merge(agent-b): rows 98/99 — site-scope gate fail-closed on unresolvable targets (5 sites, not 2: the inline GetInstance/GetSite/GetDataConnection shapes were an id-enumeration oracle; all route through DenyUnresolvedTargetIfScoped, denial indistinguishable from out-of-scope); CLI audit query/export drop 7 case-sensitive AcceptOnlyFromAmong gates for help-text values + a new strict server-side ParseEnumListStrict (no silent drop, no ordinals)

This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-17 06:20:14 -04:00
14 changed files with 818 additions and 101 deletions
@@ -231,8 +231,12 @@ public class CommandTreeTests
[Theory]
[InlineData("sideways")]
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong is case-SENSITIVE (same contract as the audit
// --channel / --kind / --status options), so the literals are lowercase only.
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong is case-SENSITIVE, so the literals are lowercase only.
// The audit --channel/--kind/--status options USED to share this contract; they
// dropped AcceptOnlyFromAmong in register row 99 precisely because the
// case-sensitivity rejected values the server accepts. --direction keeps it: it is
// a pure client-side literal that never reaches a server-side parse, so there is no
// authoritative check behind it to defer to.
[InlineData("Up")]
public void TemplateFolderReorder_RejectsAnythingElse(string direction)
{
@@ -255,6 +259,81 @@ public class CommandTreeTests
Assert.NotEmpty(parse.Errors);
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: the audit filter options must NOT be case-sensitively
// gated client-side.
//
// `audit query --status delivered` used to fail at the CLI parse layer while
// the server would have accepted it — AcceptOnlyFromAmong matches ordinally
// against the capitalised literals. The valid set now lives in the help text
// and the server's strict, case-insensitive check is authoritative (the same
// treatment row 88 gave `deploy status`). These tests fail before that change.
// ========================================================================
public static TheoryData<string, string, string> AuditFilterValues() => new()
{
// subcommand, option, value — lowercase, uppercase and mixed case of a real member.
{ "query", "--status", "delivered" },
{ "query", "--status", "DELIVERED" },
{ "query", "--channel", "apioutbound" },
{ "query", "--kind", "apicall" },
{ "export", "--status", "parked" },
{ "export", "--channel", "notification" },
{ "export", "--kind", "dbwrite" },
};
[Theory]
[MemberData(nameof(AuditFilterValues))]
public void AuditFilterOptions_AcceptValuesInAnyCase(string subcommand, string option, string value)
{
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var cmd = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == subcommand);
// `export` has three required options; supply them so the only thing under
// test is the filter value's own acceptance.
var args = subcommand == "export"
? new[] { "--since", "1h", "--until", "now", "--format", "csv", "--output", "out.csv", option, value }
: new[] { option, value };
var parse = cmd.Parse(args);
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("csv")]
[InlineData("CSV")]
[InlineData("jsonl")]
public void AuditExport_FormatOption_AcceptsValuesInAnyCase(string format)
{
// The server lowercases --format before matching and returns a 400 naming
// csv/jsonl/parquet for anything else, so the client-side literal gate was
// pure friction (register row 99).
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var export = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == "export");
var parse = export.Parse(new[]
{
"--since", "1h", "--until", "now", "--format", format, "--output", "out.csv",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void AuditQuery_UnrecognisedFilterValue_IsNotRejectedClientSide()
{
// Deliberate: the CLI no longer second-guesses the filter vocabulary. A bad
// value must reach the server, which answers 400 naming the valid set —
// one authoritative check instead of two that can drift apart.
var audit = AuditCommands.Build(Url, Format, Username, Password);
var query = audit.Subcommands.Single(c => c.Name == "query");
var parse = query.Parse(new[] { "--status", "NotAStatus" });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void SiteArea_HasMoveVerb()
{
@@ -40,15 +40,34 @@ public class AuditExportCommandTests
}
[Fact]
public void Export_InvalidFormat_Rejected()
public void Export_InvalidFormat_IsNotRejectedAtTheParseLayer()
{
// Register row 99: the client-side AcceptOnlyFromAmong gate is gone. It
// matched case-SENSITIVELY, so it rejected `--format CSV` even though the
// server lowercases the value before matching. The server returns a 400
// naming csv/jsonl/parquet and is the authoritative check.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var parse = root.Parse(new[]
{
"audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
"--format", "xml", "--output", "/tmp/out.xml",
});
Assert.NotEmpty(parse.Errors);
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("CSV")]
[InlineData("Csv")]
[InlineData("JSONL")]
public void Export_FormatInAnyCase_IsAccepted(string format)
{
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var parse = root.Parse(new[]
{
"audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
"--format", format, "--output", "/tmp/out.csv",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
// ---- Query string -----------------------------------------------------
@@ -148,16 +167,18 @@ public class AuditExportCommandTests
}
[Fact]
public void Export_MultiValueChannel_WithOneInvalidName_FailsFast()
public void Export_MultiValueChannel_WithOneUnrecognisedName_StillParses()
{
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong validates EACH value of the multi-value option.
