feat(grpc): PSK-authenticate the site gRPC control plane; drop the vestigial management receptionist registration
Phase 0 of the ClusterClient→gRPC migration
(docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md). Standalone hardening: it
closes a gap that exists today and is a precondition for moving command/control
onto gRPC in later phases.
T0.1 — delete the ManagementActor ClusterClientReceptionist registration.
It was built for an out-of-cluster CLI that was never written: the shipped CLI
speaks HTTP Basic to /management, which asks the actor in-process through
ManagementActorHolder. Nothing in the repo ever sent to /user/management. The
actor still runs there; only the cross-boundary advertisement is gone. Six
documents claimed the CLI used ClusterClient — including the CLI's own README
"Architecture Notes" — and are corrected here rather than left to rot.
T0.2 — record, do not port, the dead integration-routing path.
IntegrationCallRequest is unwired at BOTH ends: RouteIntegrationCallAsync has
zero callers anywhere, and RegisterLocalHandler(Integration, …) appears only in
a test, so production always answers "Integration handler not available". It is
excluded from the gRPC contract (28 of 29 commands migrate) rather than
enshrined on an additive-only wire format, and deleting it during a
transport migration would mix a behavioural change into a change whose whole
value is that behaviour is identical. See
docs/known-issues/2026-07-22-integration-call-routing-is-dead-code.md.
T0.3 — preshared-key authentication on SiteStreamService.
The service shipped with no auth at all: plaintext h2c, no interceptor, so
anything that could reach a site node's :8083 could open a live data stream or
read audit rows back via PullAuditEvents/PullSiteCalls. ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor
now gates /sitestream.SiteStreamService/ — modeled on LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor
(constant-time compare, fail-closed, PermissionDenied) but gating a SET of
service prefixes so phases 1A/1B add services rather than interceptors. LocalDb
sync keeps its own separate key: it authenticates the pair partner, not central,
and collapsing the two would make a site's central-facing key also admit writes
into its database.
Keys are per site (SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>), never fleet-wide, so a compromised
site yields only its own. Central attaches them through ControlPlaneCredentials,
which binds CallCredentials to the channel — covering unary and streaming
uniformly, and letting the key resolve asynchronously, which a client
interceptor could not do without blocking. All three central→site channel
creation sites go through it (SiteStreamGrpcClient and both audit pull invokers);
the pull invokers' channel caches are re-keyed by (site, endpoint) because
credentials are per-site and bound to the channel.
Two decisions beyond the plan:
* StartupValidator now requires GrpcPsk on Site nodes. The plan specified only
the runtime gate, but fail-closed with no boot check produces a node that
joins, answers heartbeats and reports healthy while refusing every stream,
audit pull and telemetry ingest — silent and total. Same reasoning as the
existing inbound API-key pepper rule.
* Added Communication:SitePsks as a central-side key map. The plan assumed
central would read the store, seeded via a dev KEK; the docker rig
deliberately boots with no master key, so store-only resolution would leave
it unable to dial its own sites. The store stays primary — it is the only
source that can serve a site added at runtime — with the map covering
key-less hosts and one-off pins. Neither source falling back to
"unauthenticated" is the invariant.
T0.4 — dev keys on both rigs and tests.
34 tests. The seven that matter most exercise a real in-process gRPC stack over
TestServer: the unit tests on either side of the wire would both stay green if
the halves disagreed, and gRPC refuses call credentials on a plaintext channel
by default — the UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials opt-in is only provable
by making a real call. They confirm correct key passes on unary AND streaming,
wrong key and no-credentials both get PermissionDenied, and an unresolvable key
fails the call with nothing reaching the service.
OPERATIONAL: a site node upgraded to this build without a key will not boot.
