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fix(security): close Theme 7 — 8 secrets / redaction / append-only findings

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Security-sensitive batch, handled main-thread for careful judgment on
secret-leak and pepper-bypass paths.

Secret leak / pepper bypass:
- CD-016 (pepper bypass): InboundApiRepository's GetApiKeyByValueAsync no
  longer hashes the candidate with the unpeppered ApiKeyHasher.Default —
  ctor takes a lazy Func<IApiKeyHasher> accessor (lazy so test composition
  roots without a pepper still bring up the repository), and the DI
  registration wires sp.GetService<IApiKeyHasher>() so the production
  peppered hasher matches the stored KeyHash. Regression test asserts
  positive (peppered roundtrip) AND negative (Default hasher misses the
  same key — proving the lookup uses the injected hasher).
- MgmtSvc-020 (SMTP credential leak): UpdateSmtpConfig/ListSmtpConfigs
  now project through SmtpConfigPublicShape so the response payload and
  audit-row afterState never carry the Credentials field — only a
  HasCredentials bool. The SMTP password / OAuth2 client secret no
  longer leaves the Admin-only UpdateSmtpConfig boundary the caller
  already supplied it to.

Redaction:
- AuditLog-008 (test-fixture under-redact): new
  SafeDefaultAuditPayloadFilter (stateless singleton) does HTTP header
  redaction for the always-sensitive defaults (Authorization, X-Api-Key,
  Cookie, Set-Cookie). FallbackAuditWriter, CentralAuditWriter, and
  AuditLogIngestActor (both ingest paths) default to it instead of null
  — composition roots that bypass AddAuditLog can no longer write
  unredacted auth headers to the audit store.
- NotifService-025 (over-mask): CredentialRedactor.Scrub now only masks
  the last colon-separated component (password / clientSecret) AND only
  if it's >= 12 chars (typical password heuristic). Short user names
  like "root" no longer become global redaction tokens that eat unrelated
  diagnostic text. The full packed string is always masked regardless of
  length. 3 new negative tests pin the no-over-mask contract.

Audit-row correctness / fail-loud:
- InboundAPI-025: Program.cs UseWhen predicate now excludes /api/audit,
  /api/management, /api/centralui, /api/script-analysis AND requires POST
  — the AuditWriteMiddleware no longer emits spurious ApiInbound rows
  for audit-log query/export endpoints (write-on-read recursion broken).
- ESG-021: ApplyAuth now logs Warning (not silent) on empty
  AuthConfiguration for apikey/basic, unknown AuthType, and malformed
  Basic config. AuthConfiguration value NEVER logged. AuthType=none
  remains silent (documented unauthenticated sentinel).
- Security-021: AddSecurity now logs a startup Warning when
  RequireHttpsCookie=false — an HTTP-only deployment that previously
  transmitted the cookie-embedded JWT silently in cleartext is now
  audible in the log.

Defensive:
- CD-021: SwitchOutPartitionAsync's monthBoundary format string now
  yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.fffffff (datetime2(7) precision) so a future
  sub-second / non-midnight boundary doesn't silently round to the
  wrong partition.

Plus reconciled stale per-module Open-findings counters that had drifted
from earlier sessions (AuditLog, CD, ESG, IAPI, MgmtSvc, NotifService,
Security).

Build clean; all affected test projects green (Host 208, ConfigDB 242,
ESG 69, IAPI 151, MgmtSvc 100, NotifService 55, Security 85, AuditLog
247/248 — 1 pre-existing date-sensitive integration test flake on
PartitionPurgeTests, unrelated). README regenerated: 46 open (was 54).
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-05-28 08:04:10 -04:00
parent 55f46e7c92
commit 46cb6965ac
22 changed files with 500 additions and 77 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
code-reviews/AuditLog/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 2 |
| Open findings | 1 |
## Summary
@@ -411,9 +411,22 @@ resolution instead.
|--|--|
| Severity | Low |
| Category | Security |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.AuditLog/Site/FallbackAuditWriter.cs:51-77`, `src/ScadaLink.AuditLog/Central/CentralAuditWriter.cs:77-104`, `src/ScadaLink.AuditLog/Central/AuditLogIngestActor.cs:125,155` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** New `SafeDefaultAuditPayloadFilter` in
`src/ScadaLink.AuditLog/Payload/` — a stateless singleton that performs HTTP
header redaction for the hard-coded sensitive defaults (Authorization,
X-Api-Key, Cookie, Set-Cookie). The three writer-chain sites
(`FallbackAuditWriter`, `CentralAuditWriter`, `AuditLogIngestActor` —
both the audit-only and cached-telemetry paths) now default to
`SafeDefaultAuditPayloadFilter.Instance` instead of null when no filter is
injected, so a test fixture (or any composition root that bypasses
`AddAuditLog`) never persists those headers verbatim. The real
`DefaultAuditPayloadFilter` (truncation + body / SQL-param redaction +
per-target overrides) is wired by `AddAuditLog` and takes precedence in
production.
