# Shared Script-Analysis Consolidation (M3) — Design

**Status:** Proposed (awaiting approval)
**Supersedes:** the M3.1–M3.4 tasks in `docs/plans/2026-06-15-stillpending-phase1-implementation.md` (those assumed a contained "wire Roslyn into TemplateEngine.ScriptCompiler" change; this design replaces them with a consolidation, per the chosen approach).
**Worktree/branch:** `worktree-m3-script-trust-boundary`.

## Goal

Make the **design-time script trust gate authoritative** and eliminate the four-way
divergence in script trust enforcement by extracting one shared, authoritative
analyzer that every script call site delegates to.

## Background — the problem

Script trust enforcement (forbidden-API deny-list + compile) exists in **four**
places, each implemented differently, and they disagree:

| Site | File | Mechanism | Forbidden-API gaps |
|---|---|---|---|
| **TemplateEngine** (the deploy gate) | `Validation/ScriptCompiler.cs`, `ValidationService.cs` | **Fake**: substring scan + brace balancing | Bypassable by alias / `using static` / `global::`; no real compile. **This is the authoritative deploy-blocking gate** (`DeploymentManager.FlatteningPipeline`, `ManagementActor`). |
| **SiteRuntime** | `Scripts/ScriptCompilationService.cs` | Semantic symbol analysis + `CSharpScript.Compile` against real `ScriptGlobals` | No reflection-gateway hardening (`typeof(x).Assembly.GetType("System.IO.File")`). |
| **InboundAPI** | `ForbiddenApiChecker.cs` | Syntactic walker + reflection-gateway + `dynamic`/`Activator` hardening | Syntactic only (no symbol resolution); forbids all `System.Diagnostics`. |
| **CentralUI** | `ScriptAnalysis/ScriptAnalysisService.cs` (+ `SandboxScriptHost`) | Semantic + full `CSharpScript.Compile` against a globals stub | Lenient threading list (allows most `System.Threading`). |

The deploy gate — the one that actually blocks a bad script from shipping — is the
**weakest**. The strong machinery exists only in higher layers
(SiteRuntime/InboundAPI/CentralUI), which TemplateEngine cannot reference.

## Approach (chosen): extract a shared analyzer project

New project **`ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ScriptAnalysis`** sitting just above Commons
(references only `Commons` + `Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Scripting` +
`Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Workspaces`). The four call sites delegate to it.

### Public surface

1. **`ScriptTrustPolicy`** — the single source of truth for the trust model:
   - `ForbiddenScopes` (namespaces/types), `AllowedExceptions`,
     `ReflectionGatewayMembers`, `ForbiddenIdentifiers` (`dynamic`, `Activator`),
   - `DefaultReferences` (canonical script metadata references) + `DefaultImports`.
2. **`ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code, extraReferences?)`** — the
   **authoritative forbidden-API gate**. Fuses SiteRuntime's *semantic* symbol
   resolution (resolves aliases, `using static`, `global::`, transitive imports —
   inspects the resolved symbol, not the spelling) with InboundAPI's *syntactic*
   reflection-gateway / `dynamic` / `Activator` hardening. Needs **no** globals type.
   Returns violation messages; empty == clean.
3. **`RoslynScriptCompiler`** —
   - `Compile(code, globalsType?, extraReferences?, extraImports?)` → real
     `CSharpScript.Create(...).Compile()`, returns error diagnostics. Each caller
     passes **its own** `globalsType`.
   - `ParseDiagnostics(code)` → syntax-only diagnostics (for callers without globals).
4. **`ScriptCompileSurface`** / **`TriggerCompileSurface`** — lightweight
   **compile-only** globals stubs mirroring `ScriptGlobals` / `TriggerExpressionGlobals`
   member-for-member, depending only on `Commons.Types(.Scripts)`. **Never executed** —
   they exist purely so the deploy gate can bind real API-using scripts
   (`Attributes[...]`, `Notify.To(...).Send(...)`, `ExternalSystem.Call(...)`, …) and
   thus catch undefined-symbol / type errors at central validation time. Drift from the
   real globals is caught by a reflection parity test (below).

### Per-consumer migration (behavior-preserving delegation)

- **TemplateEngine** (`ScriptCompiler.TryCompile`): `FindViolations` +
  `RoslynScriptCompiler.Compile(code, typeof(ScriptCompileSurface))` → the deploy
  gate now does authoritative forbidden-API **and** a real type-checking compile.
  `ValidationService.CheckExpressionSyntax` → `FindViolations` + compile against
  `TriggerCompileSurface`. Delete `ForbiddenPatterns` + the substring scan. Add
  project ref to `ScriptAnalysis`.
- **SiteRuntime** (`ScriptCompilationService.ValidateTrustModel`): delegate to
  `FindViolations`; keep `CSharpScript.Compile` against the **real** `ScriptGlobals`
  for execution.
- **InboundAPI** (`ForbiddenApiChecker.FindViolations`): delegate to shared
  (reflection-gateway behavior preserved, now centralized).
- **CentralUI** (`ScriptAnalysisService.FindForbiddenApiUsages` / `ValidateTrustModel`):
  delegate to shared; keep the editor diagnostic-marker mapping and the Test-Run
  executing host (`SandboxScriptHost`, which fires real central services).