// Register row 99: the vocabulary gate moved server-side; the multi-value
// shape itself is unchanged, so both values reach the server to adjudicate.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(
root, "audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
var parse = root.Parse(new[]
{
"audit", "export", "--since", "1h", "--until", "0h",
"--format", "csv", "--output", "/tmp/out.csv",
"--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
"--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi",
});
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
// ---- Streaming export to file -----------------------------------------
@@ -424,43 +424,51 @@ public class AuditQueryCommandTests
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_MultiValueChannel_WithOneInvalidName_FailsFast()
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: filter-vocabulary validation moved OFF the CLI.
//
// These four tests used to assert that AcceptOnlyFromAmong rejected an
// unrecognised --channel/--kind/--status at the parse layer. That gate matched
// case-SENSITIVELY, so it also rejected `--status delivered`, which the server
// has always accepted — the CLI was stricter than the system it drives. The
// gate is gone; the parse layer now accepts any string and the server answers
// 400 naming the valid set (AuditEndpointsTests pins that side).
//
// What is asserted here is the CLIENT half of that contract: the value is
// carried through to the request rather than rejected locally.
// ========================================================================
[Theory]
[InlineData("--channel", "OutboundApi")] // old (non-existent) name; the real enum is "ApiOutbound"
[InlineData("--kind", "CachedCall")]
[InlineData("--status", "Bogus")]
public void Query_UnrecognisedFilterValue_IsNotRejectedAtTheParseLayer(string option, string value)
{
// AcceptOnlyFromAmong validates EACH value of the multi-value option.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(
root, "audit", "query", "--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
var parse = root.Parse(new[] { "audit", "query", option, value });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_ChannelWithInvalidName_FailsFast_NonZeroExit()
public void Query_MultiValueChannel_WithOneUnrecognisedName_StillParses()
{
// "OutboundApi" is the old (non-existent) name; the real enum is "ApiOutbound".
// The multi-value shape is unchanged; only the vocabulary gate is gone, so
// BOTH values reach the server for it to adjudicate.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(root, "audit", "query", "--channel", "OutboundApi");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
Assert.Contains("OutboundApi", err);
var parse = root.Parse(new[] { "audit", "query", "--channel", "ApiOutbound", "OutboundApi" });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_KindWithInvalidName_FailsFast_NonZeroExit()
[Theory]
[InlineData("--channel", "apioutbound")]
[InlineData("--kind", "apicall")]
[InlineData("--status", "delivered")]
[InlineData("--status", "DELIVERED")]
public void Query_FilterValueInAnyCase_IsAccepted(string option, string value)
{
// The defect row 99 names: these all failed client-side before the fix.
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(root, "audit", "query", "--kind", "CachedCall");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
}
[Fact]
public void Query_StatusWithInvalidName_FailsFast_NonZeroExit()
{
var root = AuditCommandTestHarness.BuildRoot();
var (exit, _, err) = AuditCommandTestHarness.Invoke(root, "audit", "query", "--status", "Bogus");
Assert.NotEqual(0, exit);
Assert.NotEqual("", err);
var parse = root.Parse(new[] { "audit", "query", option, value });
Assert.Empty(parse.Errors);
}
}
@@ -4,11 +4,17 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Enums;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Tests.Types;
/// <summary>
/// Audit Log #23 (M8): tests for the shared lax multi-value query-param parsers
/// used by the ManagementService + CentralUI audit endpoints and the
/// <c>AuditLogPage</c> drill-in parser. The contract under test: parse each
/// repeated value independently, silently drop unparseable/blank elements, and
/// collapse an empty result to <c>null</c>.
/// Audit Log #23 (M8): tests for the shared multi-value query-param parsers used by
/// the ManagementService + CentralUI audit endpoints and the <c>AuditLogPage</c>
/// drill-in parser. Two contracts are under test:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><b>Lax</b> (<c>ParseEnumList</c>/<c>ParseStringList</c>, used by the
/// CentralUI surfaces): parse each repeated value independently, silently drop
/// unparseable/blank elements, collapse an empty result to <c>null</c>.</item>
/// <item><b>Strict</b> (<c>ParseEnumListStrict</c>, register row 99, used by the
/// ManagementService endpoints the CLI calls): an unrecognised value is an error
/// naming the valid set; blanks are still dropped.</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public class AuditQueryParamParsersTests
{
@@ -53,6 +59,92 @@ public class AuditQueryParamParsersTests
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumList<AuditStatus>(new[] { "Bogus", "" }));
}
// ========================================================================
// Strict variant (register row 99) — the contract the ManagementService
// /api/audit/query + /api/audit/export endpoints use, so the CLI can drop its
// case-SENSITIVE AcceptOnlyFromAmong guard and still fail loudly on garbage.
