docs: relabel wonder-app-vd03 as DEV, not production, across plans, records, reviews and API specs
vd03 is the DEV box (vd = DEV, vq03/vq04 = QA). Historical docs called it prod/production. Only vd03-referential uses are changed; generic 'production' wording (production HOCON, production code paths, ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Production, real-world production guidance) is unchanged. One verbatim git commit message quoted in PLAN-07 is left as recorded.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ All 7 fix-now items landed via PLAN-04/05/06/07/08 (verified in review 08 round
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| 104 | ~~**Existing site LocalDb files stay `auto_vacuum=NONE`; `PRAGMA incremental_vacuum` after a cap trim is a no-op on them**~~ **RESOLVED 2026-08-20 — recipe shipped and applied to the rig.** New `docker/vacuum-site-localdb.sh` (stop both nodes of a pair together → `PRAGMA auto_vacuum=INCREMENTAL; VACUUM` each volume with integrity checks before/after → start both; `DRY_RUN=1` reports) plus the topology-guide section *Site LocalDb files created before 2026-08-20 need a one-off offline VACUUM*. Run on all three rig pairs: all six files `auto_vacuum 0 → 2`, `integrity_check=ok`, ~11 % smaller (site-a 20.3 → 18.1 MB), site-a replication back `Connected=true`/backlog 0 with no watermark or schema change — the VACUUM was replication-invisible as predicted (ledger keys by declared PK; oplog `seq` is an `INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT`). The same maintenance surfaced the unrelated row 106. Original: | Arch-review 2026-08-19 P4-6 (Low-wave T4, `47f03fe6`) | `auto_vacuum` is only honoured on a table-less database, and `LocalDbSchema.EnsureCreated` had always created LocalDb's bookkeeping tables before `SiteEventLogSchema.Apply` ran — so the pragma had never once taken effect on any real file. The fix (`SiteLocalDbSetup.EnsureAutoVacuumOnFreshFile`, run before `AddZbLocalDb`'s lazy singleton constructs `SqliteLocalDb`) only helps **fresh** files; an unconditional `VACUUM` against a live ~1 GB replicated file was explicitly rejected (long exclusive lock on the active node; the rewrite is CDC-invisible but blocks the sync pump). Every node on the docker rig today predates the fix, so freed `site_events` pages there are reused, not returned to the OS — the storage cap (row 81) still bounds the data volume, only the file size stops shrinking. | Operator-scheduled `VACUUM` in a maintenance window (both nodes of a pair stopped together), or when a site's file is next recreated. |
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| 105 | ~~**Design constraint (not a defect): a LocalDb-replicated table must never be the parent of a row-mutating `ON DELETE` foreign key (`CASCADE`/`SET NULL`/`SET DEFAULT`) from another table**~~ **PINNED 2026-08-20.** Enforcement moved from the first replicated boot to the build: `SiteLocalDbReplicatedTableFkGuardTests` (Host.Tests) builds the real site schema via `OnReady` on an unreplicated config (so 0.3.3's own guard can't mask which FK is at fault), walks `SiteLocalDbSetup.ReplicatedTables` (now `internal`), asserts each exists and has no inbound row-mutating `ON DELETE` FK with the same `sqlite_master JOIN pragma_foreign_key_list` query LocalDb uses, and carries a negative control proving the checker finds a cascading child. The constraint itself stands — the row is kept as its record. Original: | Arch-review 2026-08-19 P4-7 → LocalDb 0.3.3 (scadaproj `122940c` + review follow-up `9663279`, Low-wave T5) | `LwwApplier` upserts with `INSERT OR REPLACE` under `foreign_keys=ON`, so the implicit delete fires the child action while CDC capture is suppressed — the child rows change on the applying node only and the pair diverges silently. 0.3.3 makes `RegisterReplicated` refuse such a parent at registration (clear exception naming the child FK), which is a BOOT failure for the site node, so this is enforced, not advisory. None of the ten `SiteLocalDbSetup.ReplicatedTables` has any FK today (zero `REFERENCES` on the live rig file). Model cross-table cleanup as explicit application deletes on each table (as the 3-table deploy cascade already does), never as SQLite FK actions. | Whenever a schema change adds a foreign key between site tables, or an eleventh table joins `ReplicatedTables`. |