## Unified forbidden-API policy (strictest-safe union)

- **Forbid:** `System.IO`, `System.Diagnostics.Process`, `System.Threading`,
  `System.Reflection`, `System.Net`, `System.Runtime.InteropServices`, `Microsoft.Win32`.
- **Allow exceptions:** `System.Threading.Tasks`, `System.Threading.CancellationToken`,
  `System.Threading.CancellationTokenSource`.
- **Reflection-gateway members** (blocked on any receiver): `GetType`, `GetTypeInfo`,
  `Assembly`, `Module`, `CreateInstance`, `InvokeMember`, `GetMethod(s)`,
  `GetConstructor(s)`, `GetField(s)`, `GetProperty(ies)`, `GetMember(s)`,
  `GetRuntimeMethod(s)`, `MethodHandle`, `TypeHandle`.
- **Forbidden identifiers:** `dynamic`, `Activator`.

Three genuine conflicts between the current lists, resolved toward the actual runtime gate:

1. **`System.Diagnostics`** — InboundAPI forbids the whole namespace; SiteRuntime
   forbids only `.Process`. → **Forbid `.Process` only** (allow `Stopwatch`, `Debug`,
   `Activity`). *Slightly loosens InboundAPI on harmless types; matches the real runtime.*
2. **`System.Net`** — SiteRuntime forbids only `Sockets`+`Http`; others forbid all. →
   **Forbid all `System.Net`** (scripts use the `ExternalSystem` helper for HTTP).
   *Slightly tightens SiteRuntime; safe.*
3. **`System.Threading`** — CentralUI allows most of it. → **Forbid all except Tasks +
   CancellationToken(Source)** (matches the real runtime). *Tightens the CentralUI editor.*

**Net effect:** the unified policy ≈ SiteRuntime's runtime policy (the gate that
actually executes) + InboundAPI's reflection hardening + all-`System.Net` +
`InteropServices`/`Win32`. Because SiteRuntime already enforces ~this at execution
time, no script that currently deploys-and-runs newly breaks; several real gaps close
(the deploy gate becomes real; the editor stops under-warning; reflection escapes are
blocked everywhere).

## Layering / cycle check

`ScriptAnalysis → { Commons, Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.* }`. Referenced by TemplateEngine,
SiteRuntime, InboundAPI, CentralUI. None of those are referenced *by* Commons, and
ScriptAnalysis references none of them → **no cycles**.

## Test strategy

- **New `ScriptAnalysis.Tests`** — adversarial corpus that must all yield violations:
  namespace alias, `using static`, `global::`, `typeof(x).Assembly.GetType("System.IO.File")`,
  `dynamic`, `Activator`, `InteropServices`, `Microsoft.Win32`. Legit scripts must be
  clean: `await Task`, `Stopwatch`, LINQ, `Math`, `CancellationToken`. `ParseDiagnostics`
  catches syntax errors; `Compile(..., typeof(ScriptCompileSurface))` catches
  undefined-symbol/type errors **and** accepts real API-using scripts.
- **Drift parity test** — reflect over `ScriptGlobals` vs `ScriptCompileSurface` (and
  `TriggerExpressionGlobals` vs `TriggerCompileSurface`); assert public member-name parity
  so the stub can't silently drift.
- **Preserve & re-point existing tests** — `ScriptCompilerTests`,
  `ForbiddenApiCheckerTests`, `ScriptAnalysisServiceTests` (+ async-resolve, console),
  `ScriptCompilationServiceTests`, `TrustModelSemanticTests`, `SandboxTests` must stay
  green against the delegating implementations (adjust expected wording where messages change).
- **Adversarial deploy test** (TemplateEngine integration) — a bypass script **fails to deploy**.

## Migration sequencing

- **Wave 0 — spike (M3.0):** confirm `ScriptCompileSurface` can mirror `ScriptGlobals`
  with Commons-only deps; confirm package refs resolve in the new project.
- **Wave 1 — foundation (M3.1):** build `ScriptAnalysis` (policy + validator + compiler +
  surfaces) with its full test suite. Everything else depends on this.
- **Wave 2 — consumers (M3.2–M3.5, parallelizable, disjoint projects):** TemplateEngine ∥
  SiteRuntime ∥ InboundAPI ∥ CentralUI each delegate to the shared analyzer; each keeps
  its own tests green. *Pathspec commits to avoid shared-index contamination.*
- **Wave 3 — integration + docs (M3.6):** full-solution build; targeted tests across all
  five projects + adversarial deploy test; docs (Component-TemplateEngine / -SiteRuntime /
  -InboundAPI / -Commons, README + CLAUDE.md component list, remove the "SECURITY
  LIMITATION / advisory" notes now that the gate is real); fixture cleanup for any
  latent-invalid scripts the real compile surfaces.

## Risks

- **Policy change surfaces latent-invalid fixtures/scripts** — budgeted in Wave 3
  (same risk the original plan flagged for M3.4).
- **`ScriptCompileSurface` drift** vs real `ScriptGlobals` — mitigated by the parity test.
- **Touching four working, security-sensitive components** — mitigated by
  behavior-preserving delegation + keeping each consumer's existing tests + the
  classification-driven review chain (high-risk = serial spec→code review).

## Out of scope

- Physically unifying the **executing** globals types (`ScriptGlobals`, `SandboxScriptHost`)
  — they stay with their owners; only the compile-surface stub + trust policy are shared.
- A true runtime sandbox (restricted `AssemblyLoadContext` / out-of-process) — still
  future work; the static gate is defence-in-depth, as already noted in InboundAPI-015.
