# Architecture Review — Central–Site Communication & Store-and-Forward (Round 2)

Reviewer domain: `src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication`, `src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.StoreAndForward`, the telemetry transport paths that ride them, the Host wiring that composes them, and — new this round — the **aggregated live alarm stream** shipped 2026-07-10 (`docs/plans/2026-07-10-aggregated-live-alarm-stream-plan.md`): site-wide alarm-only `SubscribeSite` gRPC stream, central `ISiteAlarmLiveCache`/`SiteAlarmLiveCacheService`/`SiteAlarmAggregatorActor`, seed-then-stream, and reconnect telemetry.

Date: 2026-07-12 (round 2). Round-1 report dated 2026-07-08 at baseline `b910f5eb`; this round re-reviews everything landed since (PLAN-02's 24 tasks, PLAN-08 options validation, and the post-initiative live-alarm-stream feature) on `main` @ `8c888f13`.

## Scope & Method

- Read the round-1 report and `archreview/plans/PLAN-02-communication-store-and-forward.md` (findings-coverage table), then **verified every round-1 finding against the current source** — no plan claim was trusted without file:line evidence.
- Fresh sweep over `git diff b910f5eb..HEAD` scoped to the Communication and StoreAndForward projects and their tests (~4,900 insertions across 50 files, 32 commits), plus the SiteRuntime/Host/CentralUI files the new code touches (`SiteReplicationActor`, `SiteStreamManager`, `AkkaHostedService`, `ScriptRuntimeContext`, `AlarmSummary.razor`).
- Static review only (suites verified green 2026-07-10). Known context: the `SiteStreamGrpcServerTests.SiteConnectionUpGauge_*` observable-gauge timing flake pre-exists on main and is not a regression from these plans.

**One-line verdict:** round 1's Critical and all three Highs are genuinely fixed and well-tested — but the **new** anti-entropy resync was built on the *wrong* active-node predicate (leader instead of the oldest-Up helper the delivery gate uses) and can wipe the delivering node's live buffer after a routine rolling restart, and its snapshot message cannot fit through Akka remoting's default frame size — so round 2 finds one new Critical and one new High, both confined to the peer-resync feature; everything else, including the brand-new live alarm stream, is solid work.