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| 106 | ~~**LocalDb: a converged pair re-streams a FULL snapshot on EVERY reconnect once the sender's oplog has been ack-pruned to empty and the receiver's watermark is 0**~~ **RESOLVED 2026-08-20 — LocalDb 0.3.4 (scadaproj `75c1897`), published and pinned.** `SnapshotStreamer.SendAsync` now stamps `as_of_seq = max(MAX(seq), last_acked_seq)`; pinned by `WipedPeer_SnapshotLiftsItsWatermark_SoTheNextReconnectSendsNoSecondSnapshot` (fails on 0.3.3 exactly as the rig did: watermark 0, expected 3). Live proof on the rig: the first restart on 0.3.4 sent one last full snapshot stamped `as_of_seq 149` (was 0) and node-a's `last_applied_remote_seq` went 0 → 149; a second restart of the pair exchanged **zero** snapshots, `Connected=true`, backlog 0. Original: | Found 2026-08-20 while verifying row 104 on the rig (site-a-a received the same 127 k-row full snapshot at both the 13:09 deploy restart and the 13:25 VACUUM restart) | Sender-side defect in `SnapshotStreamer.SendAsync`: `as_of_seq = MAX(seq)` of the oplog, which is **0** once the pair has converged and ack-pruning emptied it. The receiver's `SetLastAppliedRemoteSeqAsync` is MAX-guarded (no regression — good), but a peer whose watermark is genuinely 0 (site-a-a was rebuilt after the 2026-08-15 corruption; any wiped/re-imaged node is the same) can never be lifted by an `as_of_seq 0` snapshot, so the 0.1.2 empty-oplog horizon rule (`streamableFrom = last_acked_seq + 1`) sees `0 < 149` as a gap on every handshake and re-streams everything. Rig state: node-b `last_acked_seq=149`, oplog empty; node-a `last_applied_remote_seq=0`. Not a divergence (LWW absorbs the re-delivered rows) but a cost/availability bug — ~1 s and 127 k rows here, minutes and a full-file read on a 1 GB production pair, on every reconnect, until the sender happens to write a new row. Fix is sender-side and wire-compatible: stamp `as_of_seq = max(MAX(seq), last_acked_seq)` (a full snapshot taken now covers every delta ever pruned below `last_acked_seq`), so the receiver's MAX-guarded watermark lifts to 149 and the loop ends; add a pinning test (converged+pruned sender, zero-watermark receiver → exactly one snapshot across two handshakes). Ships as LocalDb 0.3.4. | Next LocalDb release (0.3.4) — small, well-understood, and worth doing before any production pair is rebuilt from its peer. |
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| 107 | **→ #52** **Prod `CvdReactor.ProcessRecipeDownload` still addresses `Children["DelmiaRecv"]` after the 2026-06-27 `DelmiaRecv` → `DelmiaReceiver` composition rename** — inferred from the deployed script (`docs/api-specs/Delmia-Recipe-Download-API.md` §7 item 1): `ChildrenAccessor` concatenates the name into a path, an unknown path yields null, so every call answers `Receiver ready flag not set to true` regardless of the real flag. No call has hit prod since the rename, so this is inferred, not observed. The docker rig's stand-in (`docker/seed-delmia-sim.sh`) uses `Children["DelmiaReceiver"]` and the same handshake answers correctly, which is the working reference. | Found 2026-09-02 while capturing the as-deployed spec; QA copy unread (credentials) | Separate change with its own deployment record: `scadabridge template script update` on the `CvdReactor` template + redeploy Z28061/Z28062/Z28061Sim, then a live `WWNotifier` call. | Before the first production Delmia recipe download. |
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| 108 | ~~**Inbound API keys are a PER-NODE SQLite store — a central failover invalidates every inbound client's key**~~ **RESOLVED 2026-09-02 — `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth` 0.3.0 (new `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys.SqlServer` package) + ScadaBridge `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:Provider=SqlServer`.** A central pair now shares one row set: both nodes' key stores, admin stores, and audit stores point at the same `zbauth` schema in the configuration database (connection string defaults to `ScadaBridge:Database:ConfigurationDb` — never a `${secret:}` reference, to avoid a circular dependency on the SQL-backed secrets store), so create/revoke/rotate/scope changes are cluster-wide immediately instead of per-node. Each node's existing SQLite file is imported once at boot (insert-where-absent, so both nodes importing is safe and the result is the union) and renamed `*.imported`. `Provider` defaults to `Sqlite` (unchanged behavior for single-node installs, MxAccessGateway, HistorianGateway); a clustered Central left on `Sqlite` now gets a boot-time `StartupValidator` Warning