That includes the gitignored deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -41,6 +41,54 @@ public class CommunicationOptions
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/// </summary>
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public List<string> CentralContactPoints { get; set; } = new();
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/// <summary>
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/// Preshared key authenticating this node's gRPC control plane — the site↔central
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/// boundary. On a site node this is the key its inbound gate
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/// (<c>ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor</c>) expects on every <c>SiteStreamService</c> call, and
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/// which central must present; central resolves the matching value per site from its own
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/// secret store under the name <c>SB-GRPC-PSK-{siteId}</c>.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// In production this is supplied as <c>${secret:SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>}</c> and expanded
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/// out of the secrets store before the host is built, so the plaintext never sits in
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/// appsettings. Development rigs set a literal, mirroring the LocalDb replication key.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Empty means closed, not open.</b> With no key set the interceptor rejects every gated
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/// call. This is not optional configuration: a node that ships without a key serves no
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/// streams and no audit pulls.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// Distinct from <c>LocalDb:Replication:ApiKey</c>, which authenticates the pair partner for
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/// database replication over the same listener. The two are never shared.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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public string GrpcPsk { get; set; } = "";
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/// <summary>
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/// Central-side per-site gRPC preshared keys, keyed by site identifier — the mirror image
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/// of <see cref="GrpcPsk"/>, which is the single key a site node expects on its own inbound
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/// gate. An entry here takes precedence over the secret store for that site.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Why both a config map and a secret store.</b> The store is the primary source and the
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/// only one that works for the real case: sites are added at runtime from the Central UI, so
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/// their keys cannot be enumerated in configuration at boot, and <c>SitePskProvider</c>
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/// resolves <c>SB-GRPC-PSK-{siteId}</c> on demand. This map covers the cases the store
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/// cannot or should not: a development rig that runs with no master key and injects every
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/// credential as an environment override, and an operator pinning one site's key without
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/// touching the store. Values may themselves be <c>${secret:…}</c> references, since a map
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/// declared in configuration IS enumerable at boot.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// Absence is not a fallback to "unauthenticated" in either source — a site with no key in
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/// the map and none in the store cannot be dialed at all.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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public Dictionary<string, string> SitePsks { get; set; } = new();
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/// <summary>gRPC keepalive ping interval for streaming connections.</summary>
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public TimeSpan GrpcKeepAlivePingDelay { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15);
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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
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using Grpc.Core;
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using Grpc.Net.Client;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
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/// <summary>
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/// Resolves the preshared key that authenticates gRPC control-plane traffic for one site
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/// relationship. Central holds one key per site; each site holds only its own.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Why per-site rather than one fleet-wide key.</b> A compromised site yields only its own
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/// key, never another site's. A single shared key would be simpler to seed and strictly worse
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/// on blast radius, which is why it was rejected in the design.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Fail-closed.</b> Implementations throw when the key cannot be resolved. They must never
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/// fall back to "no key means no authentication" — that is the failure mode this whole
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/// mechanism exists to remove, and it would silently disable auth on exactly the default
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/// configuration. A dial that cannot be authenticated does not happen.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// The interface lives in Communication (not Host) because both sides need it: central's
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/// site-dialing clients live here and in AuditLog, while the implementation over
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/// <c>ISecretResolver</c> lives in Host, which owns the secrets container.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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public interface ISitePskProvider
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Resolves the preshared key for <paramref name="siteId"/>, caching the result.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="siteId">Site identifier, as used in the <c>Site.SiteIdentifier</c> column.</param>
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/// <param name="ct">Cancellation token.</param>
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/// <returns>The preshared key. Never null or empty.</returns>
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/// <exception cref="InvalidOperationException">
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/// The key is not configured, not resolvable, or empty — the fail-closed path.
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/// </exception>
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ValueTask<string> GetAsync(string siteId, CancellationToken ct);
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/// <summary>
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/// Drops any cached key for <paramref name="siteId"/>, so the next
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/// <see cref="GetAsync"/> re-reads the store. Called when a site is removed, and after a
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/// key rotation.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="siteId">Site identifier whose cached key should be discarded.</param>
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void Invalidate(string siteId);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Builds the call credentials that carry a site's preshared key (and the site's own identity)
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/// on every gRPC call central makes to that site — and, from Phase 1A, on the calls a site makes
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/// to central.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Why <see cref="CallCredentials.FromInterceptor(AsyncAuthInterceptor)"/> rather than a
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/// client <c>Interceptor</c>.</b> The key is resolved asynchronously from the secrets store, and
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/// this is the one extension point in gRPC that is async by design. A client interceptor would
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/// have to block on the resolve inside a synchronous <c>AsyncServerStreamingCall</c> path.
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/// Credentials also apply uniformly to unary and streaming calls, so no call site can forget one.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// <b>Why <c>UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials</c>.</b> gRPC refuses to attach call
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/// credentials to a plaintext channel by default, precisely because a bearer token on h2c is
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/// readable and replayable by anyone on the path. That is a real and accepted limitation here:
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/// these listeners are h2c today and the boundary assumes a trusted network. The PSK raises the
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/// bar from "anyone who can reach the port" to "anyone who can read the traffic"; TLS on these
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/// listeners is the follow-on hardening and requires no change to this code.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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public static class ControlPlaneCredentials
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Metadata header naming the site a call belongs to. Central needs it to pick which
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/// per-site key to verify against; a site's own inbound gate ignores it (a site has exactly
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/// one key). Required by central's interceptor from Phase 1A.