---

## Round-1 Finding Disposition

| Round-1 finding | R1 severity | Disposition | Evidence (file:line) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ClusterClient recreate-on-address-change → name collision → restart loop | Critical | **Fixed (verified)** | `CentralCommunicationActor.cs:33-67` — `DefaultSiteClientFactory` mints `site-client-{sanitized}-{generation}` via `Interlocked.Increment` (48); real-factory lifecycle tests exist (`tests/.../DefaultSiteClientFactoryTests.cs`, `CentralCommunicationActorClientLifecycleTests.cs`) |
| `siteId` interpolated unvalidated into actor name (sub-finding) | Critical (sub) | **Fixed (verified)** | `CentralCommunicationActor.cs:59-66` — `SanitizeForActorName` maps to valid path elements, falls back to `"site"`; `Create` additionally wrapped in try/catch that logs and skips the site (582-593), stale entry removed before recreate (572-580) |
| Standby site node runs full S&F delivery pipeline (systematic duplicates) | High | **Fixed (verified)** | `StoreAndForwardService.cs:89-103` (gate seam), 682-698 (re-evaluated per sweep tick, throwing gate = standby); Host wires it to the shared singleton-host helper `IClusterNodeProvider.SelfIsPrimary` (`AkkaHostedService.cs:868-884`); unit tests cover standby-skip / flip-active / throwing-gate. **But see NEW finding N2** — the *resync* feature added alongside uses a *different* predicate |
| Debug-session gRPC failover disposes shared channel; `CleanupGrpc` creates channels during teardown | High | **Fixed (verified)** | `SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory.cs:26,61-73` — cache keyed by `(site, endpoint)`, `GetOrCreate` never disposes, `TryGet` never creates; `RemoveSiteAsync` (95-102) is the only shared-disposal path; `DebugStreamBridgeActor.cs:469-473, 495-498` — both teardown paths use `TryGet(...)?.Unsubscribe(...)` |
| Retry sweep serial, unbounded, single-laned — collapses under backlog | High (perf) | **Fixed (verified)** | `StoreAndForwardOptions.cs:31` `SweepBatchLimit` (500) → `StoreAndForwardStorage.cs:392-397` SQL `LIMIT`; per-`(category,target)` lane short-circuit on first transient failure (`StoreAndForwardService.cs:721-730`, `RetryOutcome` 752); parallel lanes capped at `SweepTargetParallelism` 4, sequential within lane (710-734) |
| Replication ops applied out of order (`Task.Run` fire-and-forget) | Medium | **Fixed (verified)** | `ReplicationService.cs:142-161` — handler invoked inline; ordering preserved by construction, faults observed via `ContinueWith(OnlyOnFaulted)` |
| Replication failures logged at Debug — dead channel invisible | Medium | **Fixed (verified)** | `ReplicationService.cs:153-168` — Warning + `ScadaBridgeTelemetry.RecordReplicationFailure()`; `SiteReplicationActor.cs:225-234` — no-peer drop also Warning + counter |
| Park/Requeue replication blind UPDATE — lost on standby missing the row | Medium | **Fixed (verified)** | `ReplicationService.cs:115-140` — Add/Park/Requeue applied via `StoreAndForwardStorage.UpsertMessageAsync` (`ON CONFLICT(id) DO UPDATE`, `StoreAndForwardStorage.cs:319-369`, `created_at` preserved) |
| Notifications park after ~25 min; `maxRetries: 0` escape hatch unused | Medium | **Fixed (verified)** | `ScriptRuntimeContext.cs:2209` — `Notify.Send` enqueues with `maxRetries: 0`; park-on-exhaustion is impossible (`StoreAndForwardService.cs:830` guards `MaxRetries > 0`) |
| Corrupt buffered notification discarded and reported as delivered | Medium | **Fixed (verified)** | `NotificationForwarder.cs:82-95` — undeserialisable payload returns `false` → engine **parks** the row; Warning log with capped payload preview (170-187) |
| Spec-vs-code drift: standby-passive model; `Notify.Send` blocks up to 30 s | Medium | **Fixed (verified)** | `Component-StoreAndForward.md:80-83` — gate + failover-window-only duplicates documented; `:52` — enqueue-only `deferToSweep` semantics documented; code matches (`StoreAndForwardService.cs:588-594` deferToSweep path never invokes the handler inline, kicks `TriggerSweep`) |
| No explicit Akka serializer — wire format unpinned | Medium (perf) | **Partially fixed / deferred (accepted)** | Round-trip pin tests added (`tests/.../WireSerializationPinTests.cs` — 191 lines, `ReplicationWireSerializationPinTests.cs`; PLAN-08 T9 additionally found the Newtonsoft ctor-optional-default gotcha and locked contracts). The serializer *swap* remains deferred by design (rolling-compat migration) — reasonable |
| Central heartbeat state not replicated to peer central node | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | `CentralCommunicationActor.cs:369-398` — `SiteHeartbeatReplica` fanned over DistributedPubSub, idempotent local mark (194-196, 390-398) |
| `SubscribeInstance` concurrency check-then-act (comment only asked) | Low | **Fixed as specified** | `SiteStreamGrpcServer.cs:287-292` — deliberate check-then-act documented with bounded-overshoot rationale |
| S&F SQLite: no WAL, no busy_timeout | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | `StoreAndForwardStorage.cs:43-47` (WAL in `InitializeAsync`), 177-185 (5 s busy_timeout per pooled open) |
| Due-check per-row `julianday()` parsing | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | Additive `last_attempt_at_ms` column + one-time backfill + `(status, last_attempt_at_ms)` index (`StoreAndForwardStorage.cs:88-114`); due predicate is pure integer math (386-400) |
| Audit-observer notification awaited inline in the sweep | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | `StoreAndForwardService.cs:117-135, 898-922` — ordered single-reader channel + pump; inline fallback preserved when not started; drained on `StopAsync` (451-468) |
| `StreamRelayActor.WriteToChannel` dead branch + silent DropOldest loss | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | `StreamRelayActor.cs:105-115` — comment corrected (guards closed channel only); real eviction counted by the bounded channel's `itemDropped` callback with first + every-500th Warning (`SiteStreamGrpcServer.cs:303-315`) |
| Duplicated Ask-timeout constants between the two ingest transports | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | Single source of truth `SiteStreamGrpcServer.AuditIngestAskTimeout` (`SiteStreamGrpcServer.cs:47`), consumed by `CentralCommunicationActor.cs:140-150, 174` |
| Heartbeat `IsActive` leader-check vs oldest-node singleton placement | Low | **Partially fixed — and now materially worse** | PLAN-01 shipped the oldest-Up helper (`ClusterActivityEvaluator.SelfIsOldest`, `Host/Health/ClusterActivityEvaluator.cs:20-31`; `AkkaClusterNodeProvider.SelfIsPrimary:29-37`) and the S&F delivery gate uses it — but `SiteCommunicationActor.DefaultIsActiveCheck` (517-526) and `SiteReplicationActor.DefaultIsActive` (190-198) still use **leader+Up** with "swap point" comments never swapped. The new resync feature was built on the leader predicate → **NEW finding N2 (Critical)** |
| `TransportHeartbeatInterval` double duty | Low | **Fixed (verified)** | `CommunicationOptions.cs:59-65` — dedicated `ApplicationHeartbeatInterval` (default 5 s, no behavior change), used at `SiteCommunicationActor.cs:444`; validated (`CommunicationOptionsValidator.cs:54-55`) |
| U1: Dual transports for the same ingest operations | Underdev | **Deferred (accepted)** | Both paths still exist (`SiteStreamGrpcServer.cs:388-491` gRPC vs `CentralCommunicationActor.cs:282-325` ClusterClient) with the shared timeout constant removing the tuning drift; consolidation remains a registered follow-up. Acceptable |
| U2: No real-collaborator test for ClusterClient cache lifecycle | Underdev | **Fixed (verified)** | `DefaultSiteClientFactoryTests.cs` (real factory, collision + sanitize), `CentralCommunicationActorClientLifecycleTests.cs` (address-edit ×3, throwing factory survives) |
| U3: No test/design treatment of standby-node sweep behavior | Underdev | **Fixed (unit level)** | Gate tests in `StoreAndForwardServiceTests.cs` (skip/resume/throwing-gate); doc updated; the live two-node kill rig landed in PLAN-01 (`TwoNodeClusterFixture`) |
| U4: Replication has no anti-entropy/resync | Underdev | **Fixed — with two new defects** | `SiteReplicationActor.cs:111-113, 175-181, 398-444` + `StoreAndForwardStorage.GetAllMessagesAsync`/`ReplaceAllAsync` (256-306). The mechanism exists and is authority-checked and capped — but see **N1 (frame size)** and **N2 (predicate inversion)** below |
| U5: Parked rows unbounded retention, no aging signal | Underdev | **Fixed (verified)** | `StoreAndForwardStorage.GetOldestParkedCreatedAtAsync` (675-685) → `HealthReportSender.cs:114-115` → additive `SiteHealthReport.OldestParkedMessageAgeSeconds` (`SiteHealthReport.cs:57`) |
| U6: Reconciliation cursor edge (`>` vs `>=`) unpinned | Underdev | **Fixed (verified, exceeded)** | `PullSiteCalls` grew an additive composite-keyset cursor (`after_id`, `SiteStreamGrpcServer.cs:598-641`); pinned by `SiteStreamPullSiteCallsTests.cs` |
| U7: `DebugStreamService._sessions` lost silently on central restart | Underdev | **Documented (accepted)** | `Component-Communication.md:67` — explicit "Accepted limitation" paragraph citing this review |