naming this design instead of silently keeping the gap. Both docker rigs (`docker/`, `docker-env2/`) run `Provider=SqlServer` on both centrals; `docker/sync-inbound-api-keys.sh` is deleted, superseded by the shared store. Rig proof 2026-09-03 (`docker/`, both centrals redeployed on `Provider=SqlServer`): both nodes imported their SQLite file at the same second with no PK race — central-a `1 key / 264 audit rows inserted`, central-b `0 / 26 inserted, 1 / 264 already present` (the union), files renamed `*.imported`; a key minted via `:9001` answered `200` via `:9002`, `--enabled false` via `:9001` made both nodes answer `401` and `:9002`'s own list showed `enabled=False`, re-enable via `:9002` restored `200` on `:9001`, delete via `:9002` made `:9001` answer `401`; `verify-delmia-notifier.sh` with a freshly minted key and NO file copy: A/B/E/F `YES`, C/G `NO`, active-central `docker kill` takeover **28 s**, rejoin as standby in 2 s. `docker-env2` (second pair, `ScadaBridgeConfig2`): both centrals booted, `zbauth` v1 created, empty files imported. QA (`vq03`/`vq04`) and prod (`vd03`) still run `Provider=Sqlite` — their move is a planned deployment record (`docs/deployment/deployment-records/2026-09-XX-zb-servers-inbound-key-store.md`), not yet applied. Design: `docs/plans/2026-09-02-inbound-api-key-shared-store-design.md`. Original: | `docs/api-specs/Delmia-Recipe-Download-API.md` §8; `docker/sync-inbound-api-keys.sh` header | Fix is an architecture decision, not a patch: move the store to the shared SQL Server (as Secrets 0.5.0 did for its central store) or replicate the file; either way revocation must become cluster-wide. Needs the `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys` library (scadaproj), not just this repo. | Before any 2-node central goes live with inbound API clients; before the next arch-review wave. |
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| 107 | **→ #52** **DEV (vd03) `CvdReactor.ProcessRecipeDownload` still addresses `Children["DelmiaRecv"]` after the 2026-06-27 `DelmiaRecv` → `DelmiaReceiver` composition rename** — inferred from the deployed script (`docs/api-specs/Delmia-Recipe-Download-API.md` §7 item 1): `ChildrenAccessor` concatenates the name into a path, an unknown path yields null, so every call answers `Receiver ready flag not set to true` regardless of the real flag. No call has hit DEV (vd03) since the rename, so this is inferred, not observed. The docker rig's stand-in (`docker/seed-delmia-sim.sh`) uses `Children["DelmiaReceiver"]` and the same handshake answers correctly, which is the working reference. | Found 2026-09-02 while capturing the as-deployed spec; QA copy unread (credentials) | Separate change with its own deployment record: `scadabridge template script update` on the `CvdReactor` template + redeploy Z28061/Z28062/Z28061Sim, then a live `WWNotifier` call. | Before the first production Delmia recipe download. |
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| 108 | ~~**Inbound API keys are a PER-NODE SQLite store — a central failover invalidates every inbound client's key**~~ **RESOLVED 2026-09-02 — `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth` 0.3.0 (new `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys.SqlServer` package) + ScadaBridge `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:Provider=SqlServer`.** A central pair now shares one row set: both nodes' key stores, admin stores, and audit stores point at the same `zbauth` schema in the configuration database (connection string defaults to `ScadaBridge:Database:ConfigurationDb` — never a `${secret:}` reference, to avoid a circular dependency on the SQL-backed secrets store), so create/revoke/rotate/scope changes are cluster-wide immediately instead of per-node. Each node's existing SQLite file is imported once at boot (insert-where-absent, so both nodes importing is safe and the result is the union) and renamed `*.imported`. `Provider` defaults to `Sqlite` (unchanged behavior for single-node installs, MxAccessGateway, HistorianGateway); a clustered Central left on `Sqlite` now gets a boot-time `StartupValidator` Warning naming this design instead of silently keeping the gap. Both docker rigs (`docker/`, `docker-env2/`) run `Provider=SqlServer` on both centrals; `docker/sync-inbound-api-keys.sh` is deleted, superseded by the shared store. Rig proof 2026-09-03 (`docker/`, both centrals redeployed on `Provider=SqlServer`): both nodes imported their SQLite file at the same second with no PK race — central-a `1 key / 264 audit rows inserted`, central-b `0 / 26 inserted, 1 / 264 already present` (the union), files renamed `*.imported`; a key minted via `:9001` answered `200` via `:9002`, `--enabled false` via `:9001` made both nodes answer `401` and `:9002`'s own list showed `enabled=False`, re-enable via `:9002` restored `200` on `:9001`, delete via `:9002` made `:9001` answer `401`; `verify-delmia-notifier.sh` with a freshly minted key and NO file copy: A/B/E/F `YES`, C/G `NO`, active-central `docker kill` takeover **28 s**, rejoin as standby in 2 s. `docker-env2` (second pair, `ScadaBridgeConfig2`): both centrals booted, `zbauth` v1 created, empty files imported. QA (`vq03`/`vq04`) and DEV (`vd03`) still run `Provider=Sqlite` — their move is a planned deployment record (`docs/deployment/deployment-records/2026-09-XX-zb-servers-inbound-key-store.md`), not yet applied. Design: `docs/plans/2026-09-02-inbound-api-key-shared-store-design.md`. Original: | `docs/api-specs/Delmia-Recipe-Download-API.md` §8; `docker/sync-inbound-api-keys.sh` header | Fix is an architecture decision, not a patch: move the store to the shared SQL Server (as Secrets 0.5.0 did for its central store) or replicate the file; either way revocation must become cluster-wide. Needs the `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys` library (scadaproj), not just this repo. | Before any 2-node central goes live with inbound API clients; before the next arch-review wave. |
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| 109 | **→ scadaproj#18** **`ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.SqlServer`'s store migrator retries its DDL with a flat `100 * attempt` backoff and no jitter — a latent concurrent-boot flake, open in Secrets** *(Low)*. Porting that migrator's retry loop verbatim for the Auth 0.3.0 SQL Server API-key store (register row 108) reproduced an intermittent exhaustion — about once in sixty 8-way concurrent-boot trials the five flat-backoff retries ran out before a DDL/lock conflict cleared; adding jitter to the Auth port's backoff took it to 0 failures in 180 trials. Secrets' own migrator has no concurrent-migrate test, so the same defect is presumed still open there — it just hasn't been exercised at 8-way concurrency, and a ScadaBridge central pair is only ever 2-way, so this is unlikely to bite in practice. | Found 2026-09-02 while implementing `docs/plans/2026-09-02-inbound-api-key-shared-store.md` (Auth 0.3.0 `SqlServerApiKeyStoreMigrator`) | Add jitter to `SqlServerSecretsStoreMigrator`'s backoff in `~/Desktop/scadaproj/ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets` (mirror the Auth fix) and add a `Migrate_Concurrently_FromEightTasks_AllSucceed`-shaped live test to catch a regression. Lives entirely in scadaproj, not this repo. | Next time Secrets' SQL Server migrator is touched, or if a wider-than-2-way concurrent boot of a Secrets-backed cluster is ever planned. |
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| 110 | **→ #53** **Flow Debugger follow-up: the *Vertical trace* list toggle (mockup Direction B)** *(Low)*. v1 ships the Direction A swimlane only; the mockup's Direction B — the same steps as a vertical, filterable list with the lane as a column — was kept as an alternate for long flows and screen readers. Additive: a list view over the existing `FlowGraph`. ~~and console capture on `ScriptRun`~~ **The console-capture half is RESOLVED 2026-09-09 (plan `docs/plans/2026-09-09-flow-debugger-step-logs.md`)** — and deliberately not as this row sketched it. `Extra.console` on the `ScriptRun` row was rejected (the 8 KB payload cap would silently drop lines, and helper-step attribution would need every helper to buffer); shipped instead is a leveled `Log` global on all four script surfaces plus one `ScriptTrace.ScriptLog` audit row per line, folded onto the step that produced it, with the failing step's full exception on `errorDetail`. `Console.Out` capture on a site node is recorded as permanently out of scope in the design's §9: `Console.Out` is process-global and shared by every concurrent run, so per-run capture is unsound. | Design `docs/plans/2026-09-05-flow-debugger-design.md` §11; plan `2026-09-05-flow-debugger.md` Task 23 | The list view was not asked for by an operator; the swimlane + Timing/Writes/Log tabs cover the acceptance flow (Delmia recipe download, rig steps H and J). | First operator request for a list view. |