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/// </summary>
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public const string SiteHeader = "x-scadabridge-site";
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/// <summary>The bearer metadata header. Lowercase — gRPC lowercases header keys on the wire.</summary>
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public const string AuthorizationHeader = "authorization";
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/// <summary>
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/// Creates call credentials that attach <c>authorization: Bearer <psk></c> and
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/// <c>x-scadabridge-site: <siteId></c> to every call.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="provider">Resolves the site's preshared key.</param>
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/// <param name="siteId">The site this channel talks to (or, site-side, this site's own id).</param>
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/// <returns>Call credentials for a channel bound to that site.</returns>
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public static CallCredentials ForSite(ISitePskProvider provider, string siteId)
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{
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ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(provider);
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ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(siteId);
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return CallCredentials.FromInterceptor(async (context, metadata) =>
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{
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// A throw here fails the call, which is the point: an unauthenticated dial must
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// not happen. Callers classify the resulting fault the same way they classify any
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// other — the pull clients degrade to an empty batch and log, the streaming
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// subscribers retry.
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var psk = await provider.GetAsync(siteId, context.CancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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metadata.Add(AuthorizationHeader, $"Bearer {psk}");
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metadata.Add(SiteHeader, siteId);
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});
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Applies per-site call credentials to channel options, if a provider is available.
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/// A null provider leaves the options untouched — the shape used by test-only and
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/// default constructors that never dial a gated endpoint.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="options">Channel options being built.</param>
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/// <param name="provider">Key provider, or null to leave the channel unauthenticated.</param>
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/// <param name="siteId">The site this channel talks to.</param>
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/// <returns>The same options instance, for chaining.</returns>
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public static GrpcChannelOptions WithSiteCredentials(
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this GrpcChannelOptions options, ISitePskProvider? provider, string? siteId)
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{
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ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options);
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if (provider is null || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(siteId))
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{
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return options;
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}
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options.Credentials = ChannelCredentials.Create(
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ChannelCredentials.Insecure, ForSite(provider, siteId));
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options.UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials = true;
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return options;
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}
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}
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@@ -60,6 +60,27 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClient : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
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/// <param name="logger">Logger for diagnostics and errors.</param>
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/// <param name="options">Communication options including keepalive settings.</param>
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public SiteStreamGrpcClient(string endpoint, ILogger logger, CommunicationOptions options)
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: this(endpoint, logger, options, pskProvider: null, siteIdentifier: null)
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{
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Creates a client that authenticates every call with the site's preshared key.
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/// This is the production shape: <c>SiteStreamService</c> is gated by
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/// <c>ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor</c> on the site node, so a client without credentials
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/// gets <see cref="StatusCode.PermissionDenied"/> on every call.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="endpoint">The gRPC endpoint address for the site.</param>
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/// <param name="logger">Logger for diagnostics and errors.</param>
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/// <param name="options">Communication options including keepalive settings.</param>
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/// <param name="pskProvider">Resolves the site's preshared key; null leaves the channel unauthenticated.</param>
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/// <param name="siteIdentifier">Site this channel talks to; null leaves the channel unauthenticated.</param>
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public SiteStreamGrpcClient(
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string endpoint,
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ILogger logger,
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CommunicationOptions options,
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ISitePskProvider? pskProvider,
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string? siteIdentifier)
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{
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Endpoint = endpoint;
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KeepAlivePingDelay = options.GrpcKeepAlivePingDelay;
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@@ -72,7 +93,7 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClient : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
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KeepAlivePingTimeout = options.GrpcKeepAlivePingTimeout,
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KeepAlivePingPolicy = HttpKeepAlivePingPolicy.Always
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}
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});
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}.WithSiteCredentials(pskProvider, siteIdentifier));
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_client = new SiteStreamService.SiteStreamServiceClient(_channel);
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_logger = logger;
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}
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@@ -26,9 +26,11 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
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private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<(string Site, string Endpoint), SiteStreamGrpcClient> _clients = new();
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private readonly ILoggerFactory _loggerFactory;
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private readonly CommunicationOptions _options;
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private readonly ISitePskProvider? _pskProvider;
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/// <summary>
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/// Test/default constructor — uses default <see cref="CommunicationOptions"/>.
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/// Test/default constructor — uses default <see cref="CommunicationOptions"/> and creates
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/// unauthenticated channels.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="loggerFactory">Logger factory passed to created clients.</param>
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public SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory(ILoggerFactory loggerFactory)
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@@ -37,16 +39,36 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// DI constructor — flows <see cref="CommunicationOptions"/> into every created
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/// <see cref="SiteStreamGrpcClient"/> so the configured gRPC keepalive settings
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/// are applied rather than hard-coded defaults.