**Description**
`FallbackAuditWriter`, `CentralAuditWriter`, and `AuditLogIngestActor` all accept an
code-reviews/ConfigurationDatabase/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 3 |
| Open findings | 1 |
## Summary
@@ -946,9 +946,22 @@ throws and exactly one row lands.
|--|--|
| Severity | Medium |
| Category | Security |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.ConfigurationDatabase/Repositories/InboundApiRepository.cs:35-39` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** Took option (a) — `InboundApiRepository` ctor now
accepts `Func<IApiKeyHasher>? hasherAccessor = null` (deferred resolution to
sidestep startup-time pepper-validation in test composition roots that don't
configure one). `GetApiKeyByValueAsync` calls `_hasherAccessor()` so the
hash matches the production peppered digest. `AddConfigurationDatabase`
registers the repository with a factory wiring
`() => sp.GetService<IApiKeyHasher>() ?? ApiKeyHasher.Default` — the
peppered hasher is used when available, falling back to Default only when
none is registered (legacy / test composition). Regression test
`CD016_GetApiKeyByValue_UsesInjectedPepperedHasher_NotDefault` asserts
positively (peppered roundtrip) and negatively (Default hasher misses the
key entirely, proving the lookup uses the injected hasher).
**Description**
`GetApiKeyByValueAsync` resolves an API key by its presented plaintext value by hashing
@@ -1191,9 +1204,20 @@ converter on the column) so the defence at the read site is no longer required.
|--|--|
| Severity | Low |
| Category | Security |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.ConfigurationDatabase/Repositories/AuditLogRepository.cs:192-338` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** Took the targeted (1) part of the recommendation —
the `monthBoundary` format string is now `"yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.fffffff"`
matching `datetime2(7)` precision, so a future sub-second or non-midnight
boundary won't silently round to the wrong partition. The staging table name
is still interpolated (T-SQL DDL identifiers can't be parameterised) but
remains internally constructed as `$"AuditLog_Staging_{Guid.NewGuid():N}"`
so SQL injection is structurally impossible. The larger
`sp_executesql`-with-typed-parameter migration was scoped to a future
follow-up since the current shape is fully controlled and the precision-
mismatch hazard was the only practical concern.
**Description**
`SwitchOutPartitionAsync` builds two large SQL batches via interpolated strings
code-reviews/ExternalSystemGateway/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 4 |
| Open findings | 1 |
## Summary
@@ -1180,9 +1180,20 @@ that happens to encode a number (already correctly returns `string`).
|--|--|
| Severity | Low |
| Category | Security |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.ExternalSystemGateway/ExternalSystemClient.cs:385-415` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** `ApplyAuth` is now an instance method that uses
the existing `_logger`. Three previously-silent fail-open paths now emit a
`LogWarning` so an operator debugging a recurring 401 sees the cause inside
ScadaLink: (1) empty `AuthConfiguration` for `AuthType=apikey`/`basic`,
(2) unknown `AuthType` (anything except `apikey`/`basic`/`none`),
(3) malformed Basic config (no `:` separator). The `AuthConfiguration`
value is NEVER included in the log message. `AuthType="none"` remains
silent — it's the documented sentinel for intentionally-unauthenticated
systems. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged: the request still goes out
(never block on auth-config issues), the failure mode is just now visible.
**Description**
`ApplyAuth` has three fail-open paths that all result in an HTTP request being sent
code-reviews/InboundAPI/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 2 |
| Open findings | 1 |
## Summary
@@ -1233,9 +1233,21 @@ immediate change required; this is a watch-list item.
|--|--|
| Severity | Medium |
| Category | Correctness & logic bugs |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.Host/Program.cs:183-185`; consumers: `src/ScadaLink.ManagementService/AuditEndpoints.cs:93-94`; emitter: `src/ScadaLink.InboundAPI/Middleware/AuditWriteMiddleware.cs:175-252` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** Took the defensive path-exclusion in
`Program.cs` (Option 1 from the recommendation). The `UseWhen` predicate
now excludes the four known `/api/*` sub-trees that belong to other modules
(`/api/audit`, `/api/management`, `/api/centralui`, `/api/script-analysis`)
AND additionally requires `POST` — the inbound API method route is the
only POST under `/api/`, so future GET-y additions under any of those
sub-trees still survive the gate. The endpoint-filter refactor option
(move the audit emission into an `IEndpointFilter` co-located with
`MapInboundAPI`) was rejected for batch scope — touches more test fixtures
and the path-predicate is fragile only against future POST additions on
the excluded prefixes, which would be noisy in code review.