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| 111 | ~~**Flow Debugger outbound nodes: no Retry/Discard on a parked node, and no `?correlationId=` deep link from the node to the Site Calls / Notification report pages** *(Low)*~~ **RESOLVED 2026-09-06 (plan `docs/plans/2026-09-06-flow-debugger-followups.md`).** `FlowStep` now carries the row's `CorrelationId`; the detail panel deep-links to `/site-calls/report?correlationId=` / `/notifications/report?correlationId=` (both pages accept it through additive per-id query filters — `SiteCallQueryRequest.TrackedOperationIdFilter`, `NotificationOutboxQueryRequest.NotificationIdFilter` — pre-filter to the row and auto-open its detail), and a `Parked` node offers Retry / Discard in place through `IFlowDebugService.RetryOutboundAsync` / `DiscardOutboundAsync`, which reuse the report pages' relay, site-scope re-check and confirm wording, after which the page re-polls Replay until the node leaves Parked. Per-attempt request/response diff is still not shown (the lifecycle rows carry the error summary only). Found on the way: the prediction circuit deadlock (`4769e192`). | Plan 2026-09-06 "Out of scope"; `FlowStepDetail.razor` parked hint | The Site Calls page owns the retry semantics and its audit rows; duplicating the action on the debugger node would need the same Deployer gate + confirm flow. | First operator who reaches a parked node from the debugger and asks for the button. |
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@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ All 7 fix-now items landed via PLAN-04/05/06/07/08 (verified in review 08 round
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| 117 | ~~**Flow Debugger site trace pull: `FlowDebugRunner.WriteAndPollAsync` fetches ONE bounded page with a fixed `since`**~~ **RESOLVED 2026-09-09 (`9ee402bb`, arch-review 2026-09-09 MG-6; closed in this register 2026-10-21 — found stale by the 2026-10-21 system review).** `WriteAndPollAsync` now advances a `(SinceUtc, AfterEventId)` keyset cursor between polls and only treats a page as progress when the cursor moved, so a chatty run can no longer push a spawned run past the page end. Original description kept for traceability: *(Low)*. The write-and-poll loop asks the site for `FlowDebugRunner.PullTraceEventsMax` rows per poll, always `since` the run start, and the site serves `ORDER BY OccurredAtUtc ASC LIMIT` — so the page is the OLDEST rows in the window, never a continuation of the previous one. Step logs made that reachable: one traced run can now emit up to 201 `ScriptLog` rows, so a handful of chatty runs inside the window can fill the page and push a later spawned run's `ScriptRun` row past the end of it, at which point the loop never sees the awaited run and reports a false `NO_TRIGGER_WITHIN_WINDOW` for a run that did happen. Final review I1 raised the cap 500 -> 2 000 (the site's own ceiling, `SiteStreamGrpcServer.MaxTraceEventsPerPull`), which makes it ~10x harder but does not remove it. The real fix is to PAGE — advance `since` to the last-seen `OccurredAtUtc` between polls (keeping the already-known ids so nothing is double-counted) — or to exclude `ScriptLog` from the awaited-run poll entirely and pull the log rows once, after the run has settled. | Final review of `docs/plans/2026-09-09-flow-debugger-step-logs.md` (I1); `src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ManagementService/FlowDebug/FlowDebugRunner.cs` `WriteAndPollAsync` | 2 000 is the site's hard ceiling, so the headroom cannot be bought again with a bigger number; paging needs the poll loop to track a cursor and the awaited-run predicate to survive a partial view, which is more than the raise was worth at review time. | The first `NO_TRIGGER_WITHIN_WINDOW` reported for a run whose Replay of the same root DOES show the spawned `ScriptRun`. |
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| 118 | **Pre-existing bUnit flake: `CentralUI.Tests.Pages.NotificationReportDetailModalTests.CloseButton_DismissesModal` (~10 %)** *(Low)*. Fails intermittently with `UnknownEventHandlerIdException` — the test resolves the close button once and clicks it after a re-render has already retired that element's handler id. Not caused by the step-logs work: the file is untouched since `40944a0d`. The fix is a one-liner — re-`Find` the button immediately before the click (the pattern the other modal tests already use) rather than reusing an element captured earlier in the test. | Observed during the step-logs full-suite runs, 2026-09-09 | It is a test-only race with a known cause and a known fix; it was out of scope for a remediation pass whose rule was to touch only the files under review. | Next time `CentralUI.Tests` is worked on, or the first time the flake blocks a gate run. |