// ========================================================================
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_NullInput_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(null, "status"));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_EmptyInput_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(Array.Empty<string?>(), "status"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("delivered")]
[InlineData("DELIVERED")]
[InlineData("Delivered")]
[InlineData(" delivered ")]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_IsCaseInsensitiveAndTrims(string raw)
{
var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(new[] { raw }, "status");
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered }, result);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_AllValuesValid_ParsesEverything()
{
var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditChannel>(
new[] { "ApiOutbound", "dboutbound" }, "channel");
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound, AuditChannel.DbOutbound }, result);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_UnrecognisedValue_ThrowsNamingTheValidSet()
{
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(
() => AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
new[] { "Delivered", "NotAStatus" }, "status"));
// The offending value AND the whole valid vocabulary must be in the message —
// naming the valid set is the entire point of the check.
Assert.Contains("NotAStatus", ex.Message);
Assert.Contains("status", ex.Message);
foreach (var name in Enum.GetNames<AuditStatus>())
{
Assert.Contains(name, ex.Message);
}
}
[Theory]
// "7" is out of range; "3" lands on a REAL member. Enum.TryParse accepts BOTH —
// a filter is a name-based contract, never an ordinal one, so both are rejected.
[InlineData("7")]
[InlineData("3")]
[InlineData("0")]
[InlineData("-1")]
[InlineData("+2")]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_NumericString_IsRejected(string raw)
{
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(
() => AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(new[] { raw }, "status"));
Assert.Contains(raw, ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_BlankElements_AreStillDroppedSilently()
{
// A repeated query param can legitimately carry an empty slot; only a
// NON-blank unrecognised value is an error.
var result = AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
new[] { "Delivered", "", " ", null }, "status");
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered }, result);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnumListStrict_AllBlank_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(AuditQueryParamParsers.ParseEnumListStrict<AuditStatus>(
new[] { "", " ", null }, "status"));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseStringList_NullInput_ReturnsNull()
{
@@ -416,23 +416,80 @@ public class AuditEndpointsTests
Assert.Null(filter.SourceSiteIds);
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 99: the enum filter dimensions parse STRICTLY here.
//
// These used to assert the LAX contract — an unrecognised enum name was
// dropped and the query ran unfiltered on that dimension, so `--status
// Nonsense` returned a plausible, complete-looking page that did not answer
// the question asked. That is exactly the failure row 88 fixed for `deploy
// status`, and it became reachable from the CLI once the (case-SENSITIVE,
// and therefore over-strict) client-side AcceptOnlyFromAmong guard was
// removed. The Guid/date dimensions stay lax — see ParseFilter's remarks.
// ========================================================================
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_UnparseableValuesInRepeatedSet_AreDroppedSilently()
public void ParseFilter_UnrecognisedEnumValue_Throws()
{
// Lax-parse contract: an unrecognised enum name is dropped, the rest of
// the repeated set survives — no 400, no whole-set drop.
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["channel"] = new[] { "ApiOutbound", "Bogus", "Notification" },
});
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(() => AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query));
Assert.Contains("Bogus", ex.Message);
Assert.Contains("channel", ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_UnrecognisedStatus_ThrowsNamingTheValidSet()
{
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["status"] = new[] { "Nonsense" },
});
var ex = Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(() => AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query));
foreach (var name in Enum.GetNames<AuditStatus>())
{
Assert.Contains(name, ex.Message);
}
}
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_LowercaseEnumValues_AreAccepted()
{
// The CLI sends whatever the operator typed now that its own case-sensitive
// guard is gone; `--status delivered` must resolve here.
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["channel"] = new[] { "apioutbound" },
["kind"] = new[] { "apicall" },
["status"] = new[] { "delivered", "PARKED" },
});
var filter = AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound, AuditChannel.Notification }, filter.Channels);
// Every value unparseable → the dimension stays unconstrained (null).