**Disposition counts:** 22 Fixed (verified) · 2 Partially fixed (serializer pin-only by design; leader-vs-oldest helper shipped but not swapped into all call sites) · 2 Deferred/accepted (U1 dual transports, U7 session locality) · 0 Not fixed · 0 Regressed. Round-1 Critical **C2/C1 (ClusterClient recreate) specially verified: genuinely fixed**, with real-collaborator tests exactly where round 1 said the blind spot was.

---

## NEW Findings — Store-and-Forward & Replication

### [Critical] N1 — Anti-entropy resync authority uses the *leader* predicate while delivery uses *oldest-Up*: after a routine rolling restart the stale rejoining node wipes the delivering node's live buffer

The delivery gate installed by PLAN-02 T4 correctly uses PLAN-01's singleton-host helper: `AkkaHostedService.cs:881` → `AkkaClusterNodeProvider.SelfIsPrimary` → `ClusterActivityEvaluator.SelfIsOldest` (`ClusterActivityEvaluator.cs:20-31`, up-number/`IsOlderThan` based — matches where cluster singletons actually run). But the **peer-join resync roles** added in the same plan use a different predicate: `SiteReplicationActor.DefaultIsActive` (`SiteReplicationActor.cs:190-198`) is **leader + Up**, with a comment calling itself the "swap point for plan 01's shared helper" that was never swapped.