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| 68 | ~~**`deploy.sh` run from a git worktree silently rehomes every node's bind-mount data dir**~~ **RESOLVED 2026-08-15 (guard added in the same close-out).** The compose files' bind mounts are relative (`./site-a-node-a/data`), so a deploy from a worktree checkout mounts the worktree's copies — the rig keeps running and looks healthy, but its SQLite stores split from the main checkout's and everything written there is orphaned by the next deploy from main. Bit the rows-46–53 close-out live: the seeding agent's `rig-probe-1` deploy persisted into worktree-homed dirs and "vanished" after the orchestrator's redeploy (no tombstone, no product bug — LWW/tombstone forensics ruled out deletion; the row sat in `.claude/worktrees/…/docker/site-a-node-a/data/site-localdb.db` the whole time). Both `docker/deploy.sh` and `docker-env2/deploy.sh` now refuse to run from a `.claude/worktrees/` path (override: `SCADABRIDGE_ALLOW_WORKTREE_DEPLOY=1`). | Found during the rows-46–53 close-out | Closed 2026-08-15. | — |
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| 119 | **→ #36** **Port the QA/prod MES receiver scripts onto the reset-aware `WriteBatchAndWaitAsync` overload (Gitea #36)** *(Medium)*. Template scripts CvdReactor MesMoveIn (13) / MesMoveOut (14) / MesSampleData (36) and base MESReceiver MoveIn/MoveOut (15, 16, 25, 26, 37, 38) still reset `<X>CompleteFlag` with a plain write and rely on `Task.Delay(1000)`; QA carries a config-only `WaitAsync(false, 10 s)` patch on 13/14 (deployment record 110). Rewrite: `var hs = await rx.Attributes.WriteBatchAndWaitAsync(values, "<X>Flag", true, "<X>CompleteFlag", true, 25 s, "<X>CompleteFlag", false, 10 s); if (!hs.Matched) return new { WasSuccessful=false, ErrorText = hs.ResetFailed ? "Timeout waiting for <X>CompleteFlag to reset" : "Timeout waiting for <X> to complete", BatchID=0 };` and delete the delay. Requires the #36 build on the target central + sites first (the overload does not exist on older sites → deploy-gate compile failure, by design). | Gitea #36, design `2026-09-10-handshake-reset-echo-design.md` §8 | Repo-only scope was the user's decision for the #36 session; the script bodies live only in the QA/prod databases. | Next QA deployment of a build ≥ this change (write a deployment record; then prod). |
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| 120 | **→ #58** **Data-sourced SCALAR writes reach the OPC UA server as String Variants — every non-String node rejects them with BadTypeMismatch (0x80740000)** *(Medium)*. `InstanceActor.HandleSetDataAttribute` / `HandleWriteAttributeBatch` decode only List values before the DCL write ("Scalars are unchanged"), so the codec-encoded string (`"True"`, `"42.5"`) reaches `RealOpcUaClient.WriteValuesAsync`, which wraps it in `new Variant(value)` — a String variant sent to a Boolean/Double node. Found live 2026-09-10 running `docker/seed-handshake-demo.sh` against opc-plc `Motor.Running`/`Pump.Running`/`Motor.Speed` (`SetAttribute('Complete') failed: OPC UA write failed with status: 0x80740000`); the seed was retargeted onto the rig's only two writable String nodes. The MxGateway path is unaffected in practice: prod's Delmia/MES handshakes write the same strings through the gateway today. Fix candidates: (a) decode scalars by declared `DataType` in the InstanceActor before the DCL write — also changes what MxGateway receives, so it needs a gateway-side compatibility check; (b) adapter-local: `RealOpcUaClient` coerces to the node's DataType (it already resolves `DataTypeIds` in `EnrichVariableTypeInfoAsync`), leaving the MxGateway wire untouched — preferred. Pin with a `RealOpcUaClientArrayWriteTests`-style test for a Boolean scalar. | Found live 2026-09-10 during the #36 rig gate | Out of scope for #36 (handshake ordering); touches the production write path and needs the MxGateway compatibility question answered first. | Before any OPC UA-bound template relies on script writes to non-String nodes (none does today — until this gate the rig's script writes to OPC UA were static-only). |