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/// Constructor without a key provider — creates unauthenticated channels, which a gated
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/// site will refuse. Retained for tests and for hosts that never dial a site.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="loggerFactory">Logger factory passed to created clients.</param>
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/// <param name="options">Communication options applied to each created client.</param>
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public SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory(ILoggerFactory loggerFactory, IOptions<CommunicationOptions> options)
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: this(loggerFactory, options, pskProvider: null)
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{
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// DI constructor — flows <see cref="CommunicationOptions"/> into every created
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/// <see cref="SiteStreamGrpcClient"/> so the configured gRPC keepalive settings are applied
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/// rather than hard-coded defaults, and attaches the per-site preshared key that the site's
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/// <c>ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor</c> requires.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="loggerFactory">Logger factory passed to created clients.</param>
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/// <param name="options">Communication options applied to each created client.</param>
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/// <param name="pskProvider">
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/// Resolves each site's preshared key. Optional in DI so a host that registers no provider
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/// (a site node, which never dials another site) still resolves this factory.
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/// </param>
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public SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory(
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ILoggerFactory loggerFactory,
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IOptions<CommunicationOptions> options,
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ISitePskProvider? pskProvider)
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{
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_loggerFactory = loggerFactory;
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_options = options.Value;
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_pskProvider = pskProvider;
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}
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/// <summary>
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@@ -59,7 +81,7 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
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/// <param name="grpcEndpoint">gRPC endpoint (second half of the cache key) the client is bound to.</param>
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/// <returns>The cached or newly-created client bound to <paramref name="grpcEndpoint"/>.</returns>
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public virtual SiteStreamGrpcClient GetOrCreate(string siteIdentifier, string grpcEndpoint) =>
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_clients.GetOrAdd((siteIdentifier, grpcEndpoint), _ => CreateClient(grpcEndpoint));
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_clients.GetOrAdd((siteIdentifier, grpcEndpoint), key => CreateClient(key.Site, key.Endpoint));
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/// <summary>
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/// Returns the cached client for <c>(site, endpoint)</c>, or <c>null</c> — never creates.
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@@ -77,12 +99,13 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
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/// can substitute a tracking client while still exercising the factory's real
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/// caching and disposal machinery.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="siteIdentifier">Site the new client talks to; selects which preshared key it presents.</param>
|
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/// <param name="grpcEndpoint">gRPC endpoint the new client will connect to.</param>
|
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/// <returns>A new <see cref="SiteStreamGrpcClient"/> connected to <paramref name="grpcEndpoint"/>.</returns>
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protected virtual SiteStreamGrpcClient CreateClient(string grpcEndpoint)
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protected virtual SiteStreamGrpcClient CreateClient(string siteIdentifier, string grpcEndpoint)
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{
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var logger = _loggerFactory.CreateLogger<SiteStreamGrpcClient>();
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return new SiteStreamGrpcClient(grpcEndpoint, logger, _options);
|
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return new SiteStreamGrpcClient(grpcEndpoint, logger, _options, _pskProvider, siteIdentifier);
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}
|
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|
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/// <summary>
|
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@@ -99,6 +122,10 @@ public class SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory : IAsyncDisposable, IDisposable
|
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if (_clients.TryRemove(key, out var client))
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await client.DisposeAsync();
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}
|
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|
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// Drop the cached preshared key too, so a site removed and re-added under the same
|
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// identifier (with a rotated key) is not dialed with the stale one.
|
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_pskProvider?.Invalidate(siteIdentifier);
|
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}
|
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|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
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using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
|
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using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Extensions;
|
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
|
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
|
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using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
|
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|
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@@ -23,7 +24,15 @@ public static class ServiceCollectionExtensions
|
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ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IValidateOptions<CommunicationOptions>, CommunicationOptionsValidator>());
|
||||
|
||||
services.AddSingleton<CommunicationService>();
|
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services.AddSingleton<SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory>();
|
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|
||||
// Explicit factory rather than AddSingleton<T>(): the ISitePskProvider dependency is
|
||||
// optional (central registers one, a site node does not), and constructor selection
|
||||
// over a nullable interface parameter is exactly the case the container cannot decide
|
||||
// for itself — GetService returns null cleanly where constructor injection would throw.
|
||||
services.AddSingleton(sp => new SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory(
|
||||
sp.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>(),
|
||||
sp.GetRequiredService<IOptions<CommunicationOptions>>(),
|
||||
sp.GetService<ISitePskProvider>()));
|
||||
services.AddSingleton<DebugStreamService>();
|
||||
|
||||
// Aggregated live alarm cache (plan #10, Task 4): transient, in-memory, shared
|
||||
|
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user