Assert.Null(filter.Statuses);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditChannel.ApiOutbound }, filter.Channels);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditKind.ApiCall }, filter.Kinds);
Assert.Equal(new[] { AuditStatus.Delivered, AuditStatus.Parked }, filter.Statuses);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseFilter_NumericEnumValue_IsRejected()
{
// Enum.TryParse would accept "3" as an ordinal; a filter is a name-based
// contract, so it must not.
var query = new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.QueryCollection(
new Dictionary<string, Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.StringValues>
{
["status"] = new[] { "3" },
});
Assert.Throws<AuditFilterParseException>(() => AuditEndpoints.ParseFilter(query));
}
[Fact]
@@ -985,6 +985,193 @@ public class ManagementActorTests : TestKit, IDisposable
ExpectMsg<ManagementSuccess>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
}
// ========================================================================
// Register row 98: the scope gate fails CLOSED on an unresolvable target.
//
// EnforceSiteScopeForInstance / EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier used to skip
// EnforceSiteScope entirely when the id did not resolve, so a site-scoped
// caller PASSED the gate and fell through into the handler body. A gate that
// cannot prove the target is inside the caller's scope must treat it as
// outside. System-wide callers return at the guards above the lookup and are
// untouched — they still get the handler's ordinary "not found".
// ========================================================================
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// _templateRepo is unstubbed for id 999 → GetInstanceByIdAsync returns null.
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
// The denial must not double as an existence oracle: the message says the
// instance is not in scope, never whether it exists.
Assert.DoesNotContain("not found", response.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("exist", response.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_IsIndistinguishableFromOutOfScope()
{
// The security property: a scoped caller cannot tell "instance 7 lives at a
// site you may not see" apart from "instance 999 does not exist" — both are
// the same ManagementUnauthorized shape.
_templateRepo.GetInstanceByIdAsync(7, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(new Instance("Pump7") { Id = 7, SiteId = 2 });
var actor = CreateActor();
actor.Tell(ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(7), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer"));
var outOfScope = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
actor.Tell(ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer"));
var nonexistent = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(outOfScope.GetType(), nonexistent.GetType());
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForAdminUser_IsUnchanged()
{
// An Administrator is system-wide, so the gate returns before the lookup:
// the handler runs and answers for itself. NOT a ManagementUnauthorized.
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Administrator");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_NonexistentIdForSystemWideDeployer_IsUnchanged()
{
// The other system-wide arm: a Deployer with NO site grants. Same rule,
// same untouched behaviour.
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(999), Array.Empty<string>(), "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetInstance_InScopeIdForSiteScopedUser_IsStillAllowed()
{
// The fail-closed change must not deny a legitimate in-scope target.
_templateRepo.GetInstanceByIdAsync(7, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(new Instance("Pump7") { Id = 7, SiteId = 1 });
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetInstanceCommand(7), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
ExpectMsg<ManagementSuccess>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
}
[Fact]
public void GetSite_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// HandleGetSite resolves the site itself and carried its own copy of the
// fail-OPEN shape (`if (site != null) EnforceSiteScope(...)`), so a scoped
// caller used to get success/null for any id — an enumeration oracle.
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetSiteByIdAsync(999, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.Site?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetSiteCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
}
[Fact]
public void GetSite_NonexistentIdForAdminUser_IsUnchanged()
{
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetSiteByIdAsync(999, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.Site?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetSiteCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Administrator");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetDataConnection_NonexistentIdForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// Third copy of the same inline fail-OPEN shape.
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetDataConnectionByIdAsync(999, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.DataConnection?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(new GetDataConnectionCommand(999), new[] { "1" }, "Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
}
[Fact]
public void QueryEventLogs_NonexistentSiteIdentifierForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{
// EnforceSiteScopeForIdentifier shares the shape: an identifier that
// resolves to no Site row is a denial for a scoped caller.
var siteRepo = Substitute.For<ISiteRepository>();
siteRepo.GetSiteByIdentifierAsync("GHOST", Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns((Commons.Entities.Sites.Site?)null);
_services.AddScoped(_ => siteRepo);
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(
new QueryEventLogsCommand("GHOST"),
new[] { "1" },
"Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
var response = ExpectMsg<ManagementUnauthorized>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.Equal(envelope.CorrelationId, response.CorrelationId);
}
[Fact]
public void QueryEventLogs_InScopeSiteIdentifierForSiteScopedUser_IsStillAllowed()
{
AddSiteRepoWithSite(1, "SITE1");
var actor = CreateActor();
var envelope = ScopedEnvelope(
new QueryEventLogsCommand("SITE1"),
new[] { "1" },
"Deployer");
actor.Tell(envelope);
// The scope gate passes; whatever the (unwired) CommunicationService does
// next is not this test's business — only that it is NOT a scope denial.
var response = ExpectMsg<object>(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
Assert.IsNotType<ManagementUnauthorized>(response);
}
[Fact]
public void GetSite_OutOfScopeForSiteScopedUser_ReturnsUnauthorized()
{