feat(grpc): PSK-authenticate the site gRPC control plane; drop the vestigial management receptionist registration
Phase 0 of the ClusterClient→gRPC migration
(docs/plans/2026-07-22-clusterclient-to-grpc-plan.md). Standalone hardening: it
closes a gap that exists today and is a precondition for moving command/control
onto gRPC in later phases.
T0.1 — delete the ManagementActor ClusterClientReceptionist registration.
It was built for an out-of-cluster CLI that was never written: the shipped CLI
speaks HTTP Basic to /management, which asks the actor in-process through
ManagementActorHolder. Nothing in the repo ever sent to /user/management. The
actor still runs there; only the cross-boundary advertisement is gone. Six
documents claimed the CLI used ClusterClient — including the CLI's own README
"Architecture Notes" — and are corrected here rather than left to rot.
T0.2 — record, do not port, the dead integration-routing path.
IntegrationCallRequest is unwired at BOTH ends: RouteIntegrationCallAsync has
zero callers anywhere, and RegisterLocalHandler(Integration, …) appears only in
a test, so production always answers "Integration handler not available". It is
excluded from the gRPC contract (28 of 29 commands migrate) rather than
enshrined on an additive-only wire format, and deleting it during a
transport migration would mix a behavioural change into a change whose whole
value is that behaviour is identical. See
docs/known-issues/2026-07-22-integration-call-routing-is-dead-code.md.
T0.3 — preshared-key authentication on SiteStreamService.
The service shipped with no auth at all: plaintext h2c, no interceptor, so
anything that could reach a site node's :8083 could open a live data stream or
read audit rows back via PullAuditEvents/PullSiteCalls. ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor
now gates /sitestream.SiteStreamService/ — modeled on LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor
(constant-time compare, fail-closed, PermissionDenied) but gating a SET of
service prefixes so phases 1A/1B add services rather than interceptors. LocalDb
sync keeps its own separate key: it authenticates the pair partner, not central,
and collapsing the two would make a site's central-facing key also admit writes
into its database.
Keys are per site (SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>), never fleet-wide, so a compromised
site yields only its own. Central attaches them through ControlPlaneCredentials,
which binds CallCredentials to the channel — covering unary and streaming
uniformly, and letting the key resolve asynchronously, which a client
interceptor could not do without blocking. All three central→site channel
creation sites go through it (SiteStreamGrpcClient and both audit pull invokers);
the pull invokers' channel caches are re-keyed by (site, endpoint) because
credentials are per-site and bound to the channel.
Two decisions beyond the plan:
* StartupValidator now requires GrpcPsk on Site nodes. The plan specified only
the runtime gate, but fail-closed with no boot check produces a node that
joins, answers heartbeats and reports healthy while refusing every stream,
audit pull and telemetry ingest — silent and total. Same reasoning as the
existing inbound API-key pepper rule.
* Added Communication:SitePsks as a central-side key map. The plan assumed
central would read the store, seeded via a dev KEK; the docker rig
deliberately boots with no master key, so store-only resolution would leave
it unable to dial its own sites. The store stays primary — it is the only
source that can serve a site added at runtime — with the map covering
key-less hosts and one-off pins. Neither source falling back to
"unauthenticated" is the invariant.
T0.4 — dev keys on both rigs and tests.
34 tests. The seven that matter most exercise a real in-process gRPC stack over
TestServer: the unit tests on either side of the wire would both stay green if
the halves disagreed, and gRPC refuses call credentials on a plaintext channel
by default — the UnsafeUseInsecureChannelCallCredentials opt-in is only provable
by making a real call. They confirm correct key passes on unary AND streaming,
wrong key and no-credentials both get PermissionDenied, and an unresolvable key
fails the call with nothing reaching the service.
OPERATIONAL: a site node upgraded to this build without a key will not boot.
That includes the gitignored deploy/wonder-app-vd03/ overlay.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ services:
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# pepper per the "different per environment" guidance; real deployments inject a
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# true secret out-of-band, never from source control. Both Central nodes share it.
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ScadaBridge__InboundApi__ApiKeyPepper: "dev-only-insecure-pepper-env2-cluster-0001"
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# DEV-ONLY gRPC control-plane preshared key for site-x — NOT a real secret.
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# Must match ScadaBridge:Communication:GrpcPsk in site-x-node-*/appsettings.Site.json.
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# Production seeds SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId> into the secret store instead.
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ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__site-x: "dev-grpc-psk-docker-env2-site-x"
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ports:
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- "9101:5000" # Web UI + Inbound API
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- "9111:8081" # Akka remoting
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@@ -43,6 +47,10 @@ services:
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# pepper per the "different per environment" guidance; real deployments inject a
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# true secret out-of-band, never from source control. Both Central nodes share it.
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ScadaBridge__InboundApi__ApiKeyPepper: "dev-only-insecure-pepper-env2-cluster-0001"
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# DEV-ONLY gRPC control-plane preshared key for site-x — NOT a real secret.
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# Must match ScadaBridge:Communication:GrpcPsk in site-x-node-*/appsettings.Site.json.
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# Production seeds SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId> into the secret store instead.
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ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__site-x: "dev-grpc-psk-docker-env2-site-x"
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ports:
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- "9102:5000" # Web UI + Inbound API
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- "9112:8081" # Akka remoting
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@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@
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"SqliteDbPath": "/app/data/store-and-forward.db"
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},
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"Communication": {
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// DEV-ONLY control-plane preshared key — NOT a real secret. Must be
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// IDENTICAL on both nodes of the pair and match the central-side entry in
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// ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__<siteId> (docker-compose.yml).
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// Production supplies this as ${secret:SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>}. Without it the
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// node fails StartupValidator: the gate is fail-closed, so an unset key would
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// refuse every SiteStream call while the node still looked healthy.
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"GrpcPsk": "dev-grpc-psk-docker-env2-site-x",
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"CentralContactPoints": [
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"akka.tcp://scadabridge@scadabridge-env2-central-a:8081",
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"akka.tcp://scadabridge@scadabridge-env2-central-b:8081"
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@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@
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"SqliteDbPath": "/app/data/store-and-forward.db"
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},
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"Communication": {
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// DEV-ONLY control-plane preshared key — NOT a real secret. Must be
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// IDENTICAL on both nodes of the pair and match the central-side entry in
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// ScadaBridge__Communication__SitePsks__<siteId> (docker-compose.yml).
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// Production supplies this as ${secret:SB-GRPC-PSK-<siteId>}. Without it the
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// node fails StartupValidator: the gate is fail-closed, so an unset key would
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// refuse every SiteStream call while the node still looked healthy.
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"GrpcPsk": "dev-grpc-psk-docker-env2-site-x",
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"CentralContactPoints": [
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"akka.tcp://scadabridge@scadabridge-env2-central-a:8081",
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"akka.tcp://scadabridge@scadabridge-env2-central-b:8081"
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