Akka.NET's cluster leader is the **lowest-address** reachable Up member — not the oldest. The two predicates diverge *persistently* (not just transiently) whenever the lower-address node is not the oldest, which is exactly the state produced by the most routine operation there is: a rolling restart (or crash + rejoin) of the lower-address site node. Sequence, with `node-a` (lower address) restarted while `node-b` keeps running:

1. `node-b` is now oldest → `SelfIsPrimary` true → node-b runs the delivery sweep and owns the live buffer. `node-a` rejoins with a fresh (higher) up-number but becomes **leader** by address ordering.
2. `node-b` observes `MemberUp(node-a)` → `TryTrackPeer` → `OnPeerTracked` (`SiteReplicationActor.cs:175-181`): `SafeIsActive()` is **false** on node-b (it is not leader) → the *delivering* node sends `RequestSfBufferResync` to the stale peer.
3. `node-a` handles it (`HandleRequestSfBufferResync`, 398-411): `SafeIsActive()` is **true** on node-a (leader+Up) → it answers with a snapshot of its **stale, pre-outage buffer**.
4. `node-b` handles the snapshot (`HandleSfBufferSnapshot`, 420-444): `SafeIsActive()` false → it calls `ReplaceAllAsync` — the method whose own doc says "**Never call on an active node** — it discards every in-flight row" (`StoreAndForwardStorage.cs:281-283`) — **on the node that is actively delivering**.

Consequences: every message buffered on node-b during and since node-a's outage is **deleted** (notifications enqueued with `maxRetries: 0` are silently gone — the one category the design promises is never lost short of payload corruption), and rows node-b already delivered are **resurrected** from node-a's stale copy → guaranteed duplicate deliveries on subsequent sweeps. `ReplicationEnabled` defaults to true (`StoreAndForwardOptions.cs:12`), so production 2-node sites are exposed by default.

Fix shape: swap both remaining leader-based predicates (`SiteReplicationActor.cs:190-198`, `SiteCommunicationActor.cs:517-526`) to the shared oldest-Up helper so *one* definition of "active" governs delivery, resync-request, resync-answer, and heartbeat IsActive; add a two-node rig test that rolls the lower-address node and asserts the surviving node's buffer is untouched. (Also consider a belt-and-braces guard: refuse `ReplaceAllAsync` while this node's *delivery gate* reports active.)

### [High] N2 — The resync snapshot rides ONE Akka remoting message with no frame-size headroom: it is silently undeliverable for any realistic backlog

`HandleRequestSfBufferResync` pipes up to **10,000 full rows** (id + target + complete `payload_json` + provenance) into a single `SfBufferSnapshot` record and Tells it across Akka remoting (`SiteReplicationActor.cs:40, 407-410, 460`). `BuildHocon` sets no `akka.remote.dot-netty.tcp.maximum-frame-size` (grep across `src/` and `docker/` finds none), so the default **128,000 bytes** applies. That is ~12 bytes per row at the cap — even a few hundred typical cached-call payloads exceed it. An oversized remote message is dropped by the transport (an error in the sender's log; no exception surfaces to the `PipeTo`), the standby never receives the snapshot, nothing retries until the *next* peer-track event, and no telemetry counts it. Net effect: **the anti-entropy fix works only for near-empty buffers and silently fails in exactly the sustained-outage/backlog scenario it was built for** (U4's "standby down for an hour"). Ironically this also caps N1's blast radius — large stale snapshots can't be delivered either — but small-buffer wipes still go through.

Fix shape: chunk the snapshot (reuse the pull-style paging the audit reconciliation already has), or stream rows as a sequence of upsert ops bracketed by begin/end markers with a completion-driven delete-absent pass; count send failures. Also reconsider the 10k in-memory `List` on the active node.

### [Medium] N3 — `_sweepTask` handoff is clobbered by every timer tick, defeating the shutdown drain it exists for

Both the timer callback (`StoreAndForwardService.cs:396-400`) and `TriggerSweep` (664-668) unconditionally `Volatile.Write(ref _sweepTask, RetryPendingMessagesAsync())`. When a sweep is still in flight, the new call no-ops via the `_retryInProgress` CAS and returns a **completed** task — which overwrites `_sweepTask`. `StopAsync` (422-431) then awaits the no-op and proceeds with shutdown while the real sweep (one that has outlived a 10 s tick — i.e. precisely the backlog case the drain was added for) is still mid-delivery. Consequence is bounded (the sweep's own catch logs; storage is connection-per-op), but the "wait for the in-flight sweep" guarantee is illusory whenever it matters. Fix: only publish the task when the CAS is won (e.g. have `RetryPendingMessagesAsync` register itself), or CAS `_sweepTask` from completed→new.

