fix(security): finish the bearer-token design and cache role mappings (review 2026-10-21 05/U1, 05/P1)

- ManagementAuthenticator accepts Authorization: Bearer <jwt> alongside Basic on
  /management, the audit REST endpoints and the debug-stream hub. Tokens are
  validated locally (HS256 only, alg=none rejected, issuer/audience, lifetime with
  30 s skew); roles and site scope inside a valid token are authoritative for its
  lifetime, so a bearer call costs no LDAP bind and no role re-map.
- /auth/token returns expires_in + management_bearer:true, carries username, display
  name, roles and permitted sites, and answers 404 under DisableLogin.
- CLI exchanges credentials once per process (in-memory CliTokenStore), sends Bearer,
  re-exchanges once on 401 then falls back to Basic; older/login-disabled servers are
  Basic-only; bad credentials are not retried with Basic. Debug stream uses the token
  via AccessTokenProvider. SCADABRIDGE_AUTH_MODE=basic opts out.
- StartupValidator fails a Central boot on a JwtSigningKey under 32 UTF-8 bytes;
  fixed the false 'fail-fast at construction' comment. Removed the dead
  RefreshToken/RecordActivity/ShouldRefresh/IsIdleTimedOut members and the inert
  JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes; JwtExpiryMinutes now documented as the bearer lifetime
  (validated > 0).
- RoleMapper reads through a process-wide RoleMappingCache (RoleMappingCacheSeconds,
  default 30 s): one refresh loads the table plus every Deployer mapping's scope
  rules, Invalidate() drops it (generation-guarded against in-flight refreshes).
- Component-Security.md / Component-CLI.md / CLI README describe the real model
  (cookie claims ticket, bearer for CLI) instead of a cookie-embedded JWT.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-10-22 06:38:44 -04:00
parent f0de11c446
commit 1b3928a0a2
24 changed files with 1728 additions and 611 deletions
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
using System.CommandLine;
using System.CommandLine.Parsing;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.SignalR.Client;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Management;
@@ -90,12 +89,44 @@ public static class DebugCommands
private static async Task<int> StreamDebugAsync(string baseUrl, string username, string password, int instanceId, string format)
{
var hubUrl = baseUrl.TrimEnd('/') + "/hubs/debug-stream";
var credentials = Convert.ToBase64String(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes($"{username}:{password}"));
// Exchange the credentials for a bearer token once (review 2026-10-21 05/U1, 05/P1) so
// the hub handshake — and every automatic reconnect — costs no LDAP bind. The hub
// authenticates through ManagementAuthenticator, which accepts the token in the
// Authorization header; the SignalR .NET client sends the AccessTokenProvider value
// there on negotiate and on the WebSocket upgrade, and re-invokes the provider on each
// reconnect, so a token that expired mid-stream is re-exchanged. A server without
// bearer support (or SCADABRIDGE_AUTH_MODE=basic) keeps the Basic header.
using var authClient = new ManagementHttpClient(baseUrl, username, password);
ManagementHttpClient.BearerResult bearer;
try
{
bearer = await authClient.TryGetBearerTokenAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is HttpRequestException or TaskCanceledException)
{
OutputFormatter.WriteError($"Connection failed: {ex.Message}", "CONNECTION_FAILED");
return 1;
}
if (bearer.Failure is not null)
{
OutputFormatter.WriteError(bearer.Failure.Error ?? "Authentication failed.", bearer.Failure.ErrorCode ?? "AUTH_FAILED");
return 1;
}
var connection = new HubConnectionBuilder()
.WithUrl(hubUrl, options =>
{
options.Headers.Add("Authorization", $"Basic {credentials}");
if (bearer.Token is not null)
{
options.AccessTokenProvider = async () =>
(await authClient.TryGetBearerTokenAsync(CancellationToken.None)).Token;
}
else
{
options.Headers.Add("Authorization", $"Basic {authClient.BasicCredentials}");
}
})
.WithAutomaticReconnect()
.Build();