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| 119 | **→ #36** **Port the QA/DEV MES receiver scripts onto the reset-aware `WriteBatchAndWaitAsync` overload (Gitea #36)** *(Medium)*. Template scripts CvdReactor MesMoveIn (13) / MesMoveOut (14) / MesSampleData (36) and base MESReceiver MoveIn/MoveOut (15, 16, 25, 26, 37, 38) still reset `<X>CompleteFlag` with a plain write and rely on `Task.Delay(1000)`; QA carries a config-only `WaitAsync(false, 10 s)` patch on 13/14 (deployment record 110). Rewrite: `var hs = await rx.Attributes.WriteBatchAndWaitAsync(values, "<X>Flag", true, "<X>CompleteFlag", true, 25 s, "<X>CompleteFlag", false, 10 s); if (!hs.Matched) return new { WasSuccessful=false, ErrorText = hs.ResetFailed ? "Timeout waiting for <X>CompleteFlag to reset" : "Timeout waiting for <X> to complete", BatchID=0 };` and delete the delay. Requires the #36 build on the target central + sites first (the overload does not exist on older sites → deploy-gate compile failure, by design). | Gitea #36, design `2026-09-10-handshake-reset-echo-design.md` §8 | Repo-only scope was the user's decision for the #36 session; the script bodies live only in the QA/DEV databases. | Next QA deployment of a build ≥ this change (write a deployment record; then DEV). |
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| 120 | **→ #58** **Data-sourced SCALAR writes reach the OPC UA server as String Variants — every non-String node rejects them with BadTypeMismatch (0x80740000)** *(Medium)*. `InstanceActor.HandleSetDataAttribute` / `HandleWriteAttributeBatch` decode only List values before the DCL write ("Scalars are unchanged"), so the codec-encoded string (`"True"`, `"42.5"`) reaches `RealOpcUaClient.WriteValuesAsync`, which wraps it in `new Variant(value)` — a String variant sent to a Boolean/Double node. Found live 2026-09-10 running `docker/seed-handshake-demo.sh` against opc-plc `Motor.Running`/`Pump.Running`/`Motor.Speed` (`SetAttribute('Complete') failed: OPC UA write failed with status: 0x80740000`); the seed was retargeted onto the rig's only two writable String nodes. The MxGateway path is unaffected in practice: DEV's (vd03) Delmia/MES handshakes write the same strings through the gateway today. Fix candidates: (a) decode scalars by declared `DataType` in the InstanceActor before the DCL write — also changes what MxGateway receives, so it needs a gateway-side compatibility check; (b) adapter-local: `RealOpcUaClient` coerces to the node's DataType (it already resolves `DataTypeIds` in `EnrichVariableTypeInfoAsync`), leaving the MxGateway wire untouched — preferred. Pin with a `RealOpcUaClientArrayWriteTests`-style test for a Boolean scalar. | Found live 2026-09-10 during the #36 rig gate | Out of scope for #36 (handshake ordering); touches the production write path and needs the MxGateway compatibility question answered first. | Before any OPC UA-bound template relies on script writes to non-String nodes (none does today — until this gate the rig's script writes to OPC UA were static-only). |
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| 121 | **→ #59** **No source-level `IsMesReportable` on native alarm source bindings** *(Low)*. `TemplateNativeAlarmSource` / `InstanceNativeAlarmSourceOverride` carry no per-alarm MES-relevance flag — "every condition under this binding is reportable" is not expressible, only the 900–999 severity-band convention. | `docs/plans/2026-09-11-mes-reportable-alarm-flag-design.md` | Native alarms have no per-alarm config row, and the design chose not to invent one for this slice. | A native-source machine needs per-alarm MES relevance beyond the severity band. |
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| 122 | **→ #60** **`IsMesReportable` does not ride the wire** *(Low)*. `AlarmStateUpdate` (vendored proto) and `DebugAlarmStateDto` have no `IsMesReportable` field, so central-side surfaces (Debug View live stream, Alarm Summary) always see `false` even though the site-side snapshot stamps the real value. Adding it is additive-only: `AlarmStateUpdate` field 25, `DebugAlarmStateDto` field 20, via a manual `regen-proto.sh` toggle-build-copy-untoggle. | `docs/plans/2026-09-11-mes-reportable-alarm-flag-design.md` | No consumer needed it in this slice — the flag exists to serve `Alarms.MesReportableAsync()` for scripts, not a central UI surface. | Operators ask to see the MES-reportable flag live on Debug View / Alarm Summary. |