**Description**
`Program.cs` wires the audit middleware as
code-reviews/ManagementService/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 3 (1 Deferred — see ManagementService-012) |
| Open findings | 1 (1 Deferred — see ManagementService-012) |
## Summary
@@ -927,9 +927,20 @@ mixed-set intersected.
|--|--|
| Severity | Medium |
| Category | Security |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.ManagementService/ManagementActor.cs:1136`–`:1153` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** Added `SmtpConfigPublicShape` projection that
returns every non-secret field plus a `HasCredentials` bool — never the
`Credentials` field itself. Both `HandleListSmtpConfigs` (broader read
access via OperationalAuditRoles) and `HandleUpdateSmtpConfig` (Admin-only
write) now project through it. The audit-row `afterState` and the response
payload both carry the credential-free shape, so the SMTP password / OAuth2
client secret never leaves the `UpdateSmtpConfig` boundary that the caller
already supplied them to. ManagementService 100/100 tests still pass.
Follow-up to tag `SmtpConfiguration.Credentials` with `[JsonIgnore]` in
Commons remains useful belt-and-braces but is out of scope here.
**Description**
`HandleUpdateSmtpConfig` reads the existing `SmtpConfiguration` entity, applies the
code-reviews/NotificationService/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 5 |
| Open findings | 1 |
## Summary
@@ -813,9 +813,23 @@ After NS-019 is decided:
|--|--|
| Severity | Low |
| Category | Correctness & logic bugs |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.NotificationService/CredentialRedactor.cs:34-48` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** Tightened the policy per the recommendation —
only the LAST colon-separated component (password in Basic / clientSecret
in OAuth2) is considered a secret, AND only when it's plausibly secret-shaped
(>= `MinSecretLength` = 12 chars). The full packed string is always masked
regardless of length (its exact appearance can only come from the
credential itself). A short user name like `root` (4 chars) or a sender
alias like `smtp` (4 chars) no longer becomes a global redaction token
that eats unrelated diagnostic text. 3 new negative tests added
(`Scrub_ShortUserName_IsNotMaskedOutsidePackedString`,
`Scrub_TenantId_IsNotMaskedOutsidePackedString`,
`Scrub_FullPackedCredential_IsAlwaysMaskedRegardlessOfLength`); 1
existing test bumped its inline password length from 10→16 chars to stay
above the new threshold.
**Description**
```csharp
code-reviews/README.md
+12 -20
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@@ -41,31 +41,31 @@ module file and counted in **Total**.
|----------|---------------|
| Critical | 0 |
| High | 0 |
| Medium | 19 |
| Low | 35 |
| **Total** | **54** |
| Medium | 16 |
| Low | 30 |
| **Total** | **46** |
## Module Status
| Module | Last reviewed | Commit | Open (C/H/M/L) | Open | Total |
|--------|---------------|--------|----------------|------|-------|
| [AuditLog](AuditLog/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/1 | 2 | 11 |
| [AuditLog](AuditLog/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/0 | 1 | 11 |
| [CLI](CLI/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/2 | 2 | 23 |
| [CentralUI](CentralUI/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/3 | 3 | 33 |
| [ClusterInfrastructure](ClusterInfrastructure/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/3 | 3 | 14 |
| [Commons](Commons/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/4 | 4 | 23 |
| [Communication](Communication/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/1 | 1 | 22 |
| [ConfigurationDatabase](ConfigurationDatabase/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/2 | 3 | 24 |
| [ConfigurationDatabase](ConfigurationDatabase/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/1 | 1 | 24 |
| [DataConnectionLayer](DataConnectionLayer/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/0 | 0 | 22 |
| [DeploymentManager](DeploymentManager/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/3 | 3 | 24 |
| [ExternalSystemGateway](ExternalSystemGateway/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/1 | 2 | 23 |
| [ExternalSystemGateway](ExternalSystemGateway/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/0 | 1 | 23 |
| [HealthMonitoring](HealthMonitoring/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/2 | 2 | 23 |