### [Low] N4 — New sweep options missing from the eager validator

`StoreAndForwardOptionsValidator` (17-34) validates path/intervals/max-retries but not the two options PLAN-02 added: a negative `SweepBatchLimit` silently means "unlimited (legacy)" (`StoreAndForwardStorage.cs:392` checks `> 0`) and a non-positive `SweepTargetParallelism` is silently clamped to 1 (`StoreAndForwardService.cs:715`). Both deserve fail-fast messages per the §1.5 eager-validation convention the same release adopted elsewhere.

### [Low] N5 — Resync snapshot vs in-flight replication op race leaves orphan rows on the standby

A replicated `Remove` sent after the active node read its snapshot but before the snapshot send is ordered *before* the snapshot on the wire (same sender/receiver pair), so the stale snapshot re-adds the removed row on the standby → an orphan Pending row that a later failover re-delivers. Bounded and self-correcting at the next resync, and inherent to no-ack replication — worth a code comment on `HandleSfBufferSnapshot` (`SiteReplicationActor.cs:420-444`) so nobody "fixes" it into something worse.

---

## NEW Findings — Aggregated Live Alarm Stream (post-initiative, first review)

The feature is well-shaped overall: one gRPC stream per site (not per circuit), reference-counted lifecycle with linger, stream-first seed with ordered delta buffering and per-key dedup (correctly copied from `DebugStreamBridgeActor`, including the inclusive-boundary rule), authority-split with the poll fallback (`IsLive` false until first seed publishes — `SiteAlarmLiveCacheService.cs:131-136, 306-323`), reconcile as the drop-detection backstop (`SiteAlarmAggregatorActor.cs:276-304` rebuilds authoritatively so disappeared rows are dropped), self-healing on both start failure (bounded retry timer, `SiteAlarmLiveCacheService.cs:249-275`) and stream give-up (reconcile tick reopens, `SiteAlarmAggregatorActor.cs:224-236`), balanced telemetry gauges in PreStart/PostStop (188, 212), viewer-cap fail-safe returning a no-op handle instead of throwing on a Blazor render path (100-107), and eager options validation (`CommunicationOptionsValidator.cs:69-87`). Findings:

### [Medium] N6 — No delta coalescing: every applied alarm delta copies the whole site cache and fans out to every viewer circuit

`HandleLiveDelta` → `Publish()` materialises a fresh `_cache.Values.ToList()` **per delta** (`SiteAlarmAggregatorActor.cs:365-367, 391-403`), and `OnPublish` invokes every subscriber's `onChanged` (`SiteAlarmLiveCacheService.cs:386-411`), each of which does a Blazor `InvokeAsync` + `GetCurrentAlarms` + re-render (`AlarmSummary.razor:369-388`). An alarm flood — the canonical SCADA storm scenario, hundreds of condition transitions per second on a large site — becomes O(cacheSize) list copies per transition on the actor thread plus a render queue entry per circuit per transition. The seed path already batches; the live path should too (e.g. a ~250 ms publish-coalescing timer, or publish-on-tick-if-dirty). Everything stays correct (last write wins), so this is performance, not correctness.

### [Low] N7 — Aggregator lifecycle nits (bundled)

1. **Reconnect re-seed can be skipped:** the post-failover-flip `StartFanout(isInitial: false)` (`SiteAlarmAggregatorActor.cs:472`) no-ops if a reconcile fan-out is already in flight (247-253) — deltas missed between stream death and the in-flight snapshot's read-time stay stale until the *next* reconcile (up to 60 s), despite the "never silently serve stale" comment.
2. **No stream-generation stamp on `GrpcAlarmStreamError`:** a late error raced out of the *previous* cancelled stream (the `RpcException(Cancelled)` filter at `SiteStreamGrpcClient.cs:256-258` covers the normal path, but a genuine socket fault can beat the cancel) is indistinguishable from a failure of the current stream and burns retry budget / double-flips. The window is small; a monotonic stream-id in the error message would close it.
3. **Static mutable test seams:** `ReconnectDelay` / `StabilityWindow` are `internal static` mutable properties (`SiteAlarmAggregatorActor.cs:61-69`) — process-global state that parallel test classes can trample; instance/ctor parameters would match how the rest of the file injects tuning.