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| 123 | **→ #61** **Rail nav scroll pane (`.rail-scroll` + the `#theme-rail > .side-rail { height: 100% }` fill rule) lives in app-local `site.css`/`NavMenu.razor`, not the `ZB.MOM.WW.Theme` kit** *(Low)*. Every other kit consumer (OtOpcUa, MxGateway, HistorianGateway, ignitionoee) has the same unbounded-nav-pushes-the-footer-off-screen shape and would need the identical fix copy-pasted. | `docs/plans/2026-09-14-pending-updates-design.md` §3.5 | Scoped to ScadaBridge for this change; upstreaming into the shared kit is a separate cross-repo release, not a one-app CSS tweak. | A second kit consumer hits the same long-nav clipping and copies the fix instead of consuming it from the kit. |
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@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ All 7 fix-now items landed via PLAN-04/05/06/07/08 (verified in review 08 round
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| 132 | **→ #68** **Site compile-cache eviction counter is not exported as a Meter** *(Low)*. `SiteScriptCompileCache` counts evictions and logs a rate-limited Warning (review 01/SR-M2) but the counter is not a `System.Diagnostics.Metrics` instrument, and `ZbTelemetryOptions.Meters` is an allowlist (`SiteServiceRegistration.ObservedMeters`), so exporting it also needs the Host allowlist entry. | 2026-10-21 system review (`docs/plans/2026-10-21-system-review-remediation.md`) (lane B) | The Warning log already surfaces thrash; a Meter is observability polish. | Wanting to alert on compile-cache thrash from Prometheus. |
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| 133 | **→ #69** **Dedicated health field for site audit rejected rows** *(Low)*. Permanent push rejections (`IngestAck.rejected_event_ids`) are counted only by the `scadabridge.site.audit.rejected_rows` counter and the `Rejected` `ForwardState`; there is no `SiteHealthReport` field/dashboard badge. | 2026-10-21 system review (`docs/plans/2026-10-21-system-review-remediation.md`) (lane H) | Rejections only come from row-intrinsic SQL errors and should be near-zero; the counter is sufficient for now. | The first non-zero `rejected_rows` seen in production, or an operator asking for it on the Health dashboard. |
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| 134 | **An oversize `AuditLog` row (larger than the gRPC message cap) wedges both push and pull** *(Low, accepted)*. A single row bigger than the 4 MB gRPC cap cannot be shipped by either the telemetry push or the reconciliation pull, so the queue head stalls. Unreachable at the default caps (8 KB / 64 KB payload caps, `InboundMaxBytes` 1 MiB) — it needs an operator to raise caps past the transport limit. | 2026-10-21 system review (`docs/plans/2026-10-21-system-review-remediation.md`) (lane H) | Defaults keep every row far below the limit; guarding means a skip/park state for unshippable rows. | Any deployment that raises `InboundMaxBytes` or the payload caps toward 4 MB. |
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| 135 | **→ #70** **Config-audit single-column indexes are possibly redundant** *(Low)*. `ReviewRemediationIndexes` added composite `AuditLogEntries` indexes `(EntityType, Timestamp DESC)`, `(User, Timestamp DESC)` and `(Timestamp DESC, Id DESC)`; the older single-column indexes on timestamp/user/entity type may now be dead weight on a write-heavy table. | 2026-10-21 system review (`docs/plans/2026-10-21-system-review-remediation.md`) (lane P / O) | Dropping needs a measured before/after on a populated table, not an assumption. | Measure index usage (`sys.dm_db_index_usage_stats`) after the migration has run in QA/prod for a few weeks, then drop the unused ones. |
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| 135 | **→ #70** **Config-audit single-column indexes are possibly redundant** *(Low)*. `ReviewRemediationIndexes` added composite `AuditLogEntries` indexes `(EntityType, Timestamp DESC)`, `(User, Timestamp DESC)` and `(Timestamp DESC, Id DESC)`; the older single-column indexes on timestamp/user/entity type may now be dead weight on a write-heavy table. | 2026-10-21 system review (`docs/plans/2026-10-21-system-review-remediation.md`) (lane P / O) | Dropping needs a measured before/after on a populated table, not an assumption. | Measure index usage (`sys.dm_db_index_usage_stats`) after the migration has run in QA/DEV for a few weeks, then drop the unused ones. |
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## Resolved (verified against the code 2026-07-10)
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Rows removed from the Deferred table above once confirmed shipped. Kept here for traceability.
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user