| [Host](Host/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/3 | 4 | 22 |
| [InboundAPI](InboundAPI/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/1 | 2 | 25 |
| [ManagementService](ManagementService/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/2/0 | 2 | 23 |
| [InboundAPI](InboundAPI/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/1 | 1 | 25 |
| [ManagementService](ManagementService/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/0 | 1 | 23 |
| [NotificationOutbox](NotificationOutbox/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/1 | 1 | 10 |
| [NotificationService](NotificationService/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/1 | 2 | 25 |
| [Security](Security/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/1 | 1 | 21 |
| [NotificationService](NotificationService/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/1/0 | 1 | 25 |
| [Security](Security/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/0 | 0 | 21 |
| [SiteCallAudit](SiteCallAudit/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/2/1 | 3 | 6 |
| [SiteEventLogging](SiteEventLogging/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/0/2 | 2 | 23 |
| [SiteRuntime](SiteRuntime/findings.md) | 2026-05-28 | `1eb6e97` | 0/0/2/0 | 2 | 26 |
@@ -88,16 +88,13 @@ _None open._
_None open._
### Medium (19)
### Medium (16)
| ID | Module | Title |
|----|--------|-------|
| AuditLog-001 | [AuditLog](AuditLog/findings.md) | Combined-telemetry transport is plumbed end-to-end but never invoked in production |
| ConfigurationDatabase-016 | [ConfigurationDatabase](ConfigurationDatabase/findings.md) | `InboundApiRepository.GetApiKeyByValueAsync` hashes the candidate with the unpeppered `ApiKeyHasher.Default` |
| ExternalSystemGateway-020 | [ExternalSystemGateway](ExternalSystemGateway/findings.md) | `JsonElementToParameterValue` silently downcasts non-Int64 JSON numbers to `double`, losing precision for `decimal` SQL parameters on retry |
| Host-016 | [Host](Host/findings.md) | Site `CentralContactPoints` second entry targets the site's own remoting port |
| InboundAPI-025 | [InboundAPI](InboundAPI/findings.md) | `AuditWriteMiddleware` runs against the entire `/api/*` branch — emits spurious `ApiInbound` audit rows for `/api/audit/query` and `/api/audit/export` |
| ManagementService-020 | [ManagementService](ManagementService/findings.md) | UpdateSmtpConfig returns and audits the SMTP Credentials field verbatim |
| ManagementService-021 | [ManagementService](ManagementService/findings.md) | Transport bundle handlers have zero test coverage |
| NotificationService-024 | [NotificationService](NotificationService/findings.md) | No test affirms the central-only invariant; the orphaned-path tests give a false coverage signal |
| SiteCallAudit-001 | [SiteCallAudit](SiteCallAudit/findings.md) | SupervisorStrategy override is dead code; XML claims Resume that is not enforced |
@@ -112,11 +109,10 @@ _None open._
| TemplateEngine-020 | [TemplateEngine](TemplateEngine/findings.md) | `Create*` audit entries are written with `EntityId = "0"` before `SaveChangesAsync` populates the real key |
| Transport-010 | [Transport](Transport/findings.md) | Critical Overwrite + cross-cutting paths uncovered by tests |
### Low (35)
### Low (30)
| ID | Module | Title |
|----|--------|-------|
| AuditLog-008 | [AuditLog](AuditLog/findings.md) | Test composition roots that omit `IAuditPayloadFilter` silently pass UNREDACTED payloads through the writer chain |
| CLI-020 | [CLI](CLI/findings.md) | `bundle export` success-envelope parse is unguarded |
| CLI-022 | [CLI](CLI/findings.md) | `CommandTreeTests` excludes the two new command groups |
| CentralUI-029 | [CentralUI](CentralUI/findings.md) | `ConfigurationAuditLog` uses `JS.InvokeAsync<int>("eval", ...)` instead of a dedicated JS module |
@@ -130,12 +126,10 @@ _None open._
| Commons-020 | [Commons](Commons/findings.md) | Transport types and new Audit-message types have no unit tests in `ScadaLink.Commons.Tests` |
| Commons-023 | [Commons](Commons/findings.md) | Trailing-optional `SourceNode` on positional records mixes additive evolution patterns |
| Communication-020 | [Communication](Communication/findings.md) | `SiteAddressCacheLoaded` carries mutable `Dictionary`/`List` types |
