it lives in Commons because the management surface (Commons-only
references) must catch it to return a curated error rather than MapFault's
generic internal-error text.

Client key plumbing:
- Central UI: new scoped CircuitClientAddressProvider snapshots
  Connection.RemoteIpAddress at circuit establishment — the same constraint and
  the same pattern as CookieAuthenticationStateProvider, since HttpContext is
  null by the time a circuit submits a passphrase.
- CLI/management: additive ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp, stamped by
  ManagementEndpoints and threaded through DispatchCommand to the preview/import
  bundle handlers.
- No attributable address => a single SHARED "<unattributed>" bucket, not a
  bypass: unknown clients get a stricter budget, never none. Per-client
  isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same
  caveat the login throttle carries (Component-Security.md).

Docs: Component-Transport.md + docs/components/Transport.md record the two-level
ordering, the client-key sourcing, the shared-bucket fallback and a
troubleshooting entry for the new error.

Tests: 6 importer tests (cap enforced; denial != passphrase failure, no strike
burned; per-client isolation; shared unattributed bucket; unencrypted bundles
consume no budget; a locked bundle spends no hourly budget) — 4 of the 6 fail
with the limiter call disabled, i.e. against the dead-code state. Plus
ManagementActor tests pinning the ClientIp forwarding and the curated
throttle error.

docs/requirements/Component-Transport.md

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ The manifest is plaintext so the import wizard can preview bundle contents and s
 flowchart TD
     subgraph T["ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Transport"]
         EXPORTER["IBundleExporter<br/>ExportAsync(ExportSelection, Passphrase?, ct) → Stream"]
-        IMPORTER["IBundleImporter<br/>LoadAsync(stream, Passphrase?, ct) → BundleSession<br/>PreviewAsync(sessionId, ct) → ImportPreview<br/>ApplyAsync(sessionId, resolutions, ct) → ImportResult<br/>Abandon(sessionId)"]
+        IMPORTER["IBundleImporter<br/>LoadAsync(stream, Passphrase?, ct, ClientIp?) → BundleSession<br/>PreviewAsync(sessionId, ct) → ImportPreview<br/>ApplyAsync(sessionId, resolutions, ct) → ImportResult<br/>Abandon(sessionId)"]
         RESOLVER["DependencyResolver"]
         SERIALIZER["BundleSerializer<br/>(manifest + content JSON; ZIP packer)"]
         ENCRYPTOR["BundleSecretEncryptor<br/>(AES-256-GCM + PBKDF2)"]
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ Imports are all-or-nothing per bundle. A bundle either applies fully or not at a
 
 - **AES-256-GCM** for content encryption with **PBKDF2-SHA256 / 600 000 iterations** (OWASP 2023+ guidance), per-bundle random salt, random IV per encryption. The GCM auth tag is verified before decryption — a wrong passphrase fails cleanly.
 - **Passphrase never persisted.** It lives only inside the export/import service call path and is discarded after use. No environment variable, no log line.
-- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-session 3-strike lockout; per-IP-per-hour cap (default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row.
+- **Failed-unlock rate limit:** per-bundle 3-strike lockout (keyed by `ContentHash`, server-side); per-IP-per-hour cap (`MaxUnlockAttemptsPerIpPerHour`, default 10, configurable) to deter brute force against a stolen bundle. Each failed attempt produces a `BundleImportUnlockFailed` audit row. The two are evaluated in order — bundle lockout, then per-IP throttle, then decrypt — so hammering an already-locked bundle spends no hourly budget, and a throttle denial (`BundleUnlockThrottledException`, fail-closed with a curated message on both the UI and CLI surfaces) burns **no** per-bundle strike, since it never reaches the decryptor. Successful unlocks count against the hourly budget too: it caps attempts, not failures. The client key is the caller's remote IP — from `CircuitClientAddressProvider` (snapshotted at Blazor circuit establishment, since `HttpContext` is unavailable mid-circuit) for the Central UI, and from `ManagementEnvelope.ClientIp` for the CLI; a caller with no attributable address shares a single stricter bucket rather than bypassing the throttle. Per-client isolation is only real behind a ForwardedHeaders-trusted proxy, the same caveat the login throttle carries in `Component-Security.md`. (Register row 44: the limiter existed, was configured and unit-tested, but was never invoked until this was wired.)
 - **Bundle size cap** on upload (default 100 MB, configurable) to bound memory.
 - **In-transit:** existing HTTPS to the Central UI; no new channel.
 - **Audit trail is the chain of custody.** Every export, every import (including aborted ones at validation), and every unlock failure is audit-logged with source env, content hash, encrypted yes/no, and artifact summary.