### [Low] N8 — "Lives only on the active central node" is aspirational, and deleted sites leak idle channels

`SetActorSystem` is wired on every central node (`AkkaHostedService.cs:430`), so browsing the standby node directly (port 9002, documented for diagnostics) starts a second, fully functional aggregator + gRPC stream there — harmless (read-only) but contradicting the `[PERM]` doc claim in `ISiteAlarmLiveCache.cs:13-17`. Separately, `SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory.RemoveSiteAsync` — designed as "the disposal path when a site record is deleted" (`SiteStreamGrpcClientFactory.cs:88-102`) — has **no production caller** (grep: tests only), so a deleted site's channels (and an aggregator kept alive by an open viewer, which then reconciles to an empty snapshot forever) persist until process restart. Bounded, but wire the deletion path or document the gap.

### [Low] N9 — A site with only one configured gRPC endpoint can never go live

`ResolveSiteAsync` requires **both** `GrpcNodeAAddress` and `GrpcNodeBAddress` (`SiteAlarmLiveCacheService.cs:294-300`); a single-node site (or one with only NodeA populated) silently never starts an aggregator and polls forever, with only a log Warning. The aggregator itself would work fine flipping between one address; accept a single endpoint and disable the flip.

---

## What's genuinely good (round 2)

- **The fix quality is high and test-backed.** Every round-1 fix landed with the failing-test-first shape the plan prescribed; the two places round 1 called out as structurally untested (real `DefaultSiteClientFactory`, standby sweep behavior) now have real-collaborator tests. The wire-format pin tests even caught a real Newtonsoft deserialization gotcha (ctor optional-param defaults) during PLAN-08.
- **The sweep redesign is careful.** Skipped lane rows keep `RetryCount`/`LastAttemptAt` untouched so the park horizon reflects real attempts; `GroupBy` stability preserves per-target FIFO; the observer pump preserves per-operation event order while latency-isolating the sweep; the gate is fail-safe (throwing → standby) and re-evaluated per tick.
- **Storage hygiene done right:** additive `last_attempt_at_ms` with one-time guarded backfill and a covering `(status, due)` index; shared `InsertMessageSql` + `BindMessageParameters` so column lists can't drift; defensive `Guid.TryParse` on read so one corrupt row can't abort a sweep.
- **The live alarm stream reuses instead of reinventing:** `SubscribeSite` rides the same hardened `RunSubscriptionStreamAsync` pipeline (readiness/shutdown gates, correlation-id validation, duplicate replacement, DropOldest with counted evictions, leak-proof subscribe failure cleanup — `SiteStreamGrpcServer.cs:253-385`); the client shares the proto→domain mapping; the actor copies the proven seed-then-stream/buffer/dedup/stability-window design from `DebugStreamBridgeActor` including its NUL-delimited three-part alarm key; the proto change is purely additive (new RPC + new request message).
- **Failure-mode thinking is visible everywhere in the new code:** seed fan-out degrades per-instance rather than failing whole; a failed *initial* seed keeps `IsLive` false so the page keeps polling; publish callbacks are exception-isolated outside the lock; the viewer cap rejects with a no-op disposable rather than throwing into a render.
- Docs were genuinely synchronized: `Component-StoreAndForward.md` (gate, resync, enqueue-only Send) and `Component-Communication.md` (U7 accepted-limitation) now match the code they describe.

---

## Severity tally — NEW findings only

| Severity | Count | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 1 | N1 (resync predicate inversion wipes the delivering node's buffer) |
| High | 1 | N2 (resync snapshot exceeds Akka remoting frame size — silently undeliverable) |
| Medium | 2 | N3 (`_sweepTask` clobbering defeats shutdown drain), N6 (no live-delta coalescing) |
| Low | 5 | N4 (validator gaps), N5 (resync/op race), N7 (aggregator lifecycle nits), N8 (standby aggregator + channel leak on site delete), N9 (dual-endpoint requirement) |

Both the Critical and the High are confined to the **peer-join anti-entropy resync** (PLAN-02 T20/T21) — the one round-2 feature that shipped without a two-node integration test — and both are small, well-localized fixes: swap two predicates to the existing shared helper, and chunk one message.