| ConfigurationDatabase-021 | [ConfigurationDatabase](ConfigurationDatabase/findings.md) | `SwitchOutPartitionAsync` interpolates `monthBoundary` / staging table name into raw SQL |
| ConfigurationDatabase-024 | [ConfigurationDatabase](ConfigurationDatabase/findings.md) | Missing test coverage for SPLIT-RANGE failure-continuation and production-shape rowversion delete |
| DeploymentManager-021 | [DeploymentManager](DeploymentManager/findings.md) | `ResolveSiteIdentifierAsync` silently substitutes the DB id when the site row is missing |
| DeploymentManager-022 | [DeploymentManager](DeploymentManager/findings.md) | `Pending` and `InProgress` are written back-to-back with no intervening work |
| DeploymentManager-024 | [DeploymentManager](DeploymentManager/findings.md) | Test probe actors hold mutable static state across tests |
| ExternalSystemGateway-021 | [ExternalSystemGateway](ExternalSystemGateway/findings.md) | `ApplyAuth` silently sends an unauthenticated request on unknown `AuthType`, empty `AuthConfiguration`, or malformed Basic config |
| HealthMonitoring-021 | [HealthMonitoring](HealthMonitoring/findings.md) | `CentralSiteId = "central"` reserved constant silently collides with a real site named "central" |
| HealthMonitoring-022 | [HealthMonitoring](HealthMonitoring/findings.md) | `CentralHealthReportLoopTests` uses real-time `PeriodicTimer` + `Task.Delay`; flake-prone on slow CI |
| Host-018 | [Host](Host/findings.md) | Shipped per-role configs omit `NodeOptions.NodeName`, leaving `SourceNode` null |
@@ -143,8 +137,6 @@ _None open._
| Host-021 | [Host](Host/findings.md) | Microsoft `Logging:LogLevel` section in `appsettings.json` is dead config under Serilog |
| InboundAPI-023 | [InboundAPI](InboundAPI/findings.md) | `EndpointExtensions.HandleInboundApiRequest` composition wiring has no test coverage |
| NotificationOutbox-008 | [NotificationOutbox](NotificationOutbox/findings.md) | `FallbackMaxRetries` / `FallbackRetryDelay` path is unreachable in production AND untested |
| NotificationService-025 | [NotificationService](NotificationService/findings.md) | `CredentialRedactor` over-masks: any 4-character credential component is masked anywhere it appears, including unrelated log text |
| Security-021 | [Security](Security/findings.md) | `RequireHttpsCookie=false` dev opt-out has no warning path — an HTTP production deployment silently transmits the JWT bearer credential in cleartext |
| SiteCallAudit-006 | [SiteCallAudit](SiteCallAudit/findings.md) | Stuck-only paging test does not exercise the multi-page boundary with an interleaved non-stuck row at the cursor |
| SiteEventLogging-018 | [SiteEventLogging](SiteEventLogging/findings.md) | `FailedWriteCount` is exposed but never consumed by Health Monitoring |
| SiteEventLogging-023 | [SiteEventLogging](SiteEventLogging/findings.md) | Concurrent-stress test uses a non-volatile `stop` flag |
code-reviews/Security/findings.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
| Last reviewed | 2026-05-28 |
| Reviewer | claude-agent |
| Commit reviewed | `1eb6e97` |
| Open findings | 1 (Security-021); 1 deferred (Security-008) |
| Open findings | 0 (1 deferred — Security-008) |
## Summary
@@ -971,9 +971,21 @@ every required `SecurityOptions` field is enforced at startup, not at first use.
|--|--|
| Severity | Low |
| Category | Security |
| Status | Open |
| Status | Resolved |
| Location | `src/ScadaLink.Security/SecurityOptions.cs:100-108`; `src/ScadaLink.Security/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:54-59` |
**Resolution (2026-05-28):** Added `ILoggerFactory` to the cookie-options
`Configure` callback in `AddSecurity` so an explicit `RequireHttpsCookie=false`
opt-out now emits a startup `LogWarning` ("auth cookie SecurePolicy is
SameAsRequest. The cookie-embedded JWT will be transmitted in cleartext
over plain HTTP. This setting is intended for local dev only — set
SecurityOptions:RequireHttpsCookie=true in production."). Default is still
`true`, so production deployments unchanged. The "fail startup when
RequireHttpsCookie=false AND ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Production" hard-stop
option was not implemented (the dev Docker cluster intentionally runs with
the flag false, and the env-var name varies across deploy mechanisms);
the warning is the right ergonomic floor.
**Description**
The Security-002 fix added `RequireHttpsCookie` (default `true`) so the